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Abstract
This thesis covers several issues on fiscal policy behavior, business cycle fluctuations,
and labor market outcomes. It goes beyond of the standard axioms by taking the informal
economy as a source for shaping economic fluctuations. In fact, several macroeconomic
implications of the informal economy link the three, rather independent, essays.
Chapter 2 performs a systematic review of the literature on the cyclical behavior of
fiscal policy along three dimensions: (i) the set of theories, (ii) measurement of cyclicality
of fiscal policy, and (iii) empirical evidence. We observe that fiscal procyclicality in devel-
oping countries is a broad regularity whereas fiscal policy is generally countercyclical or
acyclical in more developed countries. We find that 36.3% of developed countries follow
countercyclical fiscal policy while only 3.5% of developing countries follow such policy
pattern. Credit constraints and political economy factors are usually taken to account for
fiscal procyclicality, but empirically they explain such procyclicality only about 33.5%
and 30.3%, respectively. We argue that the informal sector may also be an explanation in
determining fiscal procyclicality; but, to the best of our knowledge, the literature fails to
cover for this relationship.
Chapter 3 provides a set of business cycle regularities on the informal sector. We
estimate the size of the informal sector for 105 countries and summarize the findings with
10 stylized facts and 5 corollaries. We arrive at three key conclusions. First, the size
of informal sector is procyclical. Second, informal sector is linked to volatility of GDP.
Third, informal sector is positively associated to procyclicality of fiscal policy.
Chapter 4 builds a small, open, developing economy DSGE model. It considers three
alternative scenarios for financial integration under dual labor market segments. We find
that perfectly integrated economies react more smoothly to shocks. We also find that both
imperfections on credit markets and the size of the informal sector stand up as sources of
volatility in output and increase the degree of procyclical government consumption. The
model suggests that external finance premium and the informal sector (which behaves
procyclically) work under a complementary relationship.
Chapter 5 concludes and provides policy prescriptions and the path for future research.
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Suma´rio
Esta tese aborda va´rias questo˜es sobre comportamento da polı´tica fiscal, flutuac¸o˜es
macroecono´micas e resultados no mercado de trabalho. A tese vai ale´m dos axiomas
cla´ssicos, por considerar a economia informal uma fonte da prociclicidade da polı´tica
fiscal e das flutuac¸o˜es econo´micas. De facto, va´rias implicac¸o˜es macroecono´micas da
economia informal sa˜o comuns a treˆs capı´tulos independentes.
Capı´tulo 2 faz uma revisa˜o sistema´tica da literatura sobre a prociclicidade fiscal em
treˆs dimenso˜es: (i) teorias existentes para a prociclicidade fiscal, (ii) medidas da ciclici-
dade da polı´tica fiscal, e (iii) evideˆncias empı´ricas sobre as teorias existentes. Observamos
que a prociclicidade fiscal e´ uma regularidade extensa nos paı´ses em desenvolvimento, en-
quanto que polı´tica fiscal e´ contracı´clica ou acı´clica em paı´ses desenvolvidos. Enquanto
36.3% dos paı´ses desenvolvidos adotam polı´ticas fiscais contracı´clicas, apenas 3.5% dos
paı´ses em desenvolvimento seguem este padra˜o fiscal. Restric¸o˜es de cre´dito e fatores
polı´tico e institucionais sa˜o, geralmente, considerados causas da prociclicidade fiscal,
mas empiricamente apenas explicam esta prociclicidade cerca de 33.5% e 30.3%, respec-
tivamente. Argumentamos que o sector informal pode ser, tambe´m, uma explicac¸a˜o para
prociclicidade fiscal; mas, tanto quanto sabemos, a literatura desconsidera esta relac¸a˜o.
Capı´tulo 3 fornece um conjunto abrangente de regularidades cı´clicas do setor in-
formal. Estimamos a dimensa˜o da economia informal para 105 paı´ses e resumimos as
concluso˜es em 10 factos estilizados e 5 corola´rios. As treˆs prı´ncipais concluso˜es sa˜o:
primeiro, o sector informal e´ prociclica. Segundo, o sector informal relaciona positiva-
mente com prociclicidade da polı´tica fiscal. Terceiro, o sector informal e volatilidade
macroeconoˆmica esta˜o positivamente correlacionado.
Capı´tulo 4 desenvolve um modelo dinaˆmico de equilı´brio geral estoca´stico (DSGE)
onde se considera treˆs cena´rios alternativos de integrac¸a˜o financeira, sob dois segmentos
do mercado de trabalho. Concluı´mos que economias perfeitamente integradas reagem
menos a choques. Tanto imperfeic¸o˜es no mercado de cre´dito como o sector informal con-
stituem fontes da volatilidade econo´mica e da prociclicidade fiscal. Concluı´mos, tambe´m,
que pre´mio de risco e o sector informal (que e´ procı´clica) sa˜o complementares.
Capı´tulo 5 conclui, sugere recomendac¸o˜es de polı´tica e possı´veis futuras investigac¸o˜es.
iv
Contents
Biographical information i
Acknowledgements ii
Abstract iii
Suma´rio iv
List of figures viii
List of tables ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Definition of the informal sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Methods for estimating the size of the informal sector . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Informal sector, credit markets, and business cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Organization of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Procyclical Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries: A Bird’s Eye (Re)View 9
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Explaining procyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries . . . . . 11
2.2.1 Explanations based on credit market imperfections . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.2 Explanations based on political economy factors . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.3 Factors playing on the mechanisms for procyclical fiscal policy . 19
2.3 Testing for theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Overview and critical assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.1 Measurement bias in assessing procyclical fiscal policy . . . . . . 29
2.4.2 Endogeneity and omitted variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4.3 Identification problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
v
Informal Sector, Business Cycles, and Fiscal Policy
2.4.4 Additional explanation: the role of the informal sector . . . . . . 33
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3 Informal Sector Over The Business Cycle 40
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2 Estimates of the informal economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.1 Model to estimate the size of the informal economy . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.2 Sample and data filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3 Empirical facts of the informal economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.1 Long run features of the informal economy . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.2 Informal sector over the business cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4 Persistence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5 Informal economy and the official business-cycle regularities . . . . . . . 63
3.5.1 Informal economy and aggregate fluctuations . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.2 Informal economy and the cyclicality of macroeconomic aggregates 67
3.5.3 Informal economy and persistence of macroeconomic
aggregates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4 Financial Integration, Duality in Labor Markets and Business Cycles: A Tale
With Microfounded Roots. 70
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2.1 Informality, financial integration and economic responses . . . . . 71
4.2.2 Dual labor markets and search frictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3 Model set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.1 Labor market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3.3 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3.4 Nash bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3.5 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.6 Model closure and equilibrium conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4 Alternative financial market integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4.1 Complete asset markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4.2 Closed economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5 Dynamics of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5.2 Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
vi
Informal Sector, Business Cycles, and Fiscal Policy
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5 Conclusions of the thesis 98
5.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.2 Limitations, future research, and policy prescriptions . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2.1 Limitations and future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2.2 Policy prescriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Appendix A: Figures 105
A1 Relation between volatility of y and the size of s delivered by LQ. . . . . 105
A2 Relation between volatility of y and the size of s delivered by FD. . . . . 106
A3 Distribution of correlations between (yt) and st; yt and gt; st and gt; and
between (st + yt) and gt delivered by LQ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A4 Distribution of correlations between yt and st/st; yt and gt/yt; st/yt and
gt/yt; and between (st + yt) and gt/(st + yt) delivered by LQ . . . . . . 108
A5 Distribution of contemporaneous correlations between (yt) and (st); (yt)
and (gt); (st) and (gt); and between (st + yt) and (gt) delivered by FD. . 109
A6 Distribution of contemporaneous correlations between (yt) and (st); (yt)
and (gt); (st) and (gt); and between (st + yt) and (gt) delivered by FD. . 110
Appendix B: Derivations 111
B1 First order conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
B2 Economy’s resource constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
B3 Wage in the formal sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
B4 Unemployment and employments value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
B5 Employment dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
B6 Equilibrium conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
B7 Log-Linearized version of the equilibrium conditions . . . . . . . . . . . 118
B8 The steady state of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Annex 1: Classification of the countries 139
1.1 Poor Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
1.2 Emerging Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
1.3 Rich Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Annex 2: Estimates of the size of the informal sector 141
2.1 Poor countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
2.2 Emerging countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
2.3 Rich countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
vii
List of Figures
3.1 HP filter, λ = 100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 Log-Quadratic detrending (LQ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 The size of the informal sector over time (1980 to 2011) . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4 Distribution of correlations between yt and st; yt and gt; st and gt; and
between (st + yt) and gt delivered by HP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 Distribution of correlations between yt and st/st; yt and gt/yt; st/yt and
gt/yt; and between (st + yt) and gt/(st + yt) delivered by HP . . . . . . 54
3.6 Relation between volatility of yt and the size of the informal sector st/yt . 66
4.1 Dynamics of selected variables for alternative levels of financial integration 90
4.2 Dynamics of matches, searches, and vacancy for alternative levels of fi-
nancial integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 Effects of external finance premium on the dynamics selected variables . 93
4.4 Implication of Financial Integration on selected variables . . . . . . . . . 94
4.5 Implication of the informal sector on the selected variables . . . . . . . . 95
4.6 Effects of labor income tax on matches and on the size of the informal
sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
viii
List of Tables
1.1 Selected definitions of the informal sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1 Summary of evidence on existing explanations for fiscal procyclicality . . 28
2.2 Theoretical correlations of the selected fiscal variables with business cycle 29
2.3 Bibliometric summary: ∆ft = government consumption/spending . . . . 37
2.4 Continuation of Table 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5 Continuation of Table 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.1 Volatility of the selected variables: σz = standard deviation of variable zt 48
3.2 Correlation between the selected variables and output (yt), and output
inclusive the size of the informal sector, (st + yt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 Correlation of the component of output (yt) with the informal sector . . . 57
3.4 Autocorrelations of st, yt, ct, gt, it, xt,mt: ρ(zi,t,zi,t−1) = corr(zi,t, zi,t−1) . 59
3.5 Unit root test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.6 Persistence of st and yt over the phases of cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.7 Informal sector and official business cycle facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.1 Model Summary - Baseline model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2 Complete asset markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3 Closed economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.4 Summary of the calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5 Summary of the steady state values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.6 Qualitative co-movements of output with selected variables under alter-
native financial integration scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.1 Informal sector and cyclical properties of economic aggregates: stylized
facts and corollaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
The economies of developing countries are characterized by a large informal sector,
fragile financial markets and weak institutional framework when compared to developed
countries.1 These features seem to impose a divorce between developing and developed
countries, particularly, with regards to business-cycle properties and fiscal policy behavior
across the cycle. For instance, as is reported in Chapter 3, below, data support that de-
veloping economies are twice or more volatile than developed ones. Also, as is reviewed
in Chapter 2, conducting procyclical fiscal policy seems a general practice in developing
countries while, in general, such policy is countercyclical or, at worse, acyclical in devel-
oped countries. Can the size of the informal sector, imperfections in financial markets,
and the poor quality of institutional framework explain this apparent “divorce”?
Elgin and Uras (2013) report that, on average, the informal sector represents roughly
16% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in developed countries, whereas its size more than
doubles in the emerging economies, representing 38% of GDP in the period 1999-2007.
Also, according to Schneider (2002), the informal economy, in the year 2000, represented
41% of official Gross National Income (GNI) in developing countries, 38% in transition
countries and 18% in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries. In terms of economic activity (measured as percentage of total employment)
Bacchetta et al. (2009) report that the informal sector represents about 10% in developed
regions and roughly 60% in developing regions, in the year 2007. While a substantial
amount of literature has covered the implications of the informal economy to economic
growth (see, e.g., Loayza (1999) and the references therein), very few studies are available
on the business cycle properties of the informal sector and even fewer analyze the impacts
of the size of the informal sector on the behavior of fiscal variables over the cycle and the
official business cycle fluctuations. Therefore, on a financial integration framework, this
1Here, informality, informal output or informal sector or even, more generally, informal economy are
used interchangeably to refer all economic activities that take place outside of government control.
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thesis intends to contribute to fulfill this gap. It argues and shows that the informal sector
is of first-order importance in determining the business-cycle properties.
1.1 Definition of the informal sector
A first important issue is related to the definition of the informal sector (hidden, paral-
lel, underground, shadow, etc.). Since the mid-twentieth century, the informal dimensions
of organizational life have become increasingly recognized as an important topic by re-
searchers (Gouldner (1954), Blau (1957)). The earlier studies (e.g., Hart (1970; 1973))
focused mainly on the informal sector in developing countries. More recently, the infor-
mal sector in developed countries has gained an increasing interest among the researchers
(Gerxhani (2004)). Although initially it was considered to comprise only residual or
marginal activities, the informal sector is currently viewed as one of the central features
of economic and social dynamics for any country. The early works have focused mainly
on the conceptualization of the informal sector, on its significance and relation to the for-
mal sector (see, e.g., Hart (1970; 1972; 1973), Harding and Jenkins (1989), Hernando
(1990), Feige (1990) and Reed (1990)). Nevertheless, the disagreement over the defini-
tion of the informal sector has led researchers of several disciplines (e.g., labor economics,
sociology, macroeconomics, and statistics) to use different definitions of the informal sec-
tor, relying on political, economic, and social criteria and various sub-criteria, including
labor market features, tax evasion, regulation, and others. Table 1.1 summarizes the main
existing definitions of the informal economy according to economic criteria.
Table 1.1: Selected definitions of the informal sector
Criterion Definition Researchers
Labor markets (status
of labor)
The sum of all income-earning ac-
tivities with the exclusion of those
that involve contractual and legally
regulated employment
Harding and Jenkins (1989),
Renooy (1990) and Hart (1972)
Unreported income
(tax evasion)
The sum of all taxable money in-
come left unreported with the inten-
tion to evade taxes
Fezge (1981), Tanzi (1983),
Frey (1989), Cowell (1990),
Feige (1990)
Size of activity Measured as the number of people
employed in the informal sector
Sethuraman (1976)
Professional status
(informal workers)
The sum of all self employed, fam-
ily workers and domestic servants
Hart (1970; 1973)
Regulation (registra-
tion of an activity)
All establishments which are unreg-
istered and unlicensed
Swaminathan (1991)
National statistics
(GNP accounts)
All economic activities non re-
ported to official accounts
Fezge (1981)
The definition used in this thesis is more comprehensive with respect to the criteria.
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Chapter 3 estimates the informal sector in terms of official output. Chapter 4 takes infor-
mality in terms of total employment and so it employs labor market status, size of activity,
regulation, and professional status criteria.
1.2 Methods for estimating the size of the informal sector
The literature provides several methods for estimating the size of the informal econ-
omy. Among them, some have had more prominence in the empirical literature, such as
direct, indirect and latent variables approaches (for details, see, e.g., Schneider (2005)).
The direct approach relies basically on surveys and tax auditing on households and firms.
The resulting data are then used within a microeconometric model to estimate the size
of the informal sector (Isachsen and Strøm (1985), Mogensen (1995), Pedersen (2003)).
The main advantage of this method is that it uses more detailed information about the
shadow economy, but it is associated with endogeneity problem (arising from measure-
ment errors, selection bias and simultaneity) and, further, it does not allow for the anal-
ysis of the dynamics of the informal sector over time. The indirect approach makes use
of macroeconomic theory to estimate the size of the informal economy. In particular, it
relies on economic indicators that are supposed to contain information about the infor-
mal economy. Schneider (2005) identifies five indicators which are supposed to contain
such information: (i) the gap between national expenditure and income (e.g., used by
Park (1979), Petersen (1982), O’Higgins (1989); (ii) the gap between official and actual
labor force (see, e.g., Del Boca (1981), Contini (1982), O’Neill (1983); (iii) volume of
transactions as predicted by the quantity theory of money (see, e.g., Langfeldt (1982),
Boeschoten and Fase (1984), Feige (1996); (iv) the currency demand approach which
was used by Cagan (1958) and further developed by Tanzi (1983) and others; and (v)
the electricity consumption approach developed by Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) and
a series of works by Lacko´ (1996; 1998; 2000). For a comprehensive survey and criti-
cism on these approaches, see Schneider (2005) and the references therein. A third ap-
proach, the latent variables model, known as dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes
(DYMIMIC) model (see, for instance, Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984)), relies on the
assumption that there are multiple factors determining the size and the trend of the infor-
mal economy. This approach arises in order to overcome one of the fundamental critiques
to the direct and indirect approaches: the uniqueness of the determinants of the infor-
mal economy. This approach consists of two steps. In a first step a factor model is used
to estimate the latent variable (informal economy) and, in a second step, in a structural
econometric model framework, the coefficients which establish the relation between la-
tent variables are estimated. However, as with other approaches, it is liable to criticisms:
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it lacks a theoretical basis for the inclusion of the indicators as causes (Arias et al. (2007));
it lacks robustness to data transformations, to the units of measurement and to the sam-
ple used (Breusch (2005)).2 To overcome these weaknesses of DYMIMIC model, for
instance, Solomon (2011) makes use of a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model as a theoret-
ical framework to identify the causes and indicators to estimate the size of the informal
economy. Still in this vein, Elgin and Oztunali (2012) recognize that the shortcomings
transversal to all these models is the ad-hoc econometric specification and the absence
of microeconomic foundations. The authors propose a two-sector (formal and informal)
dynamic general equilibrium model to estimate the size of the informal economy. Orsi
et al. (2014) is another example of this method which relies on Bayesian estimation of a
DSGE model with Italian data.
Following Elgin and Oztunali (2012)’s approach, Chapter 3 estimates the size of the
informal sector for 105 countries (37 poor, 46 emerging and 22 rich countries). Then, it
provides a set of business cycle regularities on the informal sector as well as the relation-
ship between the informal sector with the key economic aggregates.
1.3 Informal sector, credit markets, and business cycle
The 2008 banking crisis and the resulting economic slowdown lay bare the stabiliza-
tion role of fiscal policy. At the same time, there is a recognition that flexible financial
markets would help that stabilization role, as it provides room for fiscal expansion which,
in turn, push down unemployment and foster economic growth in the short run. Oth-
erwise, when a negative economic shock impinges on a rigid financial framework, as is
the case of developing countries, policymakers are almost forced to orient spending in
the same direction as that of the cycle which, in turn, introduces additional volatility to
the economy. Indeed, imperfections in the financial markets in developing countries have
been strongly blamed for the observed procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries
as well as a source for the so-called small shock, large cycles puzzle (see e.g., Bernanke
et al. (1999) for an overview). The informal activity, however, seems almost ignored
in that story or, at least, placed in the background. While costly financing may foster
informality, this latter may in turn ward off foreign creditors by weakening the country
credibility as well as imposing an increased volatility in macroeconomic aggregates, re-
sulting in increased country risk premium. A similar argument may rely on the result of
Eslava et al. (2010). As referred in Bacchetta et al. (2009), firms facing capital shortages
are less likely to create formal jobs and so are prone to resort to the informal ones. Con-
versely, when firms face shortages in high skill labor, they are likely to opt for smaller
2For a detailed analysis of the DYMIMIC approach and its main criticisms, see Dell’Anno (2003).
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plant sizes, which potentially damage their ability to access financial markets. So when
negative shocks hit the economy, they undergo a decrease in production, investment and
spending amplifying the initial contractionary shock. In the same spirit, Elgin and Uras
(2013) show that a larger shadow economy size is associated with higher interest rates
and financial instability. Indeed, this thesis will show that the informal sector and imper-
fections in financial markets work under a complementary relationship.
While the role of credit markets on business cycle stabilization is relatively well docu-
mented in the literature, the implications of the informal sector are hardly addressed. This
can result from the nature of the informality: it can be just an independent activity and
so an alternative to formal sector, or it can be an activity that stems from the opportunity
provided by formal activities and so may be a complement to formal sector. In either case,
the informal economy reduces fiscal policy space by weakening the government’s ability
to collect tax revenues, as it operates outside taxation framework. C¸ic¸ek and Elgin (2011)
find evidence supporting a more pronounced procyclicality of fiscal policy in countries
with a larger size of the informal economy. Bacchetta et al. (2009) argue that the informal
sector may affect the effectiveness of fiscal policy because it is not covered by automatic
stabilizers. Therefore, Keynesian prescriptions may be constrained by the size of infor-
mality. This thesis will report a positive association between procyclical fiscal policy and
the size of the informal sector.
The dynamics of the informal sector across the phases of cycle is explained with two
opposite arguments. On the one hand, the countercyclical argument: whenever there is
a negative shock in the formal sector, individuals become more involved in the infor-
mal sector’s activities due to the lack of alternative ways of earning a living (O’Higgins
(1989), Lubell (1991)). Loayza and Rigolini (2006) joined this argument by presenting a
model where business cycle result from productivity shocks which affect the formal and
the informal economy in different ways, generating a countercyclical reaction for the lat-
ter. In their model, the informal sector is determined by its relative costs and benefits and
the distribution of workers’ skills. On the other hand, the procyclical argument consid-
ers that a positive shock on the formal economy leads an increase on the demand (direct
and indirect) for goods and services produced in the informal sector. In line, Fortuna and
Prates (1989) observe that, in developing countries, the prospering period of export of
manufactures entail high levels of benefit for entrepreneurs, use of advanced technology,
and growth in the scale of production. In addition, it fosters a process of informalization
disguised as small independent entrepreneurship (Gerxhani (2004)). Another argument
is that, during downturns, only the most productive firms survive and so those operating
informally would exit (Elgin (2012)). Empirical literature has supported the procyclical
arguments. For instance, Arias et al. (2007) find a positive relationship between the in-
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formal and the formal economy over the business cycle. Schneider (1998) reports that,
in Germany and Austria, at least two-thirds of the income earned in the informal econ-
omy are directly affected in the formal economy leading a positive effect on the formal
economy. Adam and Ginsburgh (1985), in a study for Belgium, also find evidence for
procyclical movements of the informal sector. Fiess et al. (2010) also find evidence for
expansionary episodes as a result of relative demand or productivity shocks to the non-
tradable (mostly of informal nature in their model). In accordance, this thesis will deliver
a procyclical informal sector either from the empirical exercises or from our theoretical
model.
1.4 Organization of the thesis
This thesis rolls over three topics: the cyclicality of fiscal policy in developing coun-
tries, business cycle regularities of the informal sector and its relation with key macroeco-
nomic aggregates, and finally, the implications of imperfections in financial markets and
the informal sector on business cycle fluctuations, on fiscal policy, and on labor market
outcomes. It also explores the interaction between the informal sector and imperfections
in credit markets. Therefore, the thesis consists of three stand-alone chapters, in addition
to this introduction and a final conclusion.
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the cyclicality of fiscal policy in developing coun-
tries comparing with that in developed ones, together with the literature rationale for the
differences. The majority of the literature finds evidence that fiscal policy in developing
countries is procyclical, contrasting with countercyclical or acyclical one in developed
countries. A first rationale advanced for this procyclicality bias is thanks to Gavin and
Perotti (1997). The authors argue that the loss of confidence and the resulting intensifi-
cation of borrowing constraints, particularly during bad times, are central in determining
fiscal procyclicality in Latin America. Alternatively, there are voracity effects arguments
(Tornell and Lane (1999)). According to this view, the ability to run large budget sur-
pluses in good times is severely hampered by political pressures that, although being
always present, are exacerbated in times of plenty. Therefore, additional fiscal resources
in good times are wasted in favor of rent-seeking groups, rather than being saved for
smoothing consumption in bad times.
To tackle the literature on this issue Chapter 2 reviews the literature on procyclicality
of fiscal policy on three perspectives: summarizes the theories for procyclicality of fiscal
policy, reviews alternative methods in the literature to assess cyclicality of fiscal policy,
and presents evidence-based literature from testing theories. Relying on signal and statis-
tical significance, evidence of cyclicality of fiscal policy are distributed among acyclical,
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countercyclical and procyclical for developed and developing countries.3 We observe that
fiscal procyclicality in developing countries is a broad regularity whereas fiscal policy
is generally countercyclical or acyclical in the more developed countries. Specifically,
while 36.3% of developed countries follow countercyclical fiscal policy, only 3.5% of
developing countries follow such policy pattern. Although credit constraints and political
economy factors are strongly used to justify fiscal procyclicality in developing countries,
evidence-based literature shows that they only explain such procyclicality about 33.5%
and 30.3%, respectively. Lastly, we provide a critical overview of the existing literature
as well as propose a discussion on why informality may be central in determining cyclical
stances of fiscal policy.
Chapter 3 assesses the business cycle features of the informal sector and its relation
with the key macroeconomic variables for three groups of countries: rich, developing,
and poor countries. While business cycle regularities have been largely studied in the
literature with reference to “official” or “observable” output, there is still no unified set of
stylized facts of the informal sector that may represent a large part of economic activity,
accounting in some countries, for roughly one half to two thirds of observable output. This
chapter provides extensive exercises on business cycle facts of the underground sector as
well as rationalizes how the informal and the formal sector are evolved. It first presents
estimates of the size of the informal economy using a general equilibrium model (GEM)
approach, and then provides a comprehensive set of business cycle regularities on the
informal sector. Chapter 3 addresses the following questions: 1) does the level of gross
domestic product (GDP) of a country matter for the size of the informal sector? 2) Does
the size of the informal sector affect the volatility of official output? 3) Does the size of
the informal sector move pro or countercyclically? 4) How persistent are the fluctuations
of the informal output? 5) Are fluctuations in the underground sector symmetric? 6) Does
the underground sector affect the cyclicality of fiscal policy?
Chapter 4 builds a small, open, developing economy DSGE model. It considers three
alternative scenarios for financial integration under dual labor market segments (formal
and informal). While the informal labor market is frictionless, formal labor market is
characterized by search and matching frictions a la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides and
the baseline model is characterized by frictions measured by country risk premium.
Since very early, it was recognized a persistent divisions among workers, working
in different labor market segments, with different working conditions, and promotional
opportunities (Reich et al. (1973)). Further, currently there is a growing recognition that
informality should be viewed not as a marginal or peripheral sector but, instead, as an im-
3While in respect to the size of the informal sector procyclicality (countercyclicality) means positive
(negative) relationship with official business cycle (GDP), in respect to fiscal policy variables, procyclicality
means that such policy behaves in a way that exacerbate the cycle.
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portant component of the whole economy (Chen (2005)). However, the perspectives with
which literature has been dealing with informality are not uniform. Among alternatives,
Chapter 4 follows the structuralist approach.4 Basically, it models a dual labor market in
a framework with trading frictions a la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides in which employ-
ment adjusts at the extensive margin. Accounting for trading frictions in labor market
allows to identify rules governing the flows between the formal sector, the informal sector
and the unemployment pool. Trading frictions, therefore, generate unemployment in the
steady state instead of a null-unemployment as in the general equilibrium models based
on Walrasian labor markets.
Chapter 4 deals with several issues. First, it looks at the dynamics of the informal
sector over the business cycle. This is done in three scenarios of financial integration:
a financial autarky model, a model with complete financial markets, and a single asset
model. Analyzing the dynamics of an economy at different scenarios of financial integra-
tion brings out the role of financial markets on business cycle fluctuations. To complement
this exercise, we also look at the responses of the economy for different sizes of external
finance premium. The results of both exercises are consistent. Further, this chapter per-
forms a number of exercises, such as the effect of financial integration on cyclicality of
fiscal policy, on volatility of output, on vacancies/unemployment, and on the size of the
informal sector. To put informality into perspective, this chapter also looks at the effects
of the informal sector on the cyclicality of fiscal policy, on volatility of output, on for-
mal matches and on unemployment. The results of these exercises are consistent with the
arguments presented in this thesis.
Chapter 5 provides a general conclusion of the thesis. It discusses some limitations of
the research as paths for future research, and sketches some policy prescriptions.
4Chapter 4 summarizes the three views of informality. For more information see, e.g., Chen (2005),
Hernando (1990) and Maloney (2004) for different views on informality.
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Chapter 2
Procyclical Fiscal Policy in Developing
Countries: A Bird’s Eye (Re)View
2.1 Introduction
Conventionally, the role of fiscal policy in stabilizing business cycles in developing
countries faces some meaningful constraints. While developed countries generally man-
age to pursue countercyclical fiscal policy by reducing spending or raising taxes during
economic upturns and enacting fiscal stimulus during downturns, developing countries
seem more prone to follow procyclical policies. This chapter, relying on both theoreti-
cal mechanisms and empirical evidence, aims at providing an assessment on fiscal policy
behavior in developing countries, contrasting with that in developed countries.
Keynesian models prescribe that fiscal policy should behave countercyclically as to
set the level of output as close as possible to its full employment flexible price level. Thus
fiscal authorities should increase consumption and/or lower tax rates during downturns
and follow the reverse whenever the economy is experiencing a boom. In turn, the clas-
sical view (the tax smoothing hypothesis in Barro (1979)) advises for a constant tax rate
over the business cycle. In regards to government consumption, however, the theories are
weaker: if government and private consumption enter separably in households’ utility, the
optimal policy should be to smooth government consumption over the business cycle; if,
instead, government and private consumption are complements (substitutes) we should
observe a procyclical (countercyclical) government consumption over the business cycle.
Therefore, while both procyclical, countercyclical, and acyclical government consump-
tion can be prescribed under the classical framework, Keynesian theory only prescribes
countercyclical public spending.
After the seminal work of Gavin and Perotti (1997), who first point out the procyclical-
ity phenomenon in Latin America, a growing body of theoretical and empirical literature
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has emerged in an attempt to explain why fiscal policy is procyclical in developing coun-
tries. Rather than feeding this literature with additional evidence, this work aims to put
this theoretical and empirical body on a lens. That is, it aims at reviewing the literature
on the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy in developing countries, comparing with that in
developed ones, enlightening the literature rationale for the differences. Taking a bird’s
eye view, we start by reviewing the existing explanations for procyclical fiscal policy and
then complement the analysis with related empirical evidence from the literature.
At reviewing the literature on the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy, we identify and
select the studies which use adequate fiscal instrument to estimate the cyclical instance
of fiscal policy as well as discriminating developing and developed countries. Then, by
recording the number of estimates of the cyclical stance of fiscal policy, we set up two
samples of estimates: one for developed countries of 160 observations and the other for
developing countries of 344 observations.
We observe that fiscal procyclicality in developing countries is a broad regularity,
while such policy is generally countercyclical or acyclical in the more developed coun-
tries.1 Specifically, relying on the sample for developed countries, we conclude that 36.3%
are countercyclical, while 24.4% are acyclical, summing up 60.6%. The picture is, how-
ever, different for developing countries. In a sample of 344 estimates, only 3.5% and
19.6% are, respectively, countercyclical and acyclical, 77% are procyclical (see Table 2.3
below). Still, among the studies which deliver procyclical fiscal policy in both group of
countries, 89% (17 out of 19) show that procyclicality is stronger in developing countries.
Therefore, these results seem to support the phenomenon termed “ when it rains, it pours”
by Kaminsky et al. (2004). We argue, however, that at the empirical ground, a deeper
analysis is in order, as most of the literature has not properly addressed at least one of
three: adequate concept, endogeneity, and identification problem. For instance, Ilzetzki
and Ve´gh (2008) by using various econometric methods, find overwhelming support that
fiscal policy is indeed procyclical in developing countries; but they also find substantial
evidence of procyclicality in high income countries. We observe that, among the studies
that use policy instrument, only 16.6% have taken into account endogeneity problem.
Similarly, we record the evidence from the selected literature which test the exist-
ing theories. We discriminate the existing theories between credit constraints and polit-
ical economy channels. We conclude that, although theoretically the literature strongly
blames credit constraints and political economy factors for the observed procyclical fiscal
policy, empirically such channels seem weak in explaining the procyclicality of fiscal pol-
1We are referring to estimates of fiscal cyclicality resulting either from correlation function or regression
based measures. The results are restrict to studies that only use fiscal instruments. Therefore, results based
on tax rates are neglected since the literature very rarely use such fiscal policy indicator due to the non-
existence of systematic data on tax rates for a large number of countries.
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icy. Analytically speaking, in regards to credit channel based explanation, in a sample of
218 results, we conclude that only 33.5% support that relaxing credit constraints provide
room for conducting countercyclical fiscal policy, while 56.5% constitute the evidence
that such factors have no effect on cyclicality of fiscal policy. Results relying on political
economy channel appear to distribute symmetrically among positive, negative, and null
effects on fiscal procyclicality (see Table 2.1). However, these result may exhibit some
caveats. While the literature takes credit constraints and political economy as alternative
explanations for fiscal procyclicality, we argue that they are not alternative explanations
but complementary, being political economy theoretically dominant: if there was no pro-
cyclicality during expansion phases, there would not be procyclicality during recessions.
Furthermore, developing countries are the default recipients of FDI inflows due to lower
labor costs and higher marginal productivity of capital. In spite of that, their fiscal policy
mostly behaves procyclically. We end this chapter by bringing informality to this research
arena.
In what follows, we first review the existing theories for procyclical fiscal policy in
section 2.2. Section 2.3 looks at the evidence for each of these theories, while section 2.4
provides a critical assessment. Conclusion is presented in section 2.5.
2.2 Explaining procyclicality of fiscal policy in develop-
ing countries
Why does fiscal policy often presents procyclical behavior in developing countries?
Several explanations have been advanced to explain this bias. These explanations follow
under two main strands: credit market imperfections, which arise either due to incom-
plete markets or due to borrowing constraints, and political economy explanations. While
credit market imperfections manifest, mainly, during downturns, leading policymakers
to a cut in spending and/or to increase taxes, political economy factors act mostly as a
phenomenon of good times with room for fiscal profligacy. Putting differently, a strong
institutional framework plays a key role in stabilizing business cycle fluctuations by con-
trolling for corruption, by attenuating policy bias and common pool problems. For several
reasons, further explored below, developing countries appear to be a working place for
these phenomena rather than developed ones.
2.2.1 Explanations based on credit market imperfections
Developing countries are often characterized by fragile financial markets and low fi-
nancial integration, when compared to industrial economies; moreover, recent progres-
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sion was done at a slow path (Prasad et al. (2003)). Such constraint may impinge on the
stabilization role of fiscal policy, determining procyclicality, namely, during the negative
phases of the cycle.
Indeed, fiscal space and/or external financing are preconditions for political authorities
to enact on expansionary fiscal policy. If there are no credit constraints, in the sense
that all, private and public, agents have easily and costlessly access to credit, we should
observe smooth consumption over the business cycle. In such scenarios fiscal policy
behaves as predicted by Barro’s tax smoothing model: negative (positive) correlation
between deficits (tax revenue) and business cycle. Under credit constraints, however,
optimal fiscal policy depends on its effects on aggregate demand and on how it interacts
with imperfections in credit markets. If fiscal policies have an expansionary effect on
aggregate demand, as predicted by Keynesian models, then it is optimal for fiscal policy
to be countercyclical to help households to smooth consumption and firms to carry out
new investment when credit constraint is tighter (e.g., subsiding innovative investment
spending during downturns). However, when both government and households are credit
constrained, the stabilization role of fiscal policy may become ineffective, giving rise
to procyclical behavior rather than a countercyclical one. This procyclicality bias arises
either due to the positive comovement between government revenue and business cycle,
forcing government to cut in spending, or even to increase taxes, during downturns, to
offset the decline in revenue and thus to comply with its (external) obligations (because
of the lack of external financing); or, as Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) put, if a
country faces quantity credit constraints on its borrowing, procyclical fiscal policy may
be contractionary. So, fiscal authority may find optimal to conduct a procyclical fiscal
policy.
Therefore, linking procyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries to the worse
conditions of financial markets is not empty of rationality. In fact, imperfections in the
credit markets are larger in developing countries than in developed ones. For instance, as
argued in Cuadra et al. (2010), governments in developed countries issue a wider range
of type of assets than governments in developing countries. Furthermore, in contrast
to governments in developing countries, governments in developed countries are able
to manage a wide range of maturities of non-contingent debt allowing them to keep a
constant tax rate over the business cycle. That is, government in developed economies,
by managing a wide range of maturities of non-contingent debt, are able to replicate
the state-contingent debt, hence achieving a smoother role of fiscal policy. In addition,
because developing countries experience higher volatility than developed countries, it is
most likely the former to face rising spreads on sovereign debt, making these countries
subject to severer credit constraints, particularly, during downturns.
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The idea that credit constraints lead to procyclical behavior of fiscal policy arose,
perhaps, with the work of Gavin et al. (1996) and that of Gavin and Perotti (1997). By
conducting a series of exercises, Gavin and Perotti (1997) observe that fiscal policy in
Latin America, in contrast to the industrial economies, has been an economic destabilizing
business-cycle factor. The exercises lead the authors to argue that conditions of access to
credit markets are the main cause for the empirically sub-optimal fiscal policy observed in
Latin America. In turn, Gavin et al. (1996) also observe that, for each dollar increased in
the OECD economies, 25 cents is absorbed in the form of a large fiscal surplus, while in
Latin America this metric is very small only of about 5 cents. Further, that this stabilizing
fiscal response of OECD budgets is the results of a fairly large increase in taxes combined
with a very small public spending response, while in Latin America the failure of fiscal
surplus is due to a strongly procyclical response of public spending. As Gavin and Perotti
(1997), the authors also blame the constraints on Latin America’s access to international
capital markets for this destabilizing role of fiscal policy. More specifically, the argument
is that Latin America region has a precarious relationship with international financial
markets which creates frequent need for destabilizing (procyclical) fiscal adjustments, and
thus exacerbating cycles. Indeed, the authors show that a one percentage point increase
in the US interest rate is associated with an increase in the stripped yield of 2 percentage
points in Mexico, 3 percentage points in Argentina, and more than 5 percentage points in
Venezuela.
Following these seminal works, a vast amount of theoretical models, embodying some
kind of financial frictions, emerge in an attempt to simulate the procyclical pattern of fis-
cal policy. A subset of these studies (including Riascos and Ve´gh (2003), Mendoza and
Oviedo (2006), Doda (2007), and Sarker (2009)) places the lack of a rich menu of finan-
cial assets at the core of procyclicality of fiscal policy. For instance, Riascos and Ve´gh
(2003) argue that the cyclical behavior of government consumption is entirely consistent
with neoclassical fiscal explanations. Accordingly to the authors, all we need is a com-
plete credit market in the sense of Arrow-Debreu. They solve the Lucas-Stokey-Ramsey
problem for a small open economy with complete markets, where endogenous govern-
ment consumption provides direct utility to the households. Under complete markets, the
optimal fiscal policy, in the sense of Ramsey planner, is to smooth the public consump-
tion across the state of economy; in turn, under incomplete markets, the optimal pattern of
fiscal policy should be procyclical. In fact, with complete markets, they show that the cor-
relation between government consumption and output is zero (consistent with empirical
evidence for industrial and G-7 countries; see, e.g., Talvi and Ve´gh (2005)), while with
only risk-free debt (used as indicator of incomplete asset markets) this correlation lays
between the [0.7-1.0] range. The procyclicality of fiscal policy arises as follows: because
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of absence of state contingent claims, in bad times, the economy is unable to borrow as
much as it would do under complete markets (with enough state contingent claims), lead-
ing private households to consume less. The decline in private consumption will lead to a
positive correlation between consumption and GDP. The government, in turn, is not able
to smooth consumption and thus consumes more in good times and less in bad times. The
combined effects reinforce business cycle fluctuations. However, Sarker (2009) observes
that if one introduces the existing trade-off between consumption and leisure in the en-
dowment economy model of Riascos and Ve´gh (2003), then the completeness of financial
markets does not matter, because, in any case, the model will deliver a procyclical pattern
of both private and public consumption. Thus drawing on Kaminsky et al. (2004)’s re-
sults, Sarker presents an extension of Riascos and Ve´gh (2003)’s work to capture the basic
features of the business cycle data in developing countries such as procyclical capital flow
and countercyclical interest rates. Basically, contrary to incompleteness of credit markets
taken by Riascos and Ve´gh (2003), the author considers that the risk premium faced by a
country is a positive function of debt an negative function of output. Thus households and
government face higher interest rates whenever borrowing pressures increase and eco-
nomic recessions take place. Therefore, during bad times any attempt by government to
conduct a countercyclical fiscal policy is hampered by the high interest rates and tends to
increase this latter even further. This conflict leads to an increase in the tax rate while the
government debt declines leading to a procyclical fiscal policy.
The work of Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) and that of Doda (2007) have some aspects
in common. While in Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) financial markets are incomplete not
only domestically but also in the sense that economy has only access to international con-
tracts in a non-state-contingent way and on which default is rule out, in Doda (2007) in-
completeness results from the absence of a domestic financial market and on a framework
that only government has access to international capital markets, and in which default
is possible. In Doda (2007)’s model, the procyclical fiscal policy arises due to the lack
of government’s commitment to comply with its external obligations (causing the interest
rate to increase, depending on the state of economy); in the Mendoza and Oviedo (2006)’s
model, government can only issue non-state-contingent debt such that the smoothing role
is unattainable. Doda (2007)’s model is calibrated to Argentina, and shows a procycli-
cal government expenditure and countercyclical labor income tax; the model of Mendoza
and Oviedo (2006) does a good job in mimicking some empirical regularities of destabi-
lizing fiscal policy in Mexico. Guerson (2003) joins to this argument by stating that the
core element driving procyclical fiscal policy is the possibility of foreign default. Model’s
mechanism considers that marginal increases in the stock of public debt are accompanied
by an increased probability of default which, in turn, pushes up the interest rate. There-
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fore, interest rate affects economy either through higher debt service costs or by reducing
private investment. Because both effects make the expected aggregate consumption next
period to fall, the government optimally avoids fully cushioning a decline in aggregate
consumption in low states.
In addiction to the previous studies, Cuadra et al. (2010) and Suzuki (2015) follow
the seminal study on international lending and sovereign default by Eaton and Gerso-
vitz (1981) to rationalize these stylized facts on fiscal variables in developing countries.
In Cuadra et al. (2010) market is incomplete in the sense that there is only one period
non-contingent bond. The unenforceability of contracts and the option to default on out-
standing debt give rise to country spread, leading to procyclical interest rate.2 Thus fiscal
authority finds it optimal to rely more heavily on taxation rather than external borrowing
to finance public expenditures in bad times, and vice versa in good times. The model does
a good job in matching business-cycle properties of Mexican economy. In a similar vein,
Suzuki (2015) relies on endogenous default model but in a contrasting framework be-
tween developing and developed countries. That is, Suzuki (2015) contrasts the business
cycle properties in developed with developing countries, and summarizes four stylized
facts for these two group of countries:
(i) government consumption is extremely volatile when compared with GDP
and with private consumption in developing and emerging markets countries,
although this is not necessarily the case in developed countries; (ii) govern-
ment consumption is procyclical in developing and emerging market coun-
tries, whereas it is acyclical or weakly procyclical in developed countries;
(iii) government consumption is less procyclical than private consumption in
developing and emerging markets countries; and (iv) transfer payments are
highly volatile and procyclical in emerging market countries, whereas it is
countercyclical in developed countries (Suzuki (2015) pp. 252-253).
Relying on these facts and on seminal work by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Suzuki (2015)
argues that the lack of coercive methods to enforce repayments of debts delivers an op-
tional default to the government, being defaulting option the driver for procyclical fis-
cal policy. Actually, Suzuki develops two models with and without default option in
sovereign borrowings. The defaulting model calibrated to the Argentina economy yields
procyclical government consumption and transfer payments, while the non-defaulting
model calibrated to the Canadian economy delivers countercyclical transfer payments.
Modeling financial frictions has not been limited to the so-called completeness of
financial markets. Indeed, another subset of studies has taken financial frictions as being
2Note that, accordingly to our working concepts, procyclical interest rate means a negative correlation
between output and interest rate, e.g., interest rates increases during downturns amplifying downturns.
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a limited access to the world capital markets. The premise is that imperfect or costly
access to the world capital markets leads fiscal authorities in developing countries to cut
in spending and raise taxes during economic downturns. Models accounting to this kind of
financial frictions include those of Aizenman et al. (2000), Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2004), Aguiar et al. (2005), Demirel (2010) and Kuralbayeva (2013).
The access to the international credit markets in Aizenman et al. (2000) is determined
by the efficiency of the tax system. Because developing countries are characterized by
inefficient tax system and volatile tax base, defaulting scenarios and the resulting bor-
rowing constraints emerge. The key model’s results is that, under this framework, large
recessions will force the government to hit its credit ceiling, leading to increased tax rates
when output and tax base decline; this is a fiscal procedure at odds to the tax-rate smooth-
ing in Barro (1979). In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) is the lack of financial depth
(supply of funds available to the government and private sectors) that determines the pro-
cyclical behavior of fiscal policy. That is, the supply of funds to developing countries is
limited to small set of specialist investors (those that have knowledge on political and ex-
change rate risk, on the degree and types of corruption, and on the corporate and judicial
system operating in developing countries). Because public sector competes with private
sector in absorbing this limited amounts of fund, fiscal policy is constrained in a way that
can overturns standard Keynesian fiscal policy prescriptions. In Demirel (2010), finan-
cial frictions are captured by a country risk premium. Demirel shows that whenever the
economy faces an adverse shock, in the presence of the country spread, optimal fiscal and
monetary policies as well as capital flows are procyclical, while in the absence of country
spread, optimal macroeconomic policies and capital flows become countercyclical.
Aguiar et al. (2005) show that a simple model of capital taxation with limited com-
mitment can explain the procyclical behavior of fiscal policy observed in developing
economies. Basically, the authors model a developing economy with limited access to
financial markets and where a government, unable to commit to tax policy, plays a re-
distributive role. Government regulates the economy through linear taxes and subsidies
levied on several income sources. The economy is populated by two groups: a significant
fraction of workers (with inelastic labor supply, risk averse behavior and with no access
to financial markets), and a fraction of capitalists that invest in physical capital. In order
to maximize the workers’ utility, the government insure the workers against intra-period
risk by taxing capital income while subsidizing labor in bad times, and, conversely, sub-
sidizing capital while taxing labor income in good times; generating procyclical taxes on
capital (e.g., amplifying cycle phases). More specifically, Aguiar et al. (2005) show that
if the government lacks the ability to commit to future fiscal policies, the best fiscal pol-
icy available exacerbates cycles, while if government could fully commit, the optimal tax
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policy plan is done in such a way that the expected capital tax payments are zero, keeping
investment constant.
Kuralbayeva (2013) starts by observing that in high-income countries (G-7), real gov-
ernment expenditure is countercyclical, while in developing countries (8 Latin America
countries) is procyclical. Further, though the two components of public expenditure (pub-
lic consumption and public investment) tend to be procyclical in both countries groups,
they are far more procyclical in developing countries. Following these observations, the
author uses a vector autoregression (VAR) to evaluate the effects of commodity prices
shock on public investment and public consumption. The model is estimated with quar-
terly data from Colombian economy covering period from 1977Q1 to 2011Q2. The author
finds that one-standard-deviation shock to the oil prices leads to a significant hump-shaped
responses of both public investment and public consumption, in a procyclical fashion. Ku-
ralbayeva (2013) rationalizes these empirical patterns of fiscal policies due to country’s
conditions of access to international capital markets. The author provides a DSGE model
with public investment and public consumption, and explores how the optimal choice of
fiscal policy in face of an adverse external shock varies with the degree of access to in-
ternational capital markets. The simulated results show that it is optimal for developed
countries to borrow from abroad to protect public expenditure and to reduce taxes to pro-
tect private consumption, while in developing countries it is optimal to adjust internally
because of the higher cost of using external funds. Therefore, the access to international
capital markets helps developed countries to conduct a countercyclical fiscal policy, while
in developing countries optimal fiscal policy should be procyclical due to the higher costs
of using external funds.
As we have seen above, credit channel has been at the core of a number of studies
that explain procyclicality of fiscal policy observed in developing countries, in opposition
to that observed in developed countries. The rationale is that the lack of a rich menu of
financial assets and/or lack of access or costly access to capital markets makes expansion-
ary fiscal policy costly or unfeasible. But does this mechanism really works to justify the
observed differences? To answer the question, Section 2.3 looks at the existing evidence
on credit channel explanations. In what follows we briefly review the political economy
motivation for procyclical fiscal policy.
2.2.2 Explanations based on political economy factors
Arguably, as Talvi and Ve´gh (2005) state, if governments in developing countries
are aware of the limits to access international credit markets during bad times, it would
rationally seek for a larger buffer during expansions, being the policy even more coun-
tercyclical, at least during expansions, than in developed countries. Although this argu-
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ment attempts to present a mechanism that would enable developing countries to conduct
macro-policies in a stabilizing or neutral way, the explanation for the procyclicality of fis-
cal policy in developing countries goes beyond the failures to access international credit
markets. Indeed, Gavin and Perotti (1997) believe that political distortions might be part
of the story.
The political distortion is documented, e.g., in Tornell and Lane (1999), as the “vorac-
ity effects” from groups of pressure. Developing countries are characterized by multiple
powerful groups, weak legal and political institutions, and where property rights in the
formal sector are not properly accounted for. Hence, whenever there is a positive shock
on the country’s resources or fiscal revenues, the groups compete to get the highest pos-
sible share of wealth by demanding more transfers from the government; therefore, this
induces higher government spending in good times, leading to a procyclical behavior of
government spending. According to Eichengreen et al. (1999), the procyclicality arises
due to the lack of mechanisms to coordinate political pressures during expansionary peri-
ods. That is, uncoordinated interests towards common resources (mostly during business
cycle peaks) tend to internalize the benefits of specific public expenditure programs, but
not the full budgetary costs involved. So, each group exerts political pressure in favor
of a given expenditure from which it can derive benefits (common pool problem). Since
the price of public goods is not adequately set (being set below the market price) and thus
does not provide a correct signal to the underlying costs, the lack of mechanisms (as is the
case for developing countries) to coordinate for these pressures will give rise to excessive
expenditure in booms.
Talvi and Ve´gh (2005) develop an optimal fiscal policy model a la Lucas and Stokey
(1983) with a political distortion embedded. This distortion works in the sense to press
increases of public spending, mostly in times of plenty. Because the tax base is more
volatile in developing countries than in developed ones (as observed by the authors), tax
smoothing would imply running large budget surpluses in good times together with large
budget deficits in bad times. However, tax smoothing falls to emerge because running
large budget surpluses in good times is costly in face of political pressures towards pub-
lic spending. Therefore, optimal fiscal policy can involve lowering taxes in good times
to fend off public spending pressures. But, because taxes lead to economic distortions,
optimal policy response to positive shocks in the tax base should involve both fiscal in-
struments: combining a decrease in tax rate with an increase in spending, rather than just
a large decrease in the tax rate. As for the results, while for the G-7 countries the correla-
tion between the cyclical components of government consumption and output is negative,
for developing countries such correlation is positive.
Other arguments, such as of Woo (2009), take social polarization of preferences as a
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coordination failure in collective action. The intuition is that different preferences about
fiscal policy give rise to conflicts of interests between policymakers, which propagates
to fiscal policy leading to a procyclical pattern. Woo (2009) formalizes this hypothesize
by developing a model of fiscal policy in which social polarization of preferences may
generate fiscal procyclicality and fiscal volatility. The motivation is that polarized pref-
erences incentive policymakers to carry out their preferred public spending, which may
be individually rational, but collectively inefficient for the economy as a whole. Such
incentive is stronger during good times, when rising government revenues or newly avail-
able resources make their agenda more feasible, leading to procyclical fiscal policies.
Indeed Woo (2009) shows that countries with highly polarized societies tend to exhibit
more procyclical fiscal policy. In that same spirit, Ilzetzki (2011) proposes a model in
which the features of developed countries are captured by a time-consistent benchmark
model yielding countercyclical policy. However, in modelling developing countries, sev-
eral distortions were considered. First, it assumes a political distortion emerging from
disagreement over the distribution of public goods between alternative governments. Be-
cause the incumbent government knows (or is almost sure) that its successor will benefit
an unpreferable political fraction, it saves less and spends more when more tax revenues
are available, making fiscal policy procyclical. Second, the model also takes into account
that credit constraints and macroeconomic volatility are also causes of procyclicality of
fiscal policy in developing countries. The author concludes that political distortion, which
results from different preferences between successive governments, can explain the pro-
cyclical behavior of fiscal policy in developing countries better than the presence of credit
constraints and/or macroeconomic volatility.
Alesina et al. (2008) join to this wisdom. The authors use principal-agent model to
explain procyclicality bias in developing countries. The procyclicality of fiscal policy
arises because of information asymmetry: voters observe the state of economy but cannot
observe how much of tax revenue is appropriated by government as rents. The former
face corrupt governments and expect the latter to appropriate part of tax revenues for
unproductive public goods. This environment leads to political distortion such that, during
a boom, voters demand for higher utility for themselves in the form of lower taxes or
better/more public goods. This forces governments into procyclical public spending and
even borrowing during expansions.
2.2.3 Factors playing on the mechanisms for procyclical fiscal policy
To provide loans to domestic borrowers (government or private sectors), foreign lenders
take in to account not only the private agents’ credit risk but also the overall country risk
to assess the ability of the domestic borrowers to repay debt. Such risks are linked to inter-
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nal factors such as institutional quality, corruption, the workings of the political system.
These factors have impacts on the risk premium on domestic loans and, therefore, affect
the credit channel, e.g., through relaxing or retracting credit constraints. Moreover, other
forms of international financing, namely foreign aid, foreign direct investment inflows as
well as others sources of internal financing, e.g., deficit monetization, may relax credit
constraints. In this section we review the literature on the role of a set of factors such as:
(i) foreign aid and investment inflows, (ii) institutional framework, and (iii) the role of
monetary policy on driving procyclical fiscal policy. Moreover, some of these factors also
shape political pressures, as is certainly the case of the quality of institutions.
2.2.3.1 Foreign aid and investment inflows
External financial flows provide alternative financing forms for government. Indeed,
these flows are substantially linked to developing countries either because of low-income
eligibility criteria (foreign aid) or due to the attractiveness of lower labor costs in the
global chain production (foreign direct investment). Both flows lead to foreign reserve
accumulation to, eventually, support government financing directly or indirectly through
the banking system or even to improve the country’s credibility in regards to external
lenders. For instance Caldero´n and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) show that fiscal policy in
Latin America and Caribbean is countercyclical under high credibility.
Whether, on the one hand, external flows relax credit constraints and thus enabling
countercyclical policies during downturns, they can, on the other hand, also promote pro-
cyclical fiscal policies during upturns, if the political economy channel dominates. Inter-
national capital inflows may create fiscal space for policymakers to conduct fiscal policy
discretionarily even if it is sub-optimal for the economy as a whole. For example, Lledo´
et al. (2011) using a panel data covering period from 1970 to 2008, for 44 sub-Saharan
African countries, identify larger fiscal space with lower external debt and the access to
concessional financing international aid flows. While Lledo´ et al. (2011) conclude that
these factors are important to diminish procyclical fiscal policy in sub-Saharan African
countries, as they relax credit constraints; Thornton (2008) provides evidence that gov-
ernment consumption is more procyclical in countries that are more reliant on foreign
aid inflows and that are less corrupt, which may be an evidence that political channel
dominates.
Zhou (2009) investigates, empirically, the relation between the cyclicality of fiscal
policy and the demand for international reserves in developing countries and how this
relationship is affected by political risk and the conditional access to capital markets. The
data comprises periods from 1980 to 2005 for 60 developing countries. He finds evi-
dence that demand for international reserves has effect on cyclical stance of fiscal policy.
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Specifically the evidence is that in developing countries with low political risk, coun-
tercyclical fiscal policy is associated with higher international reserves holdings in bad
times. Moreover, this relationship is stronger when countries with low political risk rely
heavily on external financing. The intuition is based on Aizenman and Marion (2004)’s
model. The model predicts that a country with volatile output, inelastic demand for fiscal
spending, inefficient tax collection system and sovereign risk tends to accumulate both in-
ternational reserves and external debt. While the external debt is used to smooth volatility
in output, international reserves are used to smooth consumption when default on exter-
nal debt occurs. Such precautionary reserve accumulation enables governments to pursue
countercyclical fiscal policy during economic downturns.
2.2.3.2 Institutional framework
Democracy with appropriate checks and balances improves macroeconomic manage-
ment including the room for countercyclical fiscal policy (Persson et al. (1997)). Indeed,
the political channel explanations for procyclical fiscal policy operate in a weaker way in
the presence of particular rules, regulations or independent institutions that monitor the
way budgets are drafted, approved, and carried out. Therefore, it is expected that better
institutional environment is able to promote countercyclical fiscal policy.
Caldero´n and Hebbel (2008) and Slimane and Tahar (2010) provide evidence that
countries with poor institutions find difficulty in conducting countercyclical fiscal policy.
Khan (2011) examines how institutional quality affects the cyclicality of fiscal policy in
28 Asian countries. He concludes that the higher is the level of corruption in a country, the
stronger is the procyclicality of fiscal policy; however, he does not find a clear relation-
ship between democracy and fiscal policy behavior. Truly, the results indicate a positive
correlation between fiscal procyclicality and corruption and that procyclicality of fiscal
policy is observed mainly in developing and low-income countries, where corruption is
more prevalent. Still, similar results are also provided by Alesina et al. (2008) and Hal-
land and Bleaney (2011). Alesina et al. (2008), using annual data from 1960 to 2003 for
83 countries (OECD and non-OECD), find that procyclical fiscal policy is more prevalent
in more corrupt countries and that the correlation between corruption and procyclicaclity
is mainly present in democracies. However, the correlation between corruption and pro-
cyclicality when the borrowing constraint is taking into account leads ambiguous results.
Halland and Bleaney (2011)’s results also show, among several determinants, that corrup-
tion and democracy are the most important for procyclicality of fiscal policy in developing
countries, but not the combination of corruption and democracy as in Alesina et al. (2008).
Contrasting to the positive effect of corruption on procyclical fiscal policy, Thornton
(2008) provides evidence that government consumption is more procyclical in less cor-
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rupt and less democratic countries. Caldero´n et al. (2004) argue that the lack of strong
institutions and robust policy rules prevent countries of conducting contractionary poli-
cies during booms and expansionary policies during recessions. Indeed, by using a panel
data set with 20 emerging-market economies covering from 1990 to 2003, they provide
evidence that countries with weak institutions are less able to conduct a countercyclical
fiscal policy, since the coefficient on the interaction of the Index of International Coun-
try Risk Guide (proxy for institutional quality) with the output gap reveals to be positive
and statistically significant. Caldero´n and Hebbel (2008) complemented and improved
the Caldero´n et al. (2004)’s study by using a larger sample of countries and time periods.
They find that countries with “poor” institutions or, as already referred above, with lack of
access to international capital markets are unable to conduct countercyclical fiscal policy.
Further, they conclude that the effects of institutional factors on the different behaviors of
fiscal policy between developing and industrial countries are larger than those associated
with financial factors. Manasse (2006) concludes that fiscal rules and fiscal responsibility
laws seem to enhance countercyclical policy and that institutional quality has different
effects on procyclicality of fiscal policy, depending of phases of cycle.
In addition to the above mentioned factors, there exists a significant difference in
budgetary institutions between developing and developed countries. While the former is
characterized by weak budget institutions, where numerical targets and formal constraints
on spending and fiscal deficit that may exist in paper are not be binding in practice, which
breaks new ground for common pool phenomenon described in Tornell and Lane (1999),
developed countries have relatively sound budgetary institutions which makes authorities
less prone to rent-seeking influences (Allen (2009)). Furthermore, as is argued in Dabla-
Norris et al. (2010), weak budget institutions heighten concerns about government cred-
itworthiness and fiscal sustainability, which may exacerbate financing constraints. For
instance, while Gavin and Perotti (1997) argue that concerns about creditworthiness and
sustainability are central to determining fiscal policy stances, Alberola et al. (2006) pro-
vide evidence that actually such concerns play a key role in explaining Latin America’s
fiscal behavior and the procyclical bias of fiscal policy.
Dabla-Norris et al. (2010) use multi-dimensional indices of the quality of budgetary
institutions in 70 low-income countries, from 2000 to 2009, and provide evidence that
countries with stronger fiscal institutions have better scope to conduct countercyclical
policies. More recently, Frankel et al. (2013), by implementing parametric and non-
parametric approaches and using data covering the period from 1984 to 2008 for 94 coun-
tries, show that, over the last decade, about a third of developing countries in the world
have acquired the ability to conduct countercyclical fiscal policy. The authors attribute
this progress to the improvement in the institution quality. Similar results had already
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been presented by Strawczynski and Zeira (2007) for the case of Israel, where both gov-
ernment deficit and expenditure have become more countercyclical after 1985. According
to the authors, the results are due to improvements in fiscal discipline and in result of the
economic stabilization program that occurred during that period. However, Lledo´ et al.
(2011) find that changes in political institutions have no effects on fiscal procyclicality.
2.2.3.3 The accommodating role of monetary policy
While for the most of developing countries central bank financing of deficit is a legal
provision giving rise to dependency between fiscal and monetary policies, in developed
countries such source of financing is usually prohibited, which reinforces the separation
between fiscal/debt management and monetary policy. For instance, using a sample of
152 countries, Ja´come et al. (2012) conclude that central bank financing of the budget
deficit seem to be inversely correlated to the country’s level of development. Specifically,
while in most advanced countries, central banks do not finance government expenditures,
in a large number of developing countries, short-term financing is allowed in order to
smooth out tax revenue fluctuations. These facts seem to put developing countries in a
better position to accommodate financing constraints and thus to conduct an expansionary
fiscal policy, particularly, under undeveloped financial systems and/or in downturns which
decreased tax base.
Additionally, central bank monopolizes the supply of money base to commercial
banks and thus controls over credit constraints. Therefore, the likelihood for creating
fiscal space either by printing money or by relaxing domestic credit constraints is larger
if central government is not accountable and the degree of central bank independence in
respect to central government is weak. Contrarily, if a central bank is fully independent
from central government, it will be able to put constraints on government borrowing ei-
ther by printing less money and/or by squeezing the supply of reserves for commercial
banks. Moreover, central bank monopolizes the control on interest rates which may be
used as a mean to impose costs on deficits.
In general, the literature has shown that the degree of central bank independence affects
positively the design of fiscal policy (e.g., Masciandaro and Tabellini (1988), Castellani
and Debrun (2001), Montiel (2011)). Indeed, if central government is not accountable,
and has some control over the central bank, it may takes advantage of money supply for
fiscal profligacy which, further, leads to a non-precautionary saving in time of plenty,
leading to procyclical fiscal policy.
It is instructive to note that the common pool phenomenon is more prone to arise
whenever government is unaccountable and central bank is dependent and so having scope
for policy discretion and overspending in upturns. However, the channel by which central
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bank dependence and/or central bank deficit financing shapes the cyclical stance of fiscal
policy seems a literal gap. Instead, the literature has focused on the following: (i) relation
between central bank independence and budget deficits (see e.g., De Haan and Zelhorst
(1990), Karras (1994), and Brown and Yousefi (1996)) to conclude that central bank inde-
pendence imposes constraints on budget deficits; (ii) on the link between money growth
and budget deficits (see e.g., De Haan and Zelhorst (1990), Karras (1994), and Brown
and Yousefi (1996)) to conclude that there is not a significant relationship between bud-
get deficit and money growth (monetary authority does not monetize deficits); (iii) on
the relation between inflation and foreign debt (see e.g., Assibey-Yeboah and Mohsin
(2012) and Edwards and Tabellini (1991)) which provides evidence in the sense that debt
is monetized by the central bank in developing countries. Therefore, a clear cut off mak-
ing explicit the channel by which monetary policy affects the cyclicality of fiscal policy
remains to access.
2.3 Testing for theories
We have reviewed in section 2.2 a wide range of factors which, direct or indirectly,
have effects on the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy. But, is there evidence that these
factors really work as to bias fiscal policy behavior? Basically, to answer this question, the
literature relies on a two step approach. First, defining a measure for assessing the cyclical
stance of fiscal policy, and then, second, relying on cross-country specification, testing
whether cyclicality is related with the underlying factors. The assessment of the cyclical
stance of fiscal policy relies, usually, on a pair of macroeconomic series: a business cycle
indicator and a fiscal policy indicator. Generally, the literature takes real growth rate series
or filtered series from Hodrick-Prescott (HP) or Band-Pass (BP) filtering techniques as a
cycle indicator. For the assessment of the cyclical behavior fiscal policy two technical
approaches are available: correlation and regression-based approach. The latter is done
by regressing a fiscal policy indicator on a business-cycle indicator and on a set of control
variables as represented in Equation (2.1)
∆ft = δ + βf∆yt + ρft−1 +
M∑
j=1
αjxj,t + φTt + εt, (2.1)
were ft (generally in log) is the fiscal policy indicator, yt (generally in log) is the business-
cycle indicator, xj,t is a control j among M controls variables, T refers to time trend, and
εt is the error term. ∆ is the difference operator, and δ, βf , ρ, αj and φ are parameters
to be estimated. The parameter of the interest is βf . With exception of taxes and budget
surplus, a statistically significant and positive estimate of βf
[
βˆf
]
is, generally, taken as
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an indication of procyclicality of such fiscal policy instrument and, if negative, is taken
as an indication of countercyclical fiscal policy. It is acyclical if βˆf is not statistically
different from zero. As for taxes and budget surplus, procyclicality imposes that negative
changes occur in expansions and positive changes in recessions (a statistically significant
and negative value for βˆ), and vice versa for countercyclicality.
Alternative to Equation (2.1) is the simple correlation function. While the empirical
correlation measures the degree of co-movement between a fiscal policy and business
cycle indicator (e.g., change in real GDP), βˆf from Equation (2.1) measures changes
in fiscal policy which are explained by changes in the business cycle indicator, ceteris
paribus. Having estimated the cyclicality of a given fiscal policy
[
βˆf
]
, the second step
takes cross-country specification to test whether such cyclicality measure is related with
underlying factors. Formally, testing explanations for procyclicality of fiscal policy takes
the following general cross-sectional form
βˆf,i = f(ψ
′; e1,i, ..., ek,i; β′W ), (2.2)
where βˆf,i is the estimate of cyclicality obtained from Equation (2.1) for a given fiscal
policy indicator [f ] and for an individual (country) [i]. Therefore, βˆf,i is a function of
k explanations [e1, ..., ek], a k coefficients-parameters [ψ′] associated to each explanation
[e], and a vector of controls [W ] including its associated coefficients [β′]. For example,
under a linear form for Equation (2.2), evidence supports explanation e1, if the associated
coefficient [ψ1] has the expected signal and is statistically significant.3 Studies relying
on this two step approach include Lane (2003), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004),
Thornton (2008), Woo (2009), and Halland and Bleaney (2011).
For instance, in Woo (2009), k = 1 and e1 is a measure for social polarization. Taking
income inequality as a measure for social polarization [e1], the author finds a statistically
significant ψˆ1 = 0.020, evidencing a positive association between fiscal procyclicality
and social polarization. In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), k = 1 as well and
e1 is a measure for financial depth (private credit), and the indicator for cyclical fiscal
policy is the correlation between the cyclical component government expenditure and the
cyclical component of GDP
[
ρ[GEHP ,yHP ]
]
. Either OLS or IV estimates lead the authors
to conclude that financial depth [e1] has negative effect on the degree of procyclicality of
fiscal policy. The test on a more comprehensive set of explanations [k = 4] is thanks to
Thornton (2008). Using data for the period from 1960 to 2004 for 37 low-income African
countries, Thornton provides evidence that government consumption is more procyclical
in those African countries that are more reliant on foreign aid inflows [e1] and that are
less corrupt [e2], and that it is less procyclical in countries with more unequal income
3One should note that the functional form for βf,i is also valid for empirical correlation.
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distribution [e3] and that are more democratic [e4]. Similarly, Halland and Bleaney (2011)
find evidence supporting that the effects of corruption and democracy are stronger than
that of social inequality or net foreign debt on the cyclicality of fiscal policy. However, the
authors make note that the result is not obvious, since the index of corruption is closely
correlated with poor credit ratings. In turn, Lane (2003) show that countries with volatile
output [e1] and dispersed political power [e2] are the most likely to run procyclical fiscal
policies.
There is, however, a one-step alternative approach to test theories. This approach
relies on a single equation form which estimates jointly the cyclicality of fiscal policy[
βˆf
]
and the effect
[
ψˆj
]
of a given explanation [e¯j]. Following Alesina et al. (2008), we
take a more general specification as:
∆fi,t = βf∆yi,t + ρfi,t−1 +
M∑
j=1
βjxj,(i,t) +
k∑
j=1
ψjej,(i,t)∆yi,t + ηi,t, (2.3)
where ηi,t = vt + αi + εi,t, being vt and αi are meant to capture, respectively, time and
country effects and εi,t is the error term. The parameter ρ measures degree of fiscal pol-
icy’s persistence and ψj captures the effects of explanation j on cyclicality of fiscal policy
instrument f , [βf ]. For example, a valid explanation ej delivers a significant ψˆj , such that
its effect on cyclicality of fiscal policy instrument f is given by
[
∂∆fi,t
∂∆yi,t
= βˆf + ψˆj e¯j
]
.
Alesina et al. (2008), by using government consumption as a fiscal policy indicator, es-
timate that the coefficient of interaction between corruption and output gap [e1∆yi,t] is sta-
tistically insignificant. However, they find that the estimated coefficient of the interaction
among corruption, output gap, and democracy [e1e2∆yi,t] is -21.326
[
ψˆ1,2 = −21.326
]
and statistically significant at 1% significance level. This result leads to the conclu-
sion that procyclicality of government consumption is more pronounced in more corrupt
democracies. Similarly, Caldero´n and Hebbel (2008) and Slimane and Tahar (2010) con-
clude that countries with poor institutions or/and lack of access to credit markets find
difficulty in conducting countercyclical fiscal policies.
Table 2.1, below, records evidence from the selected literature which tests the two
selected explanations for procyclical fiscal policy: credit constraints and political econ-
omy. Following Kaminsky et al. (2004), who argue that only makes sense to define pol-
icy cyclicality in terms of policy instruments which is not subject to business cycle, we
only select literature which looks at government consumption (GC) and government ex-
penditure (GE) rather than revenue-based variables.4 Relying on signal and statistical
4Actually, government spending is not a good instrument as it includes transfers and debt service. How-
ever, because several studies do not discriminate between government consumption and government spend-
ing, we use both of them.
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significance, for each explanation captured through a two-step approach (Equation (2.2))
or a one-step approach (Equation (2.3)), we record the amount of results which deliver
positive effect (+), negative effect (−), and null effects on procyclicality of fiscal pol-
icy (0). For readable purposes, we define independent variable in fourth column (not
necessarily as reported in the original study) such that, for instance, a record in the col-
umn corresponding to “+” means that an increase in that factor makes fiscal policy more
procyclical. Dependent variable (third column) are either βf coming from the two-step
approaches or a fiscal policy indicator used in the one-step approaches as described in
Equation (2.3). For instance, βf [∆GC ,∆y] is a measure of fiscal cyclicality by regressing
changes in government consumption (∆GC) on change in output (∆y). If a series x is,
e.g., the cyclical component from HP filter, then we write xHP : for example, ρ[GEHP ,yHP ]
is the correlation between cyclical component of government expenditure and the cyclical
component of output as filtered by Hodrick-Prescott method.
The results are compiled according to the two selected channels: credit channel and
political economy channel. The last row in Table 2.1 summarizes the amount of results
which deliver positive, negative and null effect of a given channel for procyclical fiscal
policy. The cells highlighted in yellow are meant to doubt of theory. For example, while
some political economy models suggest that democracy, with appropriate checks and bal-
ances, improves macroeconomic management including the room for countercyclical fis-
cal policy (Persson et al. (1997)), others argue (see e.g., Lane (2003)) that democracy,
involving multiple veto points in the process of policy-making, may lead to procyclical
fiscal policy. Indeed, results checking the effect of democracy on procyclicality of fiscal
policy are twofold. While 67% (12 out of 18) of the results support the voracity effect
prediction, 22% supports that democracy leads to countercyclical fiscal policy, and only
11% yields evidence that democracy has no effect on cyclical instance of fiscal policy.
Ir regards to credit channel, 33.5% of the results supports that relaxing credit constraints
provide room for conducting countercyclical fiscal policy, while 56.5% constitute the ev-
idence that such factors have no effect on cyclicality of fiscal policy. Results on political-
institutional channel appear to distribute symmetrically among positive (30.3%), negative
(37%), and null effect (32.6%) on fiscal procyclicality (see Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1: Summary of evidence on existing explanations for fiscal procyclicality
Credit channel Pol. - Instit. channel
Authors Time span Dependent
variable
Independent variablea Meth. + − 0 + − 0
Halland and Bleaney (2011) 1980-2004 βf [∆GC ,∆y] Net foreign debt/y OLS 4 4
Caldero´n and Hebbel (2008)
1970-2005 GE/y Foreign liabilities/y OLS 3
1970-2005 GE/y Domestic credit/y OLS 2 1
1970-2005 GE/y Foreign liabilities/y IV 2 1
1970-2005 GE/y Domestic credit/y IV 2 1
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004)
1960-2002 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Private credit OLS 1
1960-2002 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Private credit OLS 1
1960-2002 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Liquid liabilities
b IV 1
1960-2002 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Liquid liabilities IV 1
Zhou (2009) 1980-2005 F. reserve/y βf OLS 13 51980-2005 F. reserve/y βf 2SLS 4 6
Thornton (2008) 1960-2004 βf [∆GC ,∆y] Net foreign aid inflows/y OLS 4
Slimane and Tahar (2010) 1980-2007 ∆GC Domestic credit to P.S./y GMM 11980-2007 ∆GC Financial integration index GMM 1
Carneiro and Garrido (2015)
1990-2011 GEHP Debt/y OLS 5 12 11
1990-2011 GEHP Reserve/Import OLS 7 8 13
1990-2011 GEHP Chin-Ito index of capital openness OLS 28
1990-2011 GEHP Financial depth (M2/y) OLS 17 11
1990-2011 GEHP Volatility (y2HP ) OLS 1 6 21
1990-2011 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Debt/y OLS 2 6
1990-2011 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Reserve/Import OLS 4 4
1990-2011 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Chin-Ito index of capital openness OLS 8
1990-2011 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Financial depth (M2/y) OLS 8
1990-2011 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Volatility (y
2
HP ) OLS 5 3
1990-2011 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Debt/y 2SLS 1 3
1990-2011 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Reserve/Import 2SLS 2 2
1990-2011 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Chin-Ito index of capital openness 2SLS 4
1990-2011 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Financial depth (M2/y) 2SLS 4
1990-2011 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Volatility (y
2
HP ) 2SLS 1 3
Halland and Bleaney (2011)
1980-2004 βf [∆GC ,∆y] Index of democracy OLS 8
1980-2004 βf [∆GC ,∆y] Index of corruption OLS 5 3
1980-2004 βf [∆GC ,∆y] GINI index OLS 6 2
Alesina et al. (2008)
1990-2003 GEHP /y Index of corruption IV 1
1990-2003 GEHP /y Index corruption ×Democ. IV 1
1990-2003 GEHP /y Index corruption ×NonDemoc. IV 1
1990-2003 GEHP /y Index corruption ×Political indexc IV 1
Caldero´n and Hebbel (2008)
1970-2005 ∆GE/y Index of democracy OLS 2 1
1970-2005 ∆GE/y Index of democracy IV 2 1
1970-2005 ∆GE/y Index political risk OLS 4 2
1970-2005 ∆GE/y Political index OLS 4 2
Thornton (2008)
1960-2004 βf [∆GC ,∆y] GINI index OLS 4
1960-2004 βf [∆GC ,∆y] Index of corruption OLS 3
1960-2004 βf [∆GC ,∆y] Index of democracy OLS 3
1960-2004 βf [∆GC ,∆y] Ind. democracy× Index corr. OLS 1
Lane (2003) 1960-1998 βf Dispersion index OLS 1 1
Woo (2009)
1960-2003 βf [∆GE ,∆y] Income inequality (GINI) OLS 11
1960-2003 βf [∆GE ,∆y] Education inequality OLS 7 3
1960-2003 βf [∆GE ,∆y] Income inequality (GINI) WLS 10
1960-2003 βf [∆GE ,∆y] Education inequality WLS 7 3
1960-2003 βf [∆GE ,∆y] Income inequality (GINI) GMM 1
1960-2003 ρ[GSHP ,yHP ] Education inequality OLS 3
1960-2003 βf [∆GC ,∆y] Income inequality (GINI) WLS 1
1960-2003 βf [∆GC ,∆y] Income inequality (GINI) OLS 2
1960-2003 β[GEHP ,yHP ] Executive constraints index
d GMM 1
1960-2003 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Executive constraints index OLS 2
1960-2003 β[GEHP ,yHP ] Executive constraints index OLS 1
1960-2003 β[GEHP ,yHP ] Executive constraints index WLS 1
Slimane and Tahar (2010)
1980-2007 ∆GC Index of democracy GMM 1
1980-2007 ∆GC Executive constraints index GMM 1
1980-2007 ∆GC Political competition indexe GMM 1
1980-2007 ∆GC Political index GMM 1
1980-2007 ∆GC Institutional quality index GMM 1
Carneiro and Garrido (2015)
1990-2011 GEHP Institutional quality index OLS 1 47 16
1990-2011 GEHP Political check and balance OLS 3 1 24
1990-2011 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Institutional quality index OLS 20
1990-2011 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Political check and balance OLS 1 7
1990-2011 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Institutional quality index 2SLS 1 3
1990-2011 ρ[GEHP ,yHP ] Political check and balance 2SLS 4
Summary 22//7 73/6 123/27 62/12 87/4 80
aWhenever is the one-step approach case, as is always the case where dependent variable is fiscal variable rather than fiscal cyclicality, independent variable
is multiplied by business cycle indicator; which, in turn, is instrumented when necessary.
bIt equals currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and other financial intermediaries.
cIt is a variable which subtracts country’s score in an Autocracy index from its score in Democracy index.
dMeasures the extent to which the executives face political constraints in implementing their policy. It is based on the number of institutionally embedded
veto players among various branches of government. A high value indicates greater political constraints. Averaged over 1960–2000. Source: Henisz (2002).
eRefers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy formation and leadership roles can be pursued in the political arena.
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2.4 Overview and critical assessment
This section aims to provide a critical overview on the reviewed literature. In doing
so we focus on: (I) the measure to captures the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy, (II)
empirical tests on the existing explanations for procyclical fiscal policy and, last but not
least, (III) argue a factor on which the literature has given no insights that the size of the
informal sector may also have impacts on procyclical fiscal policy.
2.4.1 Measurement bias in assessing procyclical fiscal policy
Before to look at measurement bias in accessing cyclical stance of fiscal policy, it is
convenient to define our conceptual framework with which we interpret the literature as
well as what variables should be used to measure the cyclicality of fiscal policy. Following
Kaminsky et al. (2004), we took, in the previous sections, Procyclical fiscal policy as
that exacerbating cycles, Countercyclical fiscal policy as that smoothing cycles, and
Acyclical fiscal policy as that neutral to cycles, i.e., neither exacerbating nor smoothing
business cycles. To be specific regarding what variables should be used to find the cyclical
stance of fiscal policy, Table 2.2 displays the selected fiscal variables from Table 2 in
Kaminsky et al. (2004).
Table 2.2: Theoretical correlations of the selected fiscal variables with business cycle
g τ tr pb g/Y tr/Y pb/Y
Countercyclical − + + + − +/0/− +/0/−
Procyclical + − +/0/− +/0/− +/0/− +/0/− +/0/−
Acyclical 0 0 + + − +/0/− +/0/−
Source: Table 2 in Kaminsky et al. (2004), p. 16.
where g, τ , tr, and pb are, respectively, government consumption, tax rate, tax revenue,
and primary balance. Y is the GDP and x/Y is the x ratio to GDP. Therefore, only
government consumption (g) and tax rate (τ ) would unambiguously discriminate among
the procyclical, countercyclical, and acyclical fiscal policy behavior. The use of the others
variables as cyclical indicator for fiscal policy may be misleading, as either any changes
may reflect either a procyclical and/or countercyclical and/or acyclical fiscal policy. These
cases are identified with +/0/− in Table 2.2.
As shown in Table 2.2, therefore, simply eyeballing to the correlation of some fiscal
policy variables with the business cycle may lead us to erroneous conclusions. As Kamin-
sky et al. (2004) and Ilzetzki and Ve´gh (2008) state, it only makes sense to define policy
cyclicality in terms of policy instrument rather than fiscal outcomes. That is, one should
take fiscal variables of which changes are subject only to fiscal authority interventions,
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rather than those with changes depending on economic activity. To clarify this point, take
fiscal balance as an example. As put by Ilzetzki and Ve´gh (2008), even if the path of
government consumption and tax rates are independent of the business cycle, we would
observe surplus in good times and deficit in bad times because tax base expands in good
times and contracts in bad times. Thus one can arrive at the erroneous conclusion that
fiscal policy is countercyclical (i.e., following Keynesian prescriptions), when in fact the
fiscal authority is following Barro’s (1979) neoclassical prescriptions, by engaging in a
completely neutral fiscal policy intervention.
Furthermore, as Kaminsky et al. (2004) also argue, the use of a fiscal variable as a ratio
of output could yield also to misleading results, since the cyclical instance of fiscal policy
may be dominated by the cyclical behavior of output. Taking government consumption
to output ratio [g/Y ] as an example, the unambiguous indication of the cyclicality of
government consumption is only provided by positive signal [+]. Therefore, a negative
correlation between changes in output [Y ] and changes in the government consumption
to output ratio [g/Y ] might correspond both to the case of countercyclical, procyclical,
or acyclical government consumption. Still, if the result of correlation equals to zero [0],
we conclude erroneously that it is acyclical, while it is actually procyclical. In the case
of tax revenue to output ratio [tr/Y ] and primary balance to output ratio [pb/Y ] whatever
the result of the correlation, it leads to an ambiguous indication about the cyclical policy
behavior.
To clarify this issue, consider a policy instrument ft and output yt, such that the ratio
is given by ft/yt. Consider that at period t, ft = 10 and yt = 100 such that ft/yt =
0.10, and a change from t to t + 1 yielding ft+1 = 12 and yt+1 = 133, 3(3) such that
ft+1/yt+1 = 0.09. If ft is the government consumption, we observe that even though
it acts in a procyclical fashion from period t to t + 1 (↑ yt+1 and ↑ ft+1), its ratio to
output ft/yy follows a countercyclical behavior (↑ yt+1 and ↓ ft+1/yt+1). Therefore,
taking fiscal policy as a proportion of GDP can lead to conclude that fiscal policy acts in a
countercyclical way while, actually, it goes in a procyclical direction or vice versa. Even
if ft is constant over time, whenever we take its ratio to output we are forcibly imposing
a relation between ft/yt and yt.
However, in the selected literature for this review, we observe that a large number of
studies use fiscal outcomes (see e.g., Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), Alesina et al.
(2008)) as well as fiscal variables as proportion of GDP (e.g., Caldero´n and Hebbel (2008)
and others) to assess the pattern of fiscal policy over the business cycle. As we summarize
in Table 2.3 below, even the studies using policy instruments (government consumption
or spending), 5.3% (27 results out of 505) of them use policy variables as proportion of
GDP. We interpret their results as inconclusive (last column).
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For convenience let us present Table 2.3 below. Table 2.3 contains eight columns in
addition to those entitled “Authors” and “Time span”. The third and fourth columns refer
to the pair of variables to measure the cyclical stance of fiscal policy and the methodology
used, respectively. The column entitled “Step” records the number of studies which use
one and two-step approaches. If endogeneity problem is taken into account when estimat-
ing cyclicality of fiscal policy, we record in the sub-column “yes”; otherwise “no”. The
column entitled “Table 2.2” is meant to record if the study uses an adequate variable to
capture fiscal policy: “yes” if affirmative, otherwise “no”. For each study on developed
or developing countries we record in “a”, “c” and “p” depending if the results is acycli-
cal, countercyclical or procyclical. The last column “Check” is meant to check if the
result is according to Keynesian prescriptions (“K”), neoclassical theory (“C”) or if it is
inconclusive (“inc.”). In some cases, the results point in the same direction in developed
and developing countries. In this case, the record is followed by “(S)” to highlight that
such result is more strong in a given group of countries. In what follows, we start with
the issue of endogeneity in estimating the cyclicality of fiscal policy.
2.4.2 Endogeneity and omitted variables
Measurement bias arises either because we include endogenous variable in the right
side of Equation (2.1) or by omitting an important explanatory variable. Technically
speaking, measurement bias arises whenever Et (zt,jεt) 6= 0, where Et is the expectation
operator, zt,j is any j right side variables of, e.g., Equation (2.1), and εt is the correspond-
ing error term.
About 60.5% (306 out of 505) of our selected results from the literature (see Table 2.3)
takes the cyclical stance of fiscal policy by estimating the parameter of interest βf in
Equation (2.1) or Equation (2.2) (or some other similar version). However, if output
reacts to fiscal policy as predicted by Keynesian models, then the OLS estimator yields a
biased estimate of βf . Sixth column in Table 2.3 shows that, among the results coming
from regression-based measures, only 32% (98 in 307) have taken into account for the
potential endogeneity problem. Therefore, 68% of the measures of cyclicality of fiscal
policy likely suffer from endogeneity bias.
The most widespread problem we observe in the literature on estimating cyclicality of
fiscal policy is the omission bias. While all the studies have identified, at least, one factor
for observed procyclical fiscal policy, particularly, in developing countries, when estimat-
ing such cyclicality, very few studies have taken such factor(s) into account. Assuming
that the causality goes only from the business cycle to fiscal policy, the cyclicality of fis-
cal policy is measured by changes in fiscal policy ∆ft due to changes in economic cycles
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∆yt
[
∂∆ft
∂∆yt
]
. So, if a factor, say ej , plays any effect on the cyclicality of fiscal policy, it
should be trough of economic cycles (indirect effect) rather than trough of direct effect.
To be more precise, consider we expect that a factor, say ej , has effect on the cyclicality of
fiscal policy ft. Then, to capture such effect one should estimate the following regression
∆ft = β0 + βf∆yt + λ∆ytej,t + εt (2.4)
where, to simplify, we omit control variables (including ej) which have direct effects on
fiscal policy. From Equation (2.4) we conclude that
∂∆ft
∂∆yt
= βf + λe¯j , where λ captures
the indirect effect of ej on changes of fiscal variables ∆ft. Therefore, the effect on the
cyclicality of fiscal policy depends on the level and signal of factor e¯j and the parameter
λ. We observe, however, that a large portion of the literature has taken, erroneously, the
direct effect rather than that working trough business cycle. We are referring studies with
adopt the two-step approach by first using Equation (2.1) to estimate cyclicality of fiscal
policy and then using Equation (2.2) to test the explanatory power of a factor ej . To go
a little further, suppose one omit ∆ytej in the Equation (2.4) and estimate the following
underspecified equation
∆ft = δ˜ + β˜f∆yt + ξt (2.5)
where the error term ξt = λ∆ytej,t + εt and tilde above parameters is to emphasize that
they come from an underspecified regression. From Equation (2.5), it is obvious that
Et (∆ytξt) 6= 0. As is showed in the standard textbook,5 β˜f = βf + λδ˜1 where δ˜1 is
the slope coefficient by regressing of zj,t on ∆yt,
[
zj,t = δ˜0 + δ˜1∆yt
]
with zj,t = ∆ytej,t.
Therefore, this endogeneity caused by omitted factor/explanation yields a fiscal cyclicality
bias of λδ˜1. We argue, however, that implicitly in the two-step approach researchers esti-
mate ∂∆ft/∂ej rather than ∂∆ft/∂∆yt. That is, perhaps, what is going in their mind is
the direct effect of such factors rather than that working trough the business cycle (notice
that in the right side of Equation (2.2) we have ej instead of ∆ytej). Whenever one regress
βˆf on a set of factors as in Equation (2.2), ψˆj is capturing the bias rather than explanatory
power of such factor.6 Therefore, in our view, the one-step approach like Equation (2.3)
is more appropriated by delivering an unbiased estimate of fiscal policy stance. However,
from Table 2.3, we conclude that out of a sample of 306 results using regression-base
measures, only 13.4% of such results come from one-step approach. Therefore, 86.6% of
the literature result relies on the two-step approach, and so, potentially biased because of
omitting important variables.
5See e.g., Wooldridge (2015) p. 87.
6Of course that we only have measurement bias if, in fact, such factors have explanatory power to the
cyclicality of fiscal policy.
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2.4.3 Identification problem
Identification problem arises whenever we are unable to identify βj; putting differ-
ently, whenever we are unable to estimate ∂∆ft/∂∆yt.
Ilzetzki and Ve´gh (2008) analytically show how political distortions like political pres-
sures or rent-seeking activities in good times can give rise to identification problem (see
equation 16 p.14 in Ilzetzki and Ve´gh (2008)). In addition, we argue that if there exist
electoral effects on fiscal variables, the estimated fiscal procyclicality, βf , might be just
reflecting electoral effect rather than procyclical fiscal policy. For example, suppose one
is estimating fiscal policy instance using Equation (2.3). Suppose, further, that for the
most countries in the sample, economic peaks coincide with elections periods, and that
fiscal authority is neutral to business cycle but it is opportunist in the sense to influence
his re-election. Because election-induced business cycles are greater in developing coun-
tries (Shi and Svensson (2003), Shi and Svensson (2006)), we might conclude toward
procyclical fiscal stance, while, in fact, βˆf is reflecting electoral effects. To the best of our
knowledge, however, none of the selected studies has considered such possibility.
2.4.4 Additional explanation: the role of the informal sector
We end this section bringing the role of the size of the informal sector to this research
arena. By informal sector or the informal economy or, yet, simply informality we mean all
activities that are unregistered and/or unlicensed and hence working outside the controls
of the authorities. Although factors in explaining procyclical fiscal policy that we have
reviewed have its merits, we believe that the size of the informal sector may be of first-
order importance in determining the cyclicality of fiscal policy.
On the one hand, it is widely accepted in the literature that there is a positive associa-
tion between the size of the informal economy and the fluctuations in aggregate economic
activity. On the other hand, the size of the informal sector is larger in developing coun-
tries than in developed ones. Having said that, suppose that government spending [gt]
follows the following process: (i) gLt = g¯
L + βLf y
L
t + b
L
t , for developing countries (L),
and (ii) gHt = g¯
H + βHf y
H
t + b
H
t , for developed countries (H). Let g¯, yt, and bt be de-
rived, respectively, as autonomous government consumption, country permanent income
during a period of time (e.g., a year), and a buffer box which accumulates transitory in-
come to provide resources for transitory public spending. On average, the expected value
of bt is zero [ET (bT ) = 0, t = 0, 1, 2, · · ·T ]. Therefore, everything equal, cyclical stance
of fiscal policy in both countries should be equal
[
βLf = β
H
f
]
. The role of buffer box is
to accumulate surplus in good times and to provide additional resources for expansionary
fiscal policy in bad time. Thus for small decrease in yt, bt is able to fulfill its role, by
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providing additional resources to stimulate economy. Therefore, we should observe an
increase in gt. However, if the decrease in yt is very large, bt may not be able to provide
enough resources to stimulate economy, and so forcing gt to fall. In such scenarios, we
observe a procyclical behavior of government consumption [gt]. We argue, therefore, that
the size of the informal sector is the source for that procyclical behavior of government
consumption, since, at first instance, it imposes a large volatility on the economy with,
in turn, requires additional resources for economic stimulus, for which the buffer box [bt]
may not be able for.
In line to the above argument, C¸ic¸ek and Elgin (2011) provide evidence supporting
that procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in countries with larger size of
the informal sector. Rigobo´n (2004) argues that shocks that hit developing countries are
different from those that hit developed countries. We argue that even if the shocks are the
same, due to sizable informality in developing countries, their economies are less resilient
and so “leaning in the wind direction”.
Informality also has implications on fiscal policy through tax base variability. For
the sake of arguments, suppose that the size of the informal sector increases in economic
downturns. Then, the informal economy further shrinks the tax base during downturns
and relaxes it further during booms, contributing for the increased volatility of the tax
base. For instance, Talvi and Ve´gh (2005) rely on tax base variability to explain the
observed procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries.
Besides economic fluctuations, the size of the informal sector reduces fiscal space by
weakening the government’s ability to increase tax revenues and thereby the ability to
adopt expansionary fiscal policy, as a larger proportion of economic activity takes place
in the informal sector which operates outside government’s control. In this regards, we
can take the buffer box as the government ability to collect taxes, which, in turn, depends
negatively on the imperfection of their own economic structure. Such imperfection is
larger, the larger is the size of the informal sector.
Still, the way that the formal and the informal sectors relate may determine the behav-
ior of fiscal policy. For example, consider the Elgin and Uras (2013)’s argument that in a
framework with large informal economy, a contractionary fiscal policy (tax rise) can stim-
ulate further the size of the informal sector through of transition of activity from formal
to the informal sector. Under this circumstance, countercyclical fiscal policy may be con-
strained by the size of the informal sector, as the goal to fighting informality is, generally,
permanently present in policymakers’ agenda in countries with sizable informal sector.
The the size of the informal sector, also, may help to fit the so-called expansionary fiscal
contraction. In this line, Eng (2010) state that in the presence of the underground activi-
ties with strong complementary demand, high tax policy can turn out to be expansionary,
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and vice versa. Putting differently, under complementary effect on market consumption,
the high-tax induced expansion of the informal sector and the resulting increases in in-
come earned in that sector could accommodates the decline or even increase the private
consumption. Hence, fiscal policy could be procyclical in countries with sizable informal
sector.
Moreover, it is arguable that informality is strongly linked to the conventional wisdom
on credit market imperfections and political economy channels. So, bringing informality
to the research arena of the mechanism influencing procyclical fiscal policy is in order.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter reviews the literature on cyclicality of fiscal policy in developing coun-
tries comparing with that in developed ones, together with the literature rationale for the
differences. Following Kaminsky et al. (2004), we select only the studies that use fiscal
instrument. Because studies that use tax rate are very few in the literature, we only select
studies that use government consumption and/or government spending as fiscal policy in-
dicator. We, then, look at the distribution of the estimates of the cyclicality of these fiscal
variables among acyclical, countercyclical and procyclical, for developed and developing
countries. We also take the distribution of the results which are corrected from endogene-
ity problem and omission bias as well (see Table 2.3). We conclude that the view that
fiscal policy is procyclical in developing countries contrasting with the countercyclical
or acyclical ones in developed countries has reached the mainstream status. That is, the
conducting of procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries can be seen as a stylized
fact, while such policy is countercyclical or acyclical in developed countries.
In particular, in a sample of 160 estimates of cyclicality of fiscal policy for developed
countries, we conclude that 36,3% are countercyclical, while 24.4% are acyclical, sum-
ming up 60.6%. The picture is, however, different for developing countries. In a sample
of 344 results, only 3.5% of such results are countercyclical. The remaining, 19.6% are
acyclical and 77% are procyclical (see Table 2.3). Still, among the studies which de-
liver procyclical fiscal policy for both group of countries, we find that 89% (17 out of
19) constitute evidence that procyclicality is more strong in developing countries. There-
fore, evidence-based literature seem to support the phenomenon termed “ when it rains, it
pours” by Kaminsky et al. (2004). Taking developed and developing countries as a whole,
we conclude that only 11.3% (53 out of 471) of the results follow Keynesian prescription.
Therefore, empirically, the world seems to roll over a weak neoclassical framework. We
observe, however, that most of the literature has not addressed properly at least one of the
three: concept, endogeneity, and identification problem. Among the studies that use pol-
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icy instrument, only 32% have taken into account endogeneity problem, and only 12.5%
correct for both endogeneity and omission bias.
Tests on existing explanations are split between credit channel and political economy
channel. We conclude that, although theoretically the literature strongly blames credit
constraints and political economy for the observed procyclical fiscal policy, empirically
such channels seem weak in explaining the procyclicality of fiscal policy. Analytically
speaking, in a sample of 218 results for credit channel, we conclude that only 33.5% of
these results support that relaxing credit constraints provide room for conducting counter-
cyclical fiscal policy, while 56,5% constitute the evidence that such factors have no effect
on cyclicality of fiscal policy. Results on political economy channel appear to distribute
symmetrically among positive (30.3%), negative (37%), and null effect (32.6%) on fiscal
procyclicality (see Table 2.1). However, in addition to the above mentioned critics, these
result may also exhibit some caveats. While the literature takes credit constraints and
political economy as alternative explanations for fiscal procyclicality, we argue that they
are not alternative explanations but complementary, being political economy theoretically
dominant: if there was no procyclicality during expansion phases, there would not be pro-
cyclicality during recessions. Further, developing countries are the default recipients of
FDI inflows due to lower labor costs and higher marginal productivity of capital. In spite
of that, their fiscal policy mostly behaves procyclically. We end this review by identify-
ing gap in the literature: it does not formalize the informal economy in determining the
procyclicality of fiscal policy as well as does not explore electoral effect in the data.
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Table 2.3: Bibliometric summary: ∆ft = government consumption/spending
Step Endogen. Table 2.2 Developed Developing Check
Authors Time span (∆ft,∆yt) Meth. one two yes no yes no a c p a c p K C inc.
Gavin and Perotti (1997)
1970-1995 (∆GE ,∆yt) Ols 1 1 1 1 1
1970-1995 (∆GE ,∆yt) Ols 1 1 1 1 1
1970-1995 (∆GC ,∆yt) Ols 1 1 1 1 1
1970-1995 (∆GC ,∆yt) Ols 1 1 1 1(S) 1
Gavin et al. (1996) 1970-1995 (∆GE ,∆yt) Ols 1 1 1 1 11970-1995 (∆GE ,∆yt) Ols 1 1 1 1(S) 1
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) 1960-2002 (GEHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 11960-2002 (GEHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 2 2 2
Kaminsky et al. (2004)
1960-2003 (GEHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 12 8 2 2 2 10
1960-2003 (GEHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 12 4 8 12
1960-2003 (GEBP , yBP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 12 6 6 12
1960-2003 (GEBP , yBP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 12 8 4 12
Riascos and Ve´gh (2003)
1970-1994 (∆GC ,∆y) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 1
1970-1994 (∆GC ,∆y) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 1
1970-1994 (∆GC ,∆y) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 1
1970-1994 (∆GC ,∆y) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 1
1970-1994 (GCHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 1
1970-1994 (GCHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 1
1970-1994 (GCHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 1
1970-1994 (GCHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 1
Talvi and Ve´gh (2005) 1970-1994 (GCHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 11970-1994 (GCHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1(S) 1
Suzuki (2015) 1972-2004 (GCHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 11972-2004 (GCHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 1
Kuralbayeva (2013)
1972-2006 (GCHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 1
1972-2006 (GCHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1(S) 1
1972-2006 (GSHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 1
1972-2006 (GSHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 1
77Q1-11Q2 (GCHP , yHP ) VAR NA NA 1 1 1 1
Summary (#1) 0 6 1 6 70 4 18 6 12 14 0 20(4) 4 66 4
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Table 2.4: Continuation of Table 2.3
Step Endogen. Table 2.2 Developed Developing Check
Authors Time span (∆ft,∆yt) Meth. one two yes no yes no a c p a c p K C inc.
Panizza and Jaimovich (2007)
1970-2003 (∆GC ,∆y) OLS 3 3 3 3 3
1970-2003 (∆GC ,∆y) OLS 9 9 9 9 9
1970-2003 (∆GC ,∆y) IV 2 2 2 2 2
1970-2003 (∆GC ,∆y) IV 8 8 8 8 8
1970-2003 (∆GC ,∆y) IV 3 3 3 3 3
1970-2003 (∆GC ,∆y) IV 8 8 8 8 8
Woo (2009) 1960-2003 (∆GE ,∆y) OLS 1 1 1 1 11960-2003 (∆GE ,∆y) OLS 5 5 5 5(S) 5
Thornton (2008) 1960-2004 (∆GC ,∆y) OLS 37 37 37 5 32 37
Halland and Bleaney (2011)
1980-2004 (∆GC ,∆y) OLS 2 2 2 2 2
1980-2004 (∆GC ,∆y) OLS 2 2 2 2(S) 2
1980-2004 (∆GC , yHP ) OLS 1 1 1 1 1
1980-2004 (∆GC , yHP ) OLS 1 1 1 1(S) 1
1980-2004 (GC , y) OLS 1 1 1 1 1
1980-2004 (GC , y) OLS 1 1 1 1(S) 1
Slimane and Tahar (2010) 1980-2007 (∆GC ,∆y) GMM 4 4 4 4 41980-2007 (∆GC ,∆y) GMM 9 9 9 9 9
Caldero´n and Hebbel (2008)
1970-2005 (∆GE ,∆y) OLS 3 3 3 3(S) 3
1970-2005 (∆GE ,∆y) OLS 3 3 3 3 3
1970-2005 (∆GE ,∆y) IV 4 4 4 4 4
1970-2005 (∆GE ,∆y) IV 4 4 4 4 4
1970-2005 (∆GE ,∆y) IV 2 2 2 1 1 2
1970-2005 (∆GE ,∆y) IV 2 2 2 2 2
Lane (2003) a 1960-1998 (∆GE ,∆y) OLS 22 22 22 9 13 9 131960-1998 (∆GC ,∆y) OLS 22 22 22 8 14 8 14
Khan (2011)
1950-2009 (∆GE ,∆y) OLS 1 1 1 1 1
1950-2009 (∆GE ,∆y) OLS 1 1 1 1(S) 1
1950-2009 (∆GE ,∆y) Corr. NA NA NA NA 13 6 7 6 7
1950-2009 (∆GE ,∆y) Corr. NA NA NA NA 14 2 12 2 12
Summary (#2) 25 136 46 115 170 18 4 31(3) 40 15 5 80(10) 28 142 18
aThe author does not reports statistic to check the significance. So, we look at the signal of the estimated
cyclicality to discriminate between procyclical and countercyclical cyclicality.
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Table 2.5: Continuation of Table 2.3
Step Endogen. Table 2.2 Developed Developing Check
Authors Time span (∆ft,∆yt) Meth. one two yes no yes no a c p a c p K C inc.
Mailhos and Sosa (2000) 1955-1998 (GCHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 8 8 875Q1-99Q1 (GCHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 1 1 1
Arze del Granado et al. (2010) 1987-2007 (∆GE ,∆y) OLS 3 3 3 1 2 31987-2007 (∆GE ,∆y) OLS 6 6 6 3 3 6
Akitoby et al. (2004) 1970-2002 (∆GE ,∆y) OLS 51 51 51 25 1 25 1 50
Strawczynski and Zeira (2007) 1960-2005 (∆GE ,∆y) OLS 8 8 8 8 81960-2005 (∆GE ,∆y) OLS 6 6 6 6 6
Frankel et al. (2013) 1960-2009 (GEHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 21 17 4 17 41960-2009 (GEHP , yHP ) Corr. NA NA NA NA 73 6 67 6 67
Lane (1998) 1960-1995 (∆GE ,∆y) OLS 1 1 1 1 1
Alesina et al. (2008) 1960-2003 (GCHP , yHP ) IV 2 2 2 1 1 21960-2003 (GCHP , yHP ) IV 2 2 2 2 2
Lledo´ et al. (2011)
1970-2008 (∆LGS ,∆Ly) OLS 1 1 1 1 1
1970-2008 (∆LGS ,∆Ly) 2SLS 1 1 1 1 1
1970-2008 (∆LGS ,∆Ly) GMM 8 8 8 8 8
1970-2008 (∆LGS ,∆Ly) OLS 2 2 2 2 2
1970-2008 (∆LGS ,∆Ly) 2SLS 2 2 2 2 2
1970-2008 (∆LGS ,∆Ly) GMM 16 16 16 3 13 16
1970-2008 (∆LGS ,∆Ly) GMM 12 12 12 4 8 12
Ilzetzki and Ve´gh (2008)
60Q1-06Q4 (∆LGE ,∆y) OLS 1 1 1 1 1
60Q1-06Q4 (∆LGE ,∆y) OLS 1 1 1 1 1
60Q1-06Q4 (∆LGC ,∆y) OLS 2 2 2 2 2
60Q1-06Q4 (∆LGC ,∆y) OLS 2 2 2 2(S) 2
1961-2003 (∆LGE ,∆y) OLS 1 1 1 1 1
1961-2003 (∆LGE ,∆y) OLS 1 1 1 1 1
1961-2003 (∆LGC ,∆y) OLS 1 1 1 1(S) 1
1961-2003 (∆LGC ,∆y) OLS 1 1 1 1 1
60Q1-06Q4 (∆GC ,∆y) 2SLS 1 1 1 1 1
60Q1-06Q4 (∆GC ,∆y) 2SLS 1 1 1 1 1
60Q1-06Q4 (∆GC ,∆y) GMM 1 1 1 1 1
60Q1-06Q4 (∆GC ,∆y) GMM 1 1 1 1 1
60Q1-06Q4 (∆GC ,∆y) SE 1 1 1 1(S) 1
60Q1-06Q4 (∆GC ,∆y) SE 1 1 1 1 1
60Q1-06Q4 (∆GC ,∆y) VAR 1 1 1 1 1
60Q1-06Q4 (∆GC ,∆y) VAR 1 1 1 1(S) 1
Summary (#3) 16 123 51 88 237 5 17 18 9(2) 38 7 148(3) 24 214 5
SUMMARY= Summary (#1)+Summary (#2)+Summary (#3) 41 265 98 209 477 27 39 55(3) 61(2) 67 12 248(17) 56 422 27
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Chapter 3
Informal Sector Over The Business Cycle
3.1 Introduction
While business cycle regularities have been largely studied in the literature with refer-
ence to “official” or “observable” output, there is still no unified set of stylized facts when
the informal (hidden, shadow, parallel, underground, etc.) sector or even informal output
is also accounted for. Actually, an extensive body of the literature is rather comprehensive
regarding the definition and conceptualization of the informal economy.1 There is, how-
ever, a degree of ambiguity in what regards to the dynamics of the informal sector over
the business cycle. For instance, some theoretical and empirical studies argue in favor of
countercyclical behavior of the informal sector (among them, Carillo and Pugno (2004),
Bowler (2006), and Dell’Anno (2008)) while others support a procyclical behavior of the
size of the informal economy (including Giles (1997), Bajada (2003), Kucera and Galli
(2003), and Busato and Chiarini (2004)).
Furthermore, the informal sector appears as a possible explanation of some phe-
nomenon of the “official” business-cycle, particularly, in developing countries: it is ob-
served that the informal sector is larger in less developed countries (Schneider et al.
(2010), Elgin and Oztunali (2012)), which are also characterized by procyclical fiscal
policy (Gavin and Perotti (1997), Ilzetzki and Ve´gh (2008)) and a larger “official” eco-
nomic fluctuations (Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)); although with ambiguity, the literature
on the informal sector in developed countries points to a positive relationship between the
formal and the informal sector, while in less developed countries a negative relationship
1For a survey, see, e.g., Gerxhani (2004) and the references therein.
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appears to be more dominant (Gerxhani (2004), Schneider (2005)).2 Schneider (2005)
and Elgin and Oztunali (2012) find a declining trend of the underground sector over time.
Stock and Watson (2005) found that volatility of the official output in most G7 countries
had moderated over the past 40 years. Therefore, validating and systematizing knowledge
about these facts are in order.
While it is rather straightforward that country characteristics such as law, institutional
rules, education, among others, account for the size of the informal economy, it is also true
that the controversy regarding to the business cycle dynamics of the informal sector is, to a
large extent, related with the underlying definition of informality. For example, consider
the definition based on tax evasion or unreported income.3 It is likely that the amount
of tax evasion moves procyclically: it increases during booms while decreases during
downturns. Contrarily, a definition based on the firm size may be negatively related with
the official business cycle. For example, Sethuraman (1976) claims that firms with less
than ten persons employed should be considered part of the informal sector. International
Labour Organization (ILO) also associates informality to the size of firms (all those with
fewer than 5 or 10 workers, are consider informal). Thus it is reasonable to expect that
during booms firms hire more workers to face increases in demand, and, thus, are no
longer considered informal.
In this chapter, we first estimate the size of the informal economy using a general
equilibrium model (GEM) approach as in Elgin and Oztunali (2012). In fact, we are
looking to address the following questions: 1) Does the level of GDP a country matter
for the size of the informal sector? 2) How volatile is the size of the informal sector? 3)
Does the size of the informal sector moves pro or countercyclically? 4) How persistent
are the fluctuations of the informal output? 5) Are fluctuations in the underground sector
symmetric across cycle phases? 6) Does the underground sector affect the cyclical stance
of fiscal policy and the behavior of the observed output?
In particular, section 3.2 deals with data, detrending methods and provides estimates
of the size of the informal sector. Section 3.3 answers the first three questions. Questions
4 and 5 are addressed in section 3.4, and question 6 in section 3.5. Lastly, section 3.6
concludes.
2Consider the arguments that whenever there is a negative shock on the formal sector, individuals be-
come more involved in the informal sector’s activities due to the lack of alternative ways of earning a living
(Lubell (1991)). Of course this appears to be more prevalent in the poor/developing countries where there
is less support from social benefits, sub-minimun wages and poor working conditions. Therefore, it is more
likely to a countercyclical behavior of the informal sector in developing countries. In regards to the cycli-
cality of government consumption, one may relate this fact with the argument that agents in the informal
sector undermine tax collection and thus reduce the government’s ability to smooth consumption during
downturns.
3Among others, Feige (1990) and Schneider (2005) rely on this criteria to characterize the informal
sector.
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3.2 Estimates of the informal economy
3.2.1 Model to estimate the size of the informal economy
Following Elgin and Oztunali (2012) we estimate the size of the informal economy for
each country using a (deterministic) Two-Sector Dynamic General Equilibrium model.4
This methodology is inspired particularly by the Lucas Critique (Lucas, 1976) as it relies
on the use of microeconomic foundations. In this set up the economy has two sectors
of production: a formal denoted by (F ), and the informal/shadow denoted by (S). The
infinitely-lived household solves
max
{Ct,It,NSt ,NFt} ∞t=0
∞∑
n=0
βtU(Ct) (3.1)
s.t. Ct + It = (1− τt)θFtK αt N 1−αFt + θStN γSt (3.2)
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt (3.3)
NSt +NFt = Ht (3.4)
Economic agents distaste economic fluctuations. Thus we assume that utility function
U(·) is strictly concave. The output of the economy (formal and informal) is directed to
household consumption (Ct), investment (It), and government consumption (Gt) through
taxing formal output at a tax rate τt ∈ [0, 1]. Equation (3.2) is the representative house-
hold’s resource constraint, Equation (3.3) is the law of motion of capital (Kt), and Equa-
tion (3.4) is the household’s time endowment for the supply of labour in each period t,
being NFt is the amount of time devoted to the formal sector and NSt is the amount of
time devoted to the informal sector. θFt and θSt are, respectively, the level of productivity
in the formal and in the informal sector. Taking the steady state conditions of household’s
problem and assuming a logarithmic utility of consumption, the model is then calibrated
to get out time-varying estimates of the size of the informal sector as a ratio of formal
sector: st
yt
=
θStN
γ
St
θFtK
α
t N
1−α
Ft
.
3.2.2 Sample and data filtering
Here we describe shortly the range of countries as well as the detrending and the fil-
tering procedures used in this work. The sample of countries consists of 105 countries (37
poor, 46 emerging and 22 rich countries).5 We follow Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe´ (2016) to
define poor countries as those with average PPP converted GDP per capita is U.S. dollars
4See Elgin and Oztunali (2012) for more details of the model and how to achieve the size of the informal
sector.
5The groups of poor, emerging and rich countries are listed in Annex 1.
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of 2005 over the period 1990 to 2009 within the interval [0, 3.000]; emerging countries
with GDP per capita between 3.000 to 25.000 and rich countries all within the interval
[25.000, ∞]. Data are in annual frequency from the period 1980 to 2011. The choice
of the sample period is to allow us to include the largest number of countries as possible
as well as to compare business cycle regularities across-countries. Data come from Penn
World Tables (PWT) expressed in national currency and in constant 2005 national prices.6
The choice of data in national currency is to avoid the variation of exchange rate in the
data.
The business cycle regularities are characterized, in this work, in light of the defini-
tion presented by Lucas (1977) and the technical procedure proposed by Kydland and
Prescott (1990). That is, business cycle phases are deviations of aggregate real output
from its trend. Thus we extract from the raw time series data the cyclical component of a
variable Zt using Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Other methodologies, like First Difference
(FD) and Log-Quadratic Detrending (LQ), are used as well. These allow us to check the
strength of the regularities found in the data, presented later on.
The procedures are as follows: let Zt be a times series data, in logs, for t = 1, 2, ..., T .
The trend component denoted by τt is the one that solves
min
{τt}Tt=1
T∑
t=1
(Zt − τt)2 + λ
T∑
t=2
[(τt+1 − τt)− (τt − τt−1)]2 (3.5)
where the parameter λ works like a gauge between the cyclical component (Zt − τt) and
the trend component [(τt+1− τt)− (τt− τt−1)]. The larger the value of λ, the higher is the
penalty for trend component. In line, the log-quadratic detrending is the result of applying
the OLS estimator on the equation
Zt = β0 + β1t+ β2t
2 + t (3.6)
where β0, β1, β2 are parameters to be estimate and t is time variables. First differencing
is achieved by applying the lag operator (L) on raw time series data
(1− L)Zt = t (3.7)
From the equations (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7) the estimates of the cycles are (Zt − τˆt), (Zt −
βˆ0 − βˆ1t− βˆ2t2) and (1− L)Zt, respectively. In the same order, the trend component are
τˆt, βˆ0 + βˆ1t+ βˆ2t2 an X0 + θˆt.7
To illustrate how each of these methods performs, we decompose the log of U.S.
per capita GDP into trend and cyclical component using HP filter (Figure 3.1) and log-
6For a complete description of data see Feenstra et al. (2015)
7The trend from first differencing is obtained by assuming a random walk with drift.
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quadratic detrending (Figure 3.2) over the period 1950 to 2011. Both methods succeed in
identifying a list of recessions (shaded areas) in the U.S.
Figure 3.1: HP filter, λ = 100
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
9.2
9.6
10.0
10.4
10.8
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
log of U.S. GDP
GDP trend 
U.S. cycles
Figure 3.2: Log-Quadratic detrending (LQ)
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3.3 Empirical facts of the informal economy
3.3.1 Long run features of the informal economy
As we pointed out above, the controversy regarding the business cycle dynamics of
the informal sector stems, to a large extent, from the definition of informality. To put our
measure of informality into perspective, we start from the household’s resource constraint
in Equation (3.2). A causal inspection at that equation allows us to deduce the definition
of our measure of the estimated informal economy. It is a more general definition as it
includes most of the criteria used to define the informal economy (e.g., status of labor, tax
evasion, size of activity). It is all economic activity that takes place outside of government
control. Figure 3.3 illustrates how the relative size of the informal economy to GDP (s/y)
has evolved over time and across-countries. It plots the average of the relative size of the
informal economy to GDP for poor, emerging and rich countries over the period 1980 to
2011. U.S. are used as benchmark. Figure 3.3 shows that the relative size of the informal
sector to real output is larger in poor than rich countries.
Stylized fact 1. - The size of the informal sector, in percentage of official output, relates
negatively with the level of development. The estimates suggest that the larger the level
of development of a country the smaller is the size of the informal sector as % of GDP.
This result holds also in studies using other methods for estimating the size of the
informal economy. Among them, studies relying on the input and currency demand ap-
proaches (see e.g., Schneider and Enste (1999)) and on the DYMIMIC approach (Schnei-
der (2005) and Schneider et al. (2010)), find that the size of the informal sector is larger
in less developed countries than in developed ones. According to Renooy (1990) the ex-
istence of some sort of the underground activity is due to the “opportunity” factors (like
individual background, e.g., skill, education, living standard) and geographical factors.
It is almost obvious that, in fact, these ”opportunity” factors may explain the larger size
of the informal economy as % of GDP in poor countries than in rich ones as the share
of individuals with feeble background is higher in poor countries. Findings consistent
to this argument are presented in Maurizio (2014). The author finds that both formality
rate and the speed of the formalization process grow with the educational levels.8 In line,
Figure 3.3 shows a declining trend of the share of the informal economy to GDP over
time.
Stylized fact 2. - There is a declining trend of the relative size of the informal economy
to GDP; the rate of reduction is higher, and rather similar, in poor and emerging coun-
8Formality rate is measured, in Maurizio (2014), as the proportion of non-formal individuals (non-
registered wage earners, non-wage earners, unemployed and inactives) in t that become formal in t+ 1.
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tries when compared to rich countries. The estimates suggest that the declining rate of
the share of the informal economy to GDP increases from rich to poor countries.
Figure 3.3: The size of the informal sector over time (1980 to 2011)
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This fact is also supported by earlier studies of Schneider et al. (2010) who uses
DYMIMIC approach (referred there as MIMIC method) to estimate the size of the shadow
economy. The larger declining trend in poor and emerging countries compared to that
observed in rich countries may be attributed to the policy changes, ranging from employ-
ment guarantee schemes (including written contracts and minimum wage regulation) to
cash benefits for vulnerable groups and policies to promote formal enterprises. Accord-
ingly to ILO’s (2014) report, in the past decade, a number of Latin American countries
have developed mechanisms to facilitate transitions of workers from the informal to the
formal employment. For instance, mechanisms such as strengthening labour inspection,
tax benefits for small and micro-enterprises, social protection, and facilities on registra-
tion process for informal firms are outstanding in Brazil and Argentina (Maurizio (2014)),
while most of these procedures/mechanisms have already been established in rich coun-
tries.9
9We also explore how the estimated size of the informal economy is related to the size of a country
(measured by the size of population). Expectedly, results do not support any relationship between them;
apparently facts that attainment the informal economy, like institutional rules, laws and education differ
across countries but are rather independent of country’s size.
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3.3.2 Informal sector over the business cycle
Table 3.1 reports sample standard deviations of selected variables. The variables rep-
resent the cyclical components of the official output per capita (y), the informal economy
per capita (s), output inclusive the informal economy per capita (s + y), private con-
sumption per capita (c), investment (i), government consumption (g), export (x) and
import (m), all in per capita terms. The statistics are averaged over poor, emerging and
rich countries. Statistics under the heading “All Countries” are achieved by taking the
population-weighted average of each statistic across all countries. The cyclical compo-
nent of each variable (in logs) was obtained by applying alternative detrending/filtering
methods: Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP), log-quadratic detrending (LQ) and first differenc-
ing method (FD).
First of all, the results of all detrending methods confirm a stylized fact in the lit-
erature (see, e.g., Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe´ (2016): less developed countries are more
volatile than the developed counterparts. This fact is more pronounced in the compo-
nents of aggregate output. Furthermore, results in Table 3.1 are close to those reported by
Stock and Watson (2002) with respect to U.S. and to those of Backus et al. (1993) for 10
developed countries.
A striking result is that, both private consumption and government consumption, on
average, are more volatile than output under the heading “All Countries.” However, when
we consider countries by group, the reading is different: on average, the volatility of
government and private consumption is smaller than that of output in rich countries.
These findings, supported by all filtering methods we use, appears to be according to
the permanent income hypothesis or still that the Keynesian prescriptions are working in
these countries. Broadly speaking, result highlights that: output in rich countries is less
volatile than that in poor countries; investment stands for the more volatile component of
aggregate output; contrarily to poor and emerging countries, governments in rich coun-
tries appear to smooth their own consumption as well as allowing/helping households to
smooth their consumption as well. However, looking for U.S., especially as benchmark,
these findings do not hold at all.
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Table 3.1: Volatility of the selected variables: σz = standard deviation of variable zt
U.S. All Countries Poor Countries Emerging Countries Rich Countries
HP LQ FD HP LQ FD HP LQ FD HP LQ FD HP LQ FD
σy 1.88 2.60 1.97 2.78 3.65 2.83 3.68 5.30 4.14 3.76 5.35 4.02 2.64 3.98 2.62
σs 2.00 2.44 2.26 2.84 3.63 2.87 3.81 5.23 5.27 4.05 5.72 4.27 2.72 4.04 2.67
σ(y+s) 1.90 2.58 1.99 2.78 3.62 2.83 3.54 4.79 4.02 3.81 5.38 4.06 2.65 3.99 2.62
σs/σy 1.06 0.94 1.14 1.03 0.99 1.02 1.44 1.04 1.05 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.06 1.03 1.04
σc/σy 0.95 1.04 0.83 1.38 1.48 1.44 1.64 1.50 1.71 1.67 1.52 1.81 0.91 0.92 0.88
σc/σ(y+s) 0.95 1.05 0.83 1.38 1.50 1.44 1.64 1.53 1.71 1.65 1.51 1.80 0.91 0.92 0.87
σi/σy 3.98 4.46 4.28 3.63 3.49 3.84 5.39 5.17 5.69 4.32 3.98 4.71 3.68 3.25 3.79
σi/σ(y+s) 3.96 4.50 4.24 3.62 3.54 3.84 5.34 5.26 5.70 4.33 3.94 4.67 3.66 3.24 3.77
σg/σy 1.12 1.49 0.92 2.19 2.21 2.19 3.18 3.02 3.21 1.51 1.48 1.85 0.81 0.85 0.81
σg/σ(y+s) 1.12 1.50 0.91 2.18 2.24 2.19 3.18 3.08 3.22 1.49 1.47 1.84 0.81 0.85 0.81
σx/σy 3.29 3.37 2.93 3.23 3.37 3.52 4.34 4.32 4.25 2.55 2.47 2.72 2.08 2.27 2.36
σx/σ(y+s) 3.28 3.40 2.91 3.21 3.43 3.53 4.31 4.40 4.26 2.52 2.42 2.70 2.06 2.26 2.34
σm/σy 3.24 3.40 3.23 4.21 3.99 4.29 3.91 3.84 3.81 3.38 3.23 3.44 2.44 2.33 2.60
σm/σ(y+s) 3.23 3.44 3.19 4.19 4.05 4.30 3.89 3.95 3.81 3.33 3.22 3.41 3.42 2.32 2.59
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Our focus in this work is on the business cycle facts of the informal sector. The
remaining of this section and the following sections try to document the key aspects of
the business cycle of the informal sector. Throughout performing this task we will try
to explore some mechanisms, with the aim to explain how the informal and the formal
sectors are related.
The first fact that emerges from Table 3.1 is that the unofficial output is only slightly
more volatile than the official counterpart. Across all detrending methods, on average, the
informal sector is 3 to 8 percent more volatile than the official output.
Stylized fact 3. - The informal output tends to be more volatile than the official output.
The informal economy appears to fluctuate slightly more than its formal counterpart,
ranging in the interval [3, 8], in percentage terms.
The volatility of the informal sector should be interpreted in the light of its features.
For instance, in a theoretical model of the informal sector, Renooy (1990) documents
some distinct features of the informal economy compared to the formal one. Among
them are the higher degree of flexibility and low entrance threshold compared to the for-
mal sector. Thus it is likely that, under these features, ceteris paribus, the informal output
is more volatile than the one under low degree of flexibility and higher entrance thresh-
old. The volatility of the official output including the informal economy, (σ(s+y)), does
not appears to differ from the volatility of output, (σy), on average. The relative volatil-
ity, for instance, of consumption with respect to output inclusive the informal economy,
(σc/σ(y+s)), only presents a maximum difference of 0.03 in only one record. For most of
the records (see the fifth and sixth rows in Table 3.1) the values of that statistic are the
same.
To further analysing the cyclical features of the informal economy, Table 3.2 displays
the average of contemporaneous correlations across poor, emerging and rich countries. It
reports the corr[st, yt], corr[st/yt, yt], corr[zi, yt], corr[zi, (yt + st)], corr[zi/yt, yt] and
corr[zi/(yt + st), (yt + st)], where zi stands for the cyclical components of the respec-
tive variable. Here, two variables are said procyclical if they move in the same direction,
contracyclical if move in the opposite direction and acyclical when we do not identify
a clear comovement between them. Therefore, the degree of the co-movement is given
by contemporaneous correlation coefficient. The first feature we observe in Table 3.2 is
that the absolute size of the informal economy is strongly procyclical. The correlation of
real output with the informal economy is close to 1 in all groups of countries. All com-
ponents of the aggregate output are procyclical, even when we consider the size of the
informal sector. For instance, the correlation of private consumption with output ranges
within the interval [0.52, 0.93], increasing from poor to rich countries. However, the lower
comovement between ct and yt seems to be a consequence of higher volatility of private
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consumption in poor countries relative to rich ones, rather than consequence of consump-
tion smoothing in poor countries (see Table 3.1). Government spending is procyclical on
average. The striking result is regarding to U.S. where the cyclical component of govern-
ment spending delivered by LQ and FD are countercyclical. Still, it is noteworthy that
government consumption, being more volatile in less developed countries (see Table 3.1),
presents a more pronounced procyclicality in these countries, particularly in the emerging
countries (see Table 3.2). Therefore, the Keynesian prescription seems to work only in
the U.S.
Stylized fact 4. - The absolute size of the informal economy is strongly procyclical. The
size of the informal economy moves in the same direction with real output for all countries,
independently of the country’s income level. The degree of comovement increases from
less developed to more developed countries.
What can explain this homogeneous co-movement and heterogeneous degree of co-
movement between the informal economy and the real official output across different
development levels? While the comovement itself might be related to the definition of
informality and its measurement, the degree of comovement is, to a large extent, related
to how the type of informality presented in these countries are related to the formal sec-
tor. As argued in Kuehn (2014), informality in high-income countries is highly integrated
into the formal economy while in less developed countries informality is highly related
to labor market issues and most of them working independently of formal sector and sup-
ported mostly by low skill individuals. For instance, still referred in Kuehn (2014), in
Germany (rich country), among those individuals working full-time in the formal sec-
tor, 43% are also working in the informal sector. United Nations Economic and Social
Council (2006) documents that 6% of the population in the developed region of the world
is living in slums compared with 43% in developing countries. Having said that, if we
observe a one-to-one co-movement between the informal and the formal activity in rich
countries, we should observe positive correlation but smaller than one in poor countries.
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Table 3.2: Correlation between the selected variables and output (yt), and output inclusive the size of the informal sector, (st + yt)
U.S. All Countries Poor Countries Emerging Countries Rich Countries
HP LQ FD HP LQ FD HP LQ FD HP LQ FD HP LQ FD
ρ[s,y] 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.80 0.74 0.93 0.96 0.93 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.98
ρ[s/y,y] 0.12 -0.36 0.49 -0.04 -0.16 -0.06 -0.07 -0.21 -0.11 0.16 0.05 0.13 0.20 0.09 0.17
ρ[c,y] 0.91 0.93 0.88 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.70 0.71 0.68 0.79 0.80 0.72
ρ[c,(s+y)] 0.91 0.93 0.88 0.73 0.74 0.70 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.78 0.80 0.72
ρ[c/y,y] -0.30 -0.04 -0.56 -0.13 -0.07 -0.17 -0.24 -0.27 -0.17 -0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.39 -0.38 -0.49
ρ[c/(s+y),(s+y)] -0.23 0.16 -0.52 -0.15 -0.06 -0.22 -0.24 -0.21 -0.19 -0.05 -0.07 -0.12 -0.41 -0.40 -0.50
ρ[i,y] 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.73 0.72 0.64 0.48 0.45 0.44 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.82 0.81 0.77
ρ[i,(s+y)] 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.74 0.73 0.65 0.50 0.46 0.47 0.67 0.67 0.64 0.82 0.81 0.77
ρ[i/y,y] 0.79 0.84 0.87 0.54 0.50 0.45 0.31 0.26 0.28 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.68 0.65 0.61
ρ[i/(s+y),(s+y)] 0.81 0.85 0.88 0.55 0.51 0.45 0.33 0.28 0.30 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.68 0.63 0.61
ρ[g,y] 0.16 -0.09 -0.12 0.31 0.33 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.20 0.36 0.36 0.32 0.17 0.21 0.11
ρ[g,(y+s)] 0.15 -0.10 -0.13 0.29 0.32 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.21 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.16 0.20 0.10
ρ[g/y,y] -0.59 -0.61 -0.77 -0.24 -0.17 -0.30 -0.09 -0.08 -0.15 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.73 -0.72 -0.74
ρ[g/(s+y),(s+y)] -0.58 -0.59 -0.77 -0.25 -0.17 -0.32 -0.11 -0.08 -0.18 -0.44 -0.43 -0.44 -0.74 -0.71 -0.75
ρ[x,y] 0.30 0.11 0.55 0.32 0.15 0.31 0.43 0.46 0.37 0.41 0.47 0.38 0.64 0.65 0.68
ρ[x,(s+y)] 0.31 0.12 0.55 0.32 0.16 0.31 0.39 0.39 0.33 0.43 0.48 0.39 0.63 0.65 0.68
ρ[x/y,y] 0.00 -0.18 0.24 -0.02 -0.16 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.06 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.17 0.23 0.32
ρ[x/(s+y),(s+y)] 0.02 -0.14 0.25 -0.02 -0.15 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.16 0.22 0.31
ρ[m,y] 0.89 0.92 0.89 0.60 0.48 0.56 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.83 0.81 0.78
ρ[m,(s+y)] 0.89 0.92 0.89 0.60 0.49 0.56 0.41 0.37 0.38 0.62 0.90 0.58 0.83 0.81 0.78
ρ[m/y,y] 0.78 0.85 0.79 0.40 0.25 0.36 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.37 0.33 0.32 0.57 0.53 0.50
ρ[m/(s+y),(s+y)] 0.79 0.85 0.80 0.41 0.26 0.36 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.37 0.32 0.32 0.56 0.51 0.50
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How about the corr [zi, (st + yt)]? There is no evidence supporting any difference
between corr[zi, yt] and corr [zi, (st + yt)]. However, when we consider the share of vari-
ables, corr [zi/yt)], the results changes substantially. Government spending and private
consumption as a share of official output, on average, are countercyclical for all coun-
tries’ group. Given that corr [gt/yt, yt] > 0, this result constitutes the evidence that the
percentage changes of gt, over business cycle, are smaller than the percentage changes in
yt. However, the countercyclicality of the share of government spending to GDP is less
strong in poor countries or, being even acyclical; evidencing that, actually, gt is procycli-
cal in those countries. Similar reading is possible in the other selected variables.
To better qualify the relation among variables, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 report the distribu-
tion of contemporaneous correlation delivered by HP.10 In each column, from upper left
to lower left output of the Figure 3.5, are the correlations between (i) output per capita
and the size of the shadow economy per capita, (ii) output per capita and the size govern-
ment spending per capita, (iii) the size of the shadow economy per capita and the size of
government spending per capita and (iv) output inclusive the informal sector per capita
and the size of government spending per capita. Statistics of poor countries are denoted
by (xP,t) in first column. Second column is the statistic of emerging countries (xE,t) and
the last column contains the statistic of rich countries (xR,t). Figure 3.5 displays the same
statistics in terms of ratio of the variables to output and output inclusive the informal sec-
tor, which allow us to compare the relative changes of variables over the business cycle.
The tail of distribution of the statistic for each country’s groups and for each selected
variables gives us more information than focusing only on the statistics’ averages.
While the values of corr [yt, st] in Figure 3.4, for all groups of countries, lie in the
right-hand side of zero, the values of corr [yt, st/yt] present discrepancy over country’s
group: most of poor countries have values of corr [yt, st/yt] in the left-hand side of zero,
while in emerging and rich countries the values of this statistic for most of countries lie in
the right-hand side of zero. This finding, supported by both methods (see Figures 4 and
6 in Appendix A), along with Fact 5, constitutes the evidence that, in emerging and rich
countries, the percentage changes of the informal sector tend to be larger than the per-
centage changes of the official output over the business cycle, while in poor countries the
percentage changes of the informal sector tend to be smaller than the percentage changes
of official output.
Stylized fact 5. - The size of the informal economy relative to the official output tends
to be countercyclical (or anything acyclical) in poor countries while weakly procyclical
in emerging and rich countries. Given Fact 5, the percentage changes of the informal
sector, in emerging and rich countries, over the business cycle, tend to be larger than
10The results of LQ and FD are presented in Appendix A.
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the percentage changes in the official output, while the opposite seems to hold in poor
countries.
Figure 3.4: Distribution of correlations between yt and st; yt and gt; st and gt; and be-
tween (st + yt) and gt delivered by HP
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This finding may be reflecting both the features of business cycle fluctuations in
less developed countries comparing to developed ones as well as the type of informal-
ity present in each group of countries. Consider the argument linking informality in de-
veloped countries of being mainly linked to tax evasion (Kuehn (2014)). In this set up,
the informal sector may be complementary to the formal one, while in poor countries the
substitution is likely to prevail. In poor countries, most of informality is supported by vul-
nerable low skill workers, credit-constrained entrepreneurs and self-employed individuals
(Ihrig and Moe (2004)). Thus this type of informality is less dependent of official busi-
ness cycle than the one that emerges from opportunities created by official activities (tax
evasion). Putting differently, even though both types of informality move positively with
the formal sector, the sort of informality present in poor countries moves at smaller pace
than the official output does in poor countries, while the reverse occurs in rich countries.
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of correlations between yt and st/st; yt and gt/yt; st/yt and gt/yt;
and between (st + yt) and gt/(st + yt) delivered by HP
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In regards to government consumption, despite of both methods confirm its procycli-
cality, HP filtering delivers 5 poor (in 37), 4 emerging (in 46) and 7 rich (in 22) countries
with countercyclical (or acyclical) government spending. Further, evidence suggests that
in most of the countries of the sample government spending and the informal economy
move in the same direction.
Stylized fact 6. - The informal economy is positively correlated with government con-
sumption. The absolute size of the informal economy moves in the same direction with
government spending, particularly, in poor and emerging countries. However, in rich
countries this fact does not hold at all.
This fact sheds light on the behavior of government consumption over the business
cycle in the three groups of countries as well as the effect of the informal sector for that
behavior. Given that government consumption is strongly procyclical in poor and de-
veloping countries, together with Fact 5, we may anticipate that the larger is the size of
the informal sector, the greater is the degree of correlation between official output and
government consumption. Furthermore, this result constitute an evidence to the idea that
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informality in rich countries is intrinsically linked to the formal one. For example, a
consistent explanation for rich countries (particularly for U.S.), is to assume that tax rate
has positive effect on the informal economy (tax evasion) and that it is also a substitute
of government consumption. So, we should observe a countercyclical government con-
sumption in that framework. In line, Davis and Henrekson (2004) find a positive and
significant relation between tax rate and the size of the informal sector in 14 hig-income
OECD countries. Malaczewska (2013) in a normal form game, analyses the effects of
“useful government expenditures”11 on the size of the underground economy. The author
concludes that whenever wage in the underground sector is significantly larger than the
gross wage in the formal sector, government spending on public goods and services which
meet the needs of households makes the informal economy to increase. On the contrary,
if wage in the shadow sector is smaller than gross wage in the formal sector, the increase
of “useful government spending” leads to a decline in the shadow economy, apparently,
because households realize the benefits of paying taxes. Given these findings under the
facts that poor (rich) countries are characterized by low (high) wage in the formal sector
and higher (attenuated) unemployment rate, while the informal sector is attractive due to
the ability to circumvent taxes and sometimes providing high benefits, together with the
low (high) quality of public institutions in poor (rich) countries undermines (strengths) the
effectiveness of applying the penalties on informality; we conclude that Fact 6 is consis-
tent to Malaczewska (2013)’s model prediction. That is, in less developed countries even
with increases in government spending in providing public goods and services to house-
holds, the type of informality (e.g., absorbing low skill workers and self-employment)
and the low wage in the formal sector are not enough to compensate the benefits of liv-
ing informally. Thus we observe an increasing size of informality even with increases in
government spending. On the contrary, in rich countries there is high wage in the formal
sector which is intensive in high-skill workers; since in those countries, informalities are
mainly due evasion then, whenever household/firms realize that tax revenue returns to
them in the form of public goods and services, they probably sacrifice part of informality
(tax evasion) in favour of tax revenue. This exodus from the informal to the formal sector
attenuates the comovement between government spendings and even leading to a negative
correlation between them (as is the case for the U.S).
Going a step further, Table 3.3 displays the corr(st, zt) where zt, again, stands for the
components of aggregate output. According to the results presented in Table 3.3, private
consumption and the absolute size of the informal economy move in the same direction.
11There are two sorts of government spending in the literature. The so-called wasteful government spend-
ing which is the ones that are only used to meet the government needs and the useful government expendi-
tures that are all expenses that contribute to increased social welfare and for the provision of public goods
and services.
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This result is consistent with economic rationality. That is, income earned in the informal
activity could be spend on official market of goods and services.
Stylized fact 7. - The absolute size of the informal sector is positively correlated with
private consumption. The comovement between private consumption and the absolute
size of the informal economy is positive; with increased degree from poor to rich coun-
tries.
Busato and Chiarini (2004), in a two sector dynamic general equilibrium model, study
the implication of the underground economy on private consumption. The authors argu-
ment is that the underground sector offers an risk sharing opportunity, through labor
reallocation toward that sector. That is, the informal sector expands the budget constraint
of households by offering an insurance channel, alternative to financial markets, available
to people facing, for example, liquidity constraints. Chiarini and Marzano (2006) test the
substitutability effects implicit in model of Busato and Chiarini (2004) and find evidence
towards complementarity between the informal sector and private consumption in Italy.
Our results also show a positive correlation between the informal sector and the others
components of aggregate demand.
3.4 Persistence
Table 3.4 displays the statistics summarizing the persistence of the informal economy,
output and the components of output over poor, emerging and rich countries, using the
cyclical components computed using the three filtering/detrending methods. Again, we
use U.S. as benchmark. The statistic of autocorrelation should be higher (in absolute
terms) the greater is the persistence in the behavior of a certain variable over time.
First of all, results for all detrending/filtering methods highlight a larger persistence
in rich and emerging countries than in poor countries. This finding is consistent with the
findings above, supporting larger volatility of macroeconomic variables in poor countries
than in rich countries. The informal economy follows this pattern as well.
Stylized fact 8. - The informal sector is more persistent in rich countries than in poor
countries. Despite of a smaller size of the informal economy relative to GDP in rich
countries, the types of informality that exist in these countries are more persistent than
those that generally are associated to the poor countries.
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Table 3.3: Correlation of the component of output (yt) with the informal sector
U.S. All Countries Poor Countries Emerging Countries Rich Countries
HP LQ FD HP LQ FD HP LQ FD HP LQ FD HP LQ FD
ρ[s,c] 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.48 0.47 0.29 0.66 0.63 0.65 0.78 0.78 0.71
ρ[s,i] 0.93 0.90 0.94 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.52 0.46 0.50 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.84 0.82 0.79
ρ[s,g] -0.00 -0.21 -0.21 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.15 0.26 0.22 0.22 0.12 0.14 0.05
ρ[s,x] 0.38 0.25 0.59 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.37 0.36 0.30 0.45 0.49 0.40 0.63 0.63 0.67
ρ[s,m] 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.62 0.58 0.58 0.41 0.36 0.37 0.63 0.59 0.59 0.83 0.79 0.79
57
Informal Sector, Business Cycles, and Fiscal Policy
An interesting result regards to the autocorrelation delivered by FD for poor countries.
The autocorrelation of GDP and those of its components are negative or close to zero.
This is a typical behavior of mean reversion of times series, signaling that business cycles
are different across country’s levels of development. That is, in developed countries the
long-term behavior of business cycle moves slowly like random process as they present
more persistence in output and its components. Contrarily, in poor countries after either
shocks (nominal or real), the economy, eventually, returns to its “equilibrium” (initial
state) faster than in rich countries. Consistent with smoothing behavior, public and private
consumption are more persistent in rich countries than poor countries. Investment follows
this pattern as well.
Despite of this short concluding remark, a note on the persistence measure is in order.
Autocorrelation by itself does not capture possible difference in the behavior of macroe-
conomic variables on different phases of cycle. For the sake of arguments, consider de
definition of recession presented by NBER:
Recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the econ-
omy, ..., it begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends
as the economy reaches its trough, (Hall et al. (2001), p. 1).
In practice, the NBER procedures first determines the peaks and troughs in each se-
ries and then, based on well defined criterion, a common turning point is identified in
each series (see e.g., Bry and Boschan (1971)). However, while NBER relies on a set of
economic series to identify turning points, in this work we rely on the cyclical compo-
nent of GDP delivered by HP filter to determine the turning point. That is, our definition
underlies the so called ”Growth Cycles”, such that recession (expansion) is a prolonged
period of declining (increasing) growth in the cyclical component of GDP rather than
a short interruption of a contraction (expansion). With this definition in mind, the fol-
lowing questions stand out: is the unofficial/official output more persistent in recessions
or in expansions? Putting differently, are downturns in the unofficial/official output, on
average, more persistent than upturns? How does the informal economy affects, on aver-
age, the persistence of the observable output? For example, RBC models resort to AR(1)
process (Zt = 0.95Zt−1 + at) or a random walk process (Zt = Zt−1 + at) to represent
the persistence in technological shocks. In line, we address these issues by resorting to
autoregressive model. In what follows, we aim to find the answer for the first question.
The second question is addressed in section 3.5.
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Table 3.4: Autocorrelations of st, yt, ct, gt, it, xt,mt: ρ(zi,t,zi,t−1) = corr(zi,t, zi,t−1)
U.S. All Countries Poor Countries Emerging Countries Rich Countries
HP QD FD HP QD FD HP QD FD HP QD FD HP QD FD
ρ[st,st−1] 0.47 0.60 0.25 0.36 0.62 -0.00 0.36 0.57 0.00 0.53 0.69 0.25 0.61 0.74 0.33
ρ[yt,yt−1] 0.57 0.73 0.32 0.45 0.65 0.05 0.39 0.57 0.03 0.53 0.66 0.29 0.61 0.75 0.34
ρ[ct,ct−1] 0.72 0.83 0.56 0.42 0.57 0.08 0.29 0.51 -0.10 0.49 0.63 0.21 0.66 0.77 0.41
ρ[it,it−1] 0.48 0.74 0.13 0.33 0.56 -0.03 0.21 0.44 -0.19 0.41 0.57 0.04 0.52 0.64 0.17
ρ[gt,gt−1] 0.75 0.89 0.60 0.44 0.62 0.06 0.35 0.56 -0.05 0.43 0.61 0.09 0.60 0.76 0.32
ρ[xt,xt−1] 0.63 0.76 0.28 0.46 0.60 0.13 0.39 0.54 0.01 0.43 0.63 0.06 0.46 0.70 0.15
ρ[mt,mt−1] 0.56 0.75 0.22 0.36 0.51 0.00 0.33 0.54 -0.00 0.46 0.61 0.09 0.51 0.66 0.14
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The autoregresive model to estimate persistence over the business cycle is as follows:
∆Zi,t = ρ1∆Zi,t−1D + ρ2∆Zi,t−1(1−D) + ci + i,t (3.8)
where i,t ∼ N(0, σ2) and Zi,t represents the natural logarithm (Ln) of the size of the
informal economy per capita of a country i in the period t. ∆ = (1 − L) where L is the
lag operator. D is a dummy variable which assumes values 0 if economy is moving from
a peak to a trough (in recession phase) and 1 otherwise. Thus ρ1 in Equation (3.8) tries
to capture the degree of persistence of the informal economy during expansions and the
estimates of ρ2 measures the persistence during recessions. Similarly, we use the natural
logarithm of GDP per capita such that Zi,t = ln(GDP ) per capita. In line to Bry and
Boschan (1971), peak and trough are defined as follows: let Zt denote the logarithm of
the real GDP per capita. So, we define a dummy variable DW that assumes value of 1
if year t is a peak of economic activity and 0 otherwise; and a dummy variable UP that
assumes value of 1 if year t is a trough of economic activity and 0 otherwise. Therefore,
we get peak and trough as follows: DW = 1 if ∆Zt > 0 and ∆Zt+1 < 0, and UP = 1 if
∆Zt < 0 and ∆Zt+1 > 0.
Before analyzing the results from estimation of Equation (3.8), we should first have a
brief discussion of our above strategy. We do not consider short interruption as a transition
from expansion to recession or vice versa (Growth Cycles). Thus instead of ∆ZD and
∆Z(1 − D) in Equation (3.8), if we consider the cycles delivered by HP filter or L.Q.
differencing (say, ZfD), we certainly undergo into spurious result of persistence (may
even be greater than unity). This is so, because ZfD and Zf (1 −D) are portions/phases
of cycles with, respectively, positive and negative trends; such that, they are probably a
process integrated of order d with d ≥ 1. To test our view, Table 3.5 below displays the
results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test on the two phases of cycle (recessions
and expansions) of the cyclical component of the unofficial output per capita deliver by
HP filter (sfHP ) and the growth rate of the absolute size of the unofficial output per capita
(∆Ln(s)). Expansions and recessions are identified by D and (1−D), respectively.12
Table 3.5: Unit root test
sfHPD sfHP (1−D) ∆Ln(s)D ∆Ln(s)(1−D)
ADF stat.† 0.9723 0.9825 0.0000 0.0000
Max lag 1 1 1 1
Obs 1031 799 540 371
Notes: Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)
† The corresponding P-value under the Null
The fixed unobserved heterogeneity among cross-section observation is captured through
12Result similar is achieved using official output.
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of ci in Equation (3.8). As we are working with annual data, AR(1) process should be dy-
namically complete. Results displayed in Table 3.5 support the null under sfHPD and
yfHP (1 − D) and reject the null under ∆Ln(s)D and ∆Ln(s)(1 − D). Therefore, our
view appears to be consistent to the data.
Relying on Hausman test, Table 3.6 reports the results of Equation (3.8), for the
growth rate of the unofficial and the official output per capita across all countries, poor,
emerging and rich countries. According to evidence reported in this table, upturns of the
underground output are more persistent in rich countries than in poor and emerging coun-
tries, while downturns are more persistent in poor countries. Still we infer that downturns
are more persistent than upturns in poor countries. The opposite is true for emerging and
rich countries. The official output follows this pattern as well.
Stylized fact 9. - The informal economy is more persistent during recessions than ex-
pansions, in the poor countries. In the poor countries, the challenges of combating the
informal sector is particularly larger during recessions, as it is more persistent during
that period.
Table 3.6: Persistence of st and yt over the phases of cycle
All C. Poor C. Emerging C. Rich C.
Unofficial output
ρ1 0.2079*** 0.0610* 0.2814*** 0.6559***
(9.431) (1.687) (8.202) (15.54)
ρ2 0.2406*** 0.3200*** 0.1986*** 0.245***
(9.280) (6.759) (5.427) (5.411)
Hausman Test† 0.2098 0.0880* 0.102 0.293
D-W Test‡ 2.014 2.026 1.965 1.956
Skewness (sfHP ) -0.88 -1.35 -0.59 -0.15
Median (sfHP ) 0.0010 0.0004 0.0028 0.0001
Mean (sfHP ) -1.28E-13 -1.37E-13 -1.26E-13 -1.20E-13
Skewness (∆sfHP ) -1.67 -2.29 -0.96 -0.85
Median (∆sfHP ) 0.0023 0.0023 0.0022 0.0024
Mean (∆sfHP ) -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0008
Official output
ρ1 0.2990*** 0.1783*** 0.3931*** 0.7320***
(6.867) (4.909) (11.71) (19.08)
ρ2 0.3732*** 0.3868*** 0.2314*** 0.2055***
(11.10) (8.658) (6.613) (4.813)
Hausman Test† 0.734 0.016** 0.001*** 0.081*
D-W Test‡ 2.043 2.083 2.015 2.228
Notes: t-statistic in parentheses. The Null: ρi = 0, i = 1, 2.
*** Rejection of the Null at 1% level of significance
** Rejection of the Null at 5% level of significance
* Rejection of the Null at 10% level of significance
† The corresponding P-value
‡ The corresponding Durbin–Watson statistic
Relying on the estimates of the persistence over the business cycle, asymmetry in
61
Informal Sector, Business Cycles, and Fiscal Policy
fluctuations of the underground output seems to be a fact. As the literature argues, if the
unofficial output falls below its trend more drastically and severely at shorter time span
than when rising above its trend, a contractionary fiscal policy is of larger reaching com-
pared with a drastic and severe upturns in the real underground output. Putting differently,
whenever the unofficial output rises lazily and gradually the complementary effect of the
income earned in the underground sector is moderate and may not be able to undermine
the effectiveness of fiscal policy. To the contrary, if the underground output rises dras-
tically and severely at shorter time span compared to when it is falling below its trend,
the complementary effects are so powerful, undermining the effectiveness of fiscal policy,
such that a fiscal contraction can be overwhelmingly offset, or even overturned, by the
strong complementary effect of the larger informal sector (Eng (2010)).
The persistence over the course of expansions and recessions of a series gives us
the indication of its business cycle symmetry. Alternatively, we can also test the steep-
ness (steeper slope of downturns than upturns) and the deepness (deeper troughs than the
height of the peaks) hypothesis (see e.g., Sichel (1993)). While the steepness hypothesis
is supported by a negative skewness (and median larger than mean) from, e.g., cyclical
component delivered by HP filter (sfHP ), evidence of the deepness is supported by nega-
tive skewness (and median larger than mean) in the first difference of this same cyclical
component (∆sfHP ). Therefore, the larger is the degree of persistence of a phase of cycle
the greater is its steepness. Thus we contrast the estimated persistences with the estimated
skewness coefficients across all countries, poor, emerging, and rich countries.13
At some extent, the result displayed in the middle of Table 3.6 appears to oppose to
that reported in Eng (2010) and Giles (1997). But, it coincides to that of Bajada (2003) us-
ing classical cycles. Particularly, the larger degree of persistence in recessions compared
to that of expansions in poor countries is consistent with the larger negative estimated
skewness for those countries; suggesting that the fall in the underground output is dras-
tic and deep, while expansion is gradual, and shallow. Results for emerging and rich
countries are ambiguous. While estimate of persistence indicates toward spontaneous and
severe expansions, the skewness coefficient, though small, is negative suggesting toward
steepened downturns in the underground output.
Stylized fact 10. - The informal sector is asymmetric, particularly, in the poor coun-
tries. While, in the poor countries, downturns are drastic, deep and short-lived and
upturns is gradual, shallow and prolonged, in emerging and rich countries the reverse
appears to hold.
Despite of the ambiguity with respect to emerging and rich countries, results in Ta-
13Our concern is to compare the size and the signal of the skewness with the degree of persistences rather
than infer on its statistic significance.
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ble 3.6 call for caution in the design of macroeconomic policies as well as in macroeco-
nomic modelling across countries.
3.5 Informal economy and the official business-cycle reg-
ularities
So far, we have tried to provide a comprehensive set of business cycle facts of the
informal sector. In doing so, we have tried to place them into a literal perspective. The
task of this section is to establish a simple empirical test, relating the size of the un-
derground sector with some regularities of official business cycle. Particularly, we are
looking at questions as: is the size of the informal sector a candidate to explain fluctua-
tions in the official aggregate activity? Is procyclicality of fiscal policy observed in the
poor/developing countries associated to the informal sector? Is there any relation between
the size of the informal sector and the persistence of macroeconomic aggregates?
Our main aim here is to infer on the relation between the size of the underground
sector and a set of cyclical properties of official business cycle. To this end, we compute
the correlation of the relative size of the underground sector with a set of properties of
macroeconomic fluctuations. In particular, being zt standings for a component of the
aggregate output, we estimate the correlation between the relative size of the informal
sector (st/yt) and volatility of the official output (σy), ρ[s/y,σy ]; the correlation between
st/yt and the relative volatility of zt to yt, ρ[s/y,σz/σy ]; the correlation between st/yt and
the correlation between zt/yt and yt, ρ[s/y,ρ[z/y,y]]; and the correlation between st/yt and
the persistence of the official output, ρ[s/y,ρ[yt,yt−1]], and its components, ρ[s/y,ρ[zt,zt−1]].
Table 3.7 displays the estimates of those moments and the respective P-values for poor,
emerging and rich countries. The estimated moments for the entire sample are under the
heading “All countries”. An inspection at each group of countries indicates that properties
of macroeconomic fluctuations such as volatility, cyclicality and autocorrelations are not
correlated with the size of unobservable output. However, results within each group of
countries may be spurious for two motives: small sample problem and small variation in
the data as the countries within each group have similar characteristics. Thus we focus
our analysis on the entire sample (All Countries).
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Table 3.7: Informal sector and official business cycle facts
Fluctuation All Count. P. Count. E. Count. R. Count.
ρ[s/y,σy ] 0.1807
* -0.0342 0.0861 0.0928
(0.0651) (0.8407) (0.5693) (0.6811)
ρ[s/y,σc/σy ] 0.1996
** 0.1255 0.0005 0.3655
(0.0412) (0.4592) (0.9975) (0.0944)
ρ[s/y,σi/σy ] 0.3320
*** 0.1692 0.1916 0.3510
(0.0005) (0.3168) (0.2021) (0.1092)
ρ[s/y,σg/σy ] 0.3759
*** 0.0888 0.0524 -0.0914
(0.0001) (0.6008) (0.7295) (0.6857)
ρ[s/y,σx/σy ] 0.3358
*** 0.2722 0.1074 -0.1810
(0.004) (0.1031) (0.4772) (0.4200)
ρ[s/y,σm/σy ] 0.3155
*** 0.2160 0.1890 0.0775
(0.0010) (0.1992) (0.4709) (0.7317)
Comovement = = = =
ρ[s/y,ρ[c/y,y]] 0.1354 0.0306 0.1047 0.3202
(0.1683) (0.8573) (0.4883) (0.1462)
ρ[s/y,ρ[i/y,y]] -0.2250
** -0.0395 0.1038 0.3818*
(0.0210) (0.8166) (0.4925) (0.0795)
ρ[s/y,ρ[g/y,y]] 0.4696
*** 0.0496 0.0933 -0.0480
(0.0000) (0.7708) (0.5274) (0.8320)
ρ[s/y,ρ[x/y,y]] 0.0070 0.3477
** 0.0715 -0.1483
(0.9437) (0.0349) (0.6368) (0.5218)
ρ[s/y,ρ[m/y,y]] 0.2440
** 0.0303 0.0421 0.3726*
(0.0121) (0.8588) (0.7831) (0.0877)
Persistence = = = =
ρ[s/y,ρ[yt,yt−1]] -0.2036
** -0.0519 0.1301 0.0753
(0.0372) (0.7604) (0.3886) (0.7390)
ρ[s/y,ρ[ct,ct−1]] -0.3667
*** 0.1377 -0.0839 0.1598
(0.0001) (0.4161) (0.5792) (0.4774)
ρ[s/y,ρ[it,it−1]] -0.2678
*** 0.0478 0.1048 0.1195
(0.0057) (0.7787) (0.4880) (0.5965)
ρ[s/y,ρ[gt,gt−1]] -0.2488
** 0.1235 -0.0089 -0.0775
(0.0105) (0.4666) (0.9528) (0.7319)
ρ[s/y,ρ[xt,xt−1]] -0.0726 0.0724 0.1106 -0.2149
(0.4617) (0.6702) (0.4641) (0.3369)
ρ[s/y,ρ[mt,mt−1]] -0.1250 0.2774
* 0.0476 -0.2518
(0.2038) (0.0965) (0.7525) (0.2583)
N. of obs 105 37 46 22
Notes: P-value in parentheses. The Null: ρ[i,j] = 0
*** Rejection of the Null at 1% level of significance
** Rejection of the Null at 5% level of significance
* Rejection of the Null at 10% level of significance
3.5.1 Informal economy and aggregate fluctuations
The top bloc of Table 3.7 contains result of the correlation between the relative size
of the informal sector (st/yt) and the volatility of the official output (σy). It also displays
the correlation between st/yt and the relative volatility of the components of aggregate
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output, (σz/σy). The volatilities are measured by standard deviation of the cyclical com-
ponent deliver by HP filter. First of all, we observe a positive and significant correlation
between st/yt and σy as well as with the relative volatility of all components of aggregate
demand.
To go a little further, Figure 3.6 plots the logarithm of the standard deviations of the
cyclical component of GDP delivered by HP filter against the logarithm of the average
size of the informal economy (in % of GDP).14 From upper left to lower right output, are
the results with respect to the full sample (all countries), the group of poor, emerging and
rich countries, respectively. Also, in each axis is the distribution of the corresponding
variable. As in Table 3.7, there is a mix of reading we might do: within the group of
poor countries there is no evidence supporting any relation between the volatility of GDP
and the relative size of the informal economy. In emerging countries, apparently, the two
variables are slightly positively related and negatively evolved in rich countries. The es-
timated coefficients and the associated P-values for poor, emerging and rich countries are,
respectively, (−0.0028/0.7509), (0.0036/0.4881), (−0.0074/0.7113). Therefore, within
each group there is no statistic evidence supporting any relation between volatility of
output and the size of the informal sector.
Notwithstanding, a word of caution is warranted: inferring the relation between the
informal sector and volatility of GDP by linear regression within a group of countries with
similar characteristics may be under potential pitfalls. Within each group of countries, the
variation in the two variables may not be enough to allow us to ascertain about the relation
between them (small sample problem). Furthermore, a simple univariate linear regression
may suffer from omitted variable bias (as there have no control variables) and endogeneity
bias emerging from simultaneity (as there are factors explaining both informality and
formality (volatility)). Despite these latter shortcomings, whenever we focus the analysis
on the full sample (all countries) the result changes substantially (see upper left output
of Figure 3.6 and the Table 3.7). The estimated coefficient is 0.0069 corresponding a P-
value of 0.0453; meaning that, at 5% significance level, following a 10 percentage point
increase in the relative size of the informal sector, the volatility of official sector increases
about 0.068%. Therefore, the following corollary emerges:
Corollary 1. In general, countries with sizeable informal sector tend to experience greater
fluctuation in their official economic activity.
This result is consistent with some regularities of business cycle observed across coun-
tries. We have observed, in introducing this work (as well as in Fact 1), that the informal
sector is larger in less developed countries, while fluctuation in the official output is more
14As we may see in figures 7 and 8 in Appendix A, the results delivered by LQ and FD detrending are
similar.
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Figure 3.6: Relation between volatility of yt and the size of the informal sector st/yt
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severe in those countries. Additionally, we observe in Fact 2 a declining trend of informal
sector over time, while Stock and Watson (2005) find that volatility of the official output
in most G7 countries has moderated over the past 40 years. Empirical literature which
provides similar evidence is thanks to Bajada (1999), Ferreira-Tiryaki (2008), Granda-
Carvajal (2010) and C¸ic¸ek and Elgin (2011), by concluding that countries with sizeable
informality pursue increased volatility in their official output.
Literature characterises informality as being, usually, intensive in small size enter-
prises with the lack of access to credit, labor-intensive and facing high entry costs when-
ever running to the formal sector. Such features unable these small enterprises to smooth
fluctuation in cash in response to a negative shock. Thus they undergo a decrease in pro-
duction, investment and spending amplifying the initial contractionary shock (Bernanke
et al. (1994; 1999)). On the other hand, the household production literature predicts that,
in an economy with two sector (formal and informal), during expansion, the time devoted
to work will flow from the informal sector to the formal one, while the opposite occur in
recessions. This substitutability between the informal and the formal activity will lead to
a larger volatility in the latter. This implies that countries with sizeable informal activ-
ity experience larges flows in to and out from the formal sector and thus experience an
increased volatility in the formal sector (Benhabib et al. (1991)).
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3.5.2 Informal economy and the cyclicality of macroeconomic aggre-
gates
The middle block of Table 3.7 contains the estimates of the correlations between st/yt
and ρ[z/y,y]. The evidence suggests that the relative size of the informal economy (st/yt) is
significantly correlated with ρ[i/y,y], ρ[g/y,y] and ρ[m/y,y]. The negative correlation between
st/yt and ρ[i/y,y] is consistent with the argument featuring the informal sector. That is, the
informal sector being small in size, facing credit constraint, is unable to smooth their own
investment in endogenous fashion to economic state. Even having external financing,
they have access to relative small amounts at high interest rate from, generally, illegal
moneylenders (Loayza (1999)). Therefore, the larger the size of the informal sector the
larger the inability of an economy to smooth its own investment and so the smaller is the
cyclicality of it/yt to yt.
Corollary 2. Countries with sizeable underground economy are unable to adjust their
own investment levels, particularly in upturns.
Regarding to government consumption, the following corollary emerges.
Corollary 3. Countries with sizeable underground economy enhance the likelihood to
exhibit a procyclical fiscal policy.
Granda-Carvajal (2010), using data for 40 countries (17 developing and 23 OECD
countries), find a positive, although not statistically significant, relation between st/yt
and the cyclicality of government spending (ρ[g,y]) for the entire sample and a negative
correlation for highly industrialized economies. Our results are similar with respect to
the signal but yielding a correlation statistically different from zero for the entire sample.
Our result is also supported by earlier studies of C¸ic¸ek and Elgin (2011). The authors use
data for 78 countries to conclude that procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in
countries with a larger size of the underground sector. Therefore, in contrast to Granda-
Carvajal (2010), our finding is accordingly to Eng (2010)) arguments for procyclicality of
fiscal policy. That is, under larger underground activities, floating asymmetrically, with
strong complementary demand, a contractionary policy may have expansionary effects,
and vice versa. Summing up, the larger is the size (or the relative size to GDP) of the
informal sector the larger are, in the same direction, the changes of gt relative to yt.
The cyclicality of share of import (mt/yt) is positively and statistically different from
zero correlated with the informal sector. In fact, this result holds even in rich countries, at
10 percent significance level.
Corollary 4. Countries with sizeable underground economy enhance the likelihood to
boost imports in a procyclical fashion.
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The relation between the underground activities and the imports of goods and services
is under-explored in the literature. The above finding supports the ideas that part of im-
ports is used as input in the underground sector. Davies and Thurlow (2010) argue that
policies favoring the formal sector may have differential impacts on the underground ac-
tivities. The authors conclude that trade liberalization, even though “hurts” the informal
producers, favors informal traders, who benefit from lower import prices. In fact, while
trade liberalization has long been a fact in rich countries, only recently such policy is be-
ing adopted in less developed countries. Generally, if the underground market-premium
is greater than the risk premium in the official market, the informal traders have incentive
to overinvoicing the imports and sells on the informal market the amount corresponding
to the overinvoiced portion, spending less local currency for the same amount of import.
In this set-up, informality has a positive effect on imports.
3.5.3 Informal economy and persistence of macroeconomic
aggregates
As we state in section 3.4, under larger fluctuation we expect a smaller persistence of
macroeconomic aggregates. Putting differently, on the underground economy perspective,
if it relates positively with fluctuations in macroeconomic aggregates, then it should relate
negatively with the persistence of these aggregates. The empirical evidence displayed in
the bottom block of Table 3.6 supports that countries with a greater underground sector
tends to exhibit smaller persistence in its macroeconomic variables. All correlations are
negative and statistically significant, except for exports and imports.
Corollary 5. Countries with sizeable underground economy enhance the likelihood to
exhibit smaller persistence in their macroeconomic variables.
Therefore, relying on Corollary 5, the informal sector prevents countries to smooth
their economic aggregates over the business cycle.
3.6 Conclusion
Using a large dataset covering 37 poor, 46 emerging and 22 rich countries, this chap-
ter provides a set of facts regarding the cyclical features of the informal sector. As we
listed these facts, we contrast them with the existing literature and try to touch upon
some mechanisms that may constitute a fertile ground for future research. At the heart
of this chapter is the premise that the underground sector has some implications on the
regularities of official business cycle as well as on the effectiveness of macroeconomic
policy. The phenomenon of the informal sector has been a challenge for researchers.
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This challenge consists not only for being an informality but also for being difficult to
find a comprehensive, adequate and accurate measurement and definition of the informal
activity. Analysing the channels by which the informal sector evolves to the formal econ-
omy depends in large extent to its definition and measurement. We hope that the facts
highlighted throughout this chapter contribute to the existing literature of business cycle
regularities of the informal sector as well as casting light to some mechanisms by which
these two sectors are interconnected.
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Chapter 4
Financial Integration, Duality in Labor
Markets and Business Cycles: A Tale With
Microfounded Roots.
4.1 Introduction
There is a growing interest in analyzing the effects of informality on macroeconomic
aggregates. This interest is particularly pervasive for developing economies where the in-
formal economy accounts for a large share of economic activities.1 Models accounting for
the size of the informal economy have provided a relatively better performance than those
abstracting from such activities (see e.g., Benhabib et al. (1991), Busato and Chiarini
(2004), and Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012)). Further, a range of macroeconomic ef-
fects has been identified and attributed to the informal activity, namely the effects on
volatility of economic aggregates, tax base or fiscal spaces, financial instability, sovereign
default risk and public indebtedness.2
Despite the fact that intra-country macroeconomic effects of the informal economy is
relatively well documented, literature offers little in the context of global markets. Bac-
chetta et al. (2009) are an exception by arguing that the existence of a sizeable informal
sector constraints developing countries from fully benefiting from their integration into
the world economy. This work falls on this strand of research. We develop a small
1For a survey on the estimates of informality as labor market inputs see, e.g., Bacchetta et al. (2009). In
regards to informality as percentage of GDP see, e.g., Schneider and Enste (1999) and Elgin and Oztunali
(2012).
2References supporting these effects include Ferreira-Tiryaki (2008) and Granda-Carvajal (2010) by
concluding that countries with a sizable informal economy exhibit higher variability in output, consump-
tion and investment. Turnovsky and Basher (2009) and Vogel (2012) argue toward a restraining effect of
informalities on tax base, while Elgin and Uras (2013) find evidence supporting a positive relation between
the informal sector and financial instability, sovereign default risk and public indebtedness.
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open economy model featuring search and matching frictions a la Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides. With developing countries in mind, we allow for a large frictionless infor-
mal labor market. Instead, formal labor market is characterized by search and matching
frictions generating involuntary unemployment. In this set up we study the interaction
between financial integration, formal and the informal labor markets.
The existence of credit market imperfections together with a sizable informal labor
market pose several questions regarding to business cycles and on the effectiveness of gov-
ernment policies. On the one hand, credit market imperfections magnifies economic fluc-
tuations through of the so-called financial accelerator (see, e.g., Bernanke et al. (1994))
and affect the ability of a country in conducting optimal fiscal policy, particularly in re-
cessions (see e.g., the classic work of Gavin and Perotti (1997)). On the other hand, in-
formality not only has effects on economic cycles as also restrains tax base and increases
sovereign default risk (Elgin and Uras (2013)). So, financial frictions and informality,
being two phenomena of developing countries, can help to fix the so-called small shock,
large cycles puzzle as well as to explain the sub-optimal fiscal policy observed, particu-
larly, in less developed countries.
Indeed, we find that both credit market frictions and the size of the informal sector
weaken the ability of a country to cope with adverse chocks. That is, both informality
and the lack of financial integration stand for as sources of economic volatility. However,
economic volatility appears to be more due to informality than to credit market frictions.
We find that the larger is external finance premium, the higher is the size of the informal
sector. Also, both external finance premium and the size of the informal sector constrain
the implementation of optimal fiscal policies. Further, the results suggest that, in the
presence of a sizable informal sector, some labor market policy intervention alone might
be counterproductive.
To achieve these results, this chapter encompasses six sections, including this intro-
duction. Section 4.2 reviews the related literature. Section 4.3 outlines the model and
4.4 describes two alternatives for financial integration. The dynamics of the model is
presented in section 4.5, and section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Related literature
4.2.1 Informality, financial integration and economic responses
While the conventional story on the consequences of the informal sector for fluctu-
ations in economic activity has its roots under two mechanisms (the buffer and booster
role), in an open economy, financial markets dictates to what extent households insure
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toward country-specific risk and capital flows across borders. So, the first natural ques-
tion is: how do informality and financial integration interact? Establishing a connection
between these two phenomena is straightforward: the informal sector is a hidden activity,
not taxed and unable to cope with labor legislation, and therefore, it adds to information
asymmetries. Because foreign lenders only observe formal activity, they underestimate
the financial and operational power of these firms and so place out the risk premium.
Also, a cause-effect might work in the opposite direction: credit-constrained borrowers
experience difficulty to achieve a proper size to fully exploit economies of scales which,
in turn, would demand for a larger share of high-skilled labor. So, the lack of access to
credit leads firms to operate as small scale entrepreneurs with low-skilled labor such that
the informal employment stand out as a beneficial cushion. Therefore, we should observe
a negative relation between informality and financial integration. Indeed, this is what we
document in this chapter.
A second question has to do with how these phenomena affect the economic responses
to total factor productivity (TFP) shocks. Regarding to credit-market conditions, a range
of distinct results has been derived from the classical international business cycle mod-
els with capital flows across international borders. For instance, Evans and Hnatkovska
(2007) argue towards a non-monotonic relationship between the degree of financial in-
tegration and the size of fluctuations in macroeconomic aggregates; Azariadis and Pis-
sarides (2007) show that a greater access to foreign capital markets amplifies the response
of domestic unemployment rate of disturbances in the TFP relative financial autarky;
C¸enesiz and Pierdzioch (2010) distinguish an amplifier effect in the short-run and a buffer
effect in the medium-run of capital mobility on employment of TFP shocks; in Baxter
and Crucini (1994) the degree of financial integration does not mater if shocks in TFP are
temporary. Others studies such as those of Sutherland (1996), Senay (1998), and Buch
et al. (2005) have drawn on a variant of the dynamic sticky-price general equilibrium
model developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) to conclude that the impact of financial
integration on the volatility of output and consumption depend on the nature of shocks. In
a similar vein, C¸enesiz and Pierdzioch (2008) introduce a friction in labor market which
yielded a reduced magnitude effects of financial integration.
In order to overcome these nonuniform findings, factors such as country size, the de-
gree of economic diversification, and sudden changes of capital inflows have been iden-
tified as intervening factors in the relationship between macroeconomic volatility and
financial integration. For instance, in a similar spirit to the financial accelerator argu-
ments, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) build a model featuring emerging markets
whereupon firms face internal and external borrowing constraints. These authors argue
that these firms are unable to cope adequately with adverse shocks, and so, this magnifies
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the initial severity of these shocks.
However, all these studies are silent with respect to the consequences on and of the
informal sector business cycle. As is argued in Bacchetta et al. (2009) the informal jobs
may attract particular types of capital inflows related to the existence of a large low-wage
labor pool. Furthermore, the authors provide evidence suggesting a negative relation
between economic openness and the incidence of the informal employment.
4.2.2 Dual labor markets and search frictions
Following the classical Harris-Todaro framework (Todaro (1969); Harris and To-
daro (1970)), the dynamics of informality have been tackled as a disadvantaged sector.
More recently, however, there is a recognition that informality should be viewed not as
a marginal or peripheral sector but as a basic component of the total economy (Chen
(2005)). Another stream of the literature, namely, the legalist and the voluntarist ap-
proaches see informality, respectively, as a way to avoid the costs of formalization in-
cluding these of registration and license (Hernando (1990)), and as a voluntary nature
of the entry into the informal self-employment, particularly during economic upturns, in
order to escape taxation and regulation (Maloney (2004)). Lastly, there is a structuralist
approach, where the formal and the informal activities are intrinsically linked. According
to this view, formal firms seek to increase competitiveness by reducing their input costs,
including labour costs. So, aiming to extract profit, these firms promote informal produc-
tion and employment relationships with subordinated economic units and workers (Chen
(2005)). The National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector in India
calls this phenomenon as the informalization of the formal sector (Batini et al. (2010)).
Maurizio (2014), however, shows that, among the new formal workers, over the 2000s,
around 60% in Argentina and 54% in Brazil were working informally in the same job.
While a substantial body of the literature has tackled informality from sectoral per-
spective, few has tackled it from a non-marginal activity view point. For instance, Conesa
et al. (2002) build a RBC model with an informal sector and show that as workers switch
intensively from the formal to the informal sector the volatility of investment and the
recorded output increase. In contrast, Batini, Nicoletta and Levine, Paul and Lotti, Emanuela
(2009) attach the lower output volatility to the fact that the informal wages adjusts more
quickly to shocks than formal wages. Similar stabilization benefit attached to informal-
ity are founded by Busato and Chiarini (2004). The authors develop a two sector DGE
model with two technologies where the workers can split its time-work intensively in the
two sectors. Among others, the model predicts that informality allows for consumption
and income smoothing.
Focusing on developing countries, Fiess et al. (2010) model a two sector labor market
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where the formal sector (tradable) may be affected by wage rigidities and the informal
self-employment sector (non-tradable) faces credit constraints to entry. Times series data
from Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico are used to test model predictions. Fiess et al. confirm
that demand or productivity shocks to the non-tradable sector give rise to procyclical
informal employments. Still on developing countries, Bosch and Maloney (2008) analyze
the cyclical properties of worker flows in Brazil and Mexico and provide a rich empirical
ground which we reproduce here:
First, the unemployment rate is countercyclical essentially because job sepa-
rations of informal workers increase dramatically in recessions. Second, the
share of formal employment is countercyclical because of the difficulty of
finding formal jobs from inactivity, unemployment and other informal jobs
during recessions rather than because of increased separation from formal
jobs. Third, flows from formality into informality are not countercyclical,
but, if anything, pro-cyclical (Bosch and Maloney (2008)).
Drawing on these empirical results Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012) build, and simulate
a two-sector search and matching labor market model in which firms have the choice of
hiring workers legally or illegally, allowing for substitution between the formal and the
informal contracts within similar job types. Using data from Brazil, the model performs
well in matching the cyclical properties found in Bosch and Maloney (2008).
In this chapter we follow the structuralist approach. Basically, we model a dual labor
market in a framework with trading frictions a la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides in which
the employment adjusts at the extensive margin. While Zenou (2008) argues that the
search and matching frictions are the main factors for the emergence of informality, Bosch
and Esteban-Pretel (2012) rationalize the presence of both the formal and the informal
workers within a firm through two effects: meeting effect and offer effect.3 Contrasting
with the traditional view, Hansen (1985) notes that most of the employment fluctuations
arise at the extensive margin rather than at the intensive margin.
Accounting for trading frictions present within the formal and/or the informal labor
markets allows to identify mechanisms governing the flows among the formal sectors,
the informal sectors and the unemployment pool. Trading frictions, therefore, generate
unemployment in the steady state instead of a null-unemployment as in the general equi-
librium models based on Walrasian labor markets. Furthermore, the flows and the transi-
tion rates of workers are key determinants of macroeconomic fluctuations on the search
matching set up, while in the classical labor market is the intesive margin mechanisms
3Meting effect is the increased number of meetings between firms and workers, through of vacancy
creation, due to economic expansions. In turn, offer effect is the result of increased use of formal contracts,
to take advantage of a positive productivity shocks.
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that determine changes in the labor market outcomes. Frictions in the labor market (may)
absorb the effects of credit-market conditions on labor market outcomes (see e.g., results
in C¸enesiz and Pierdzioch (2008)). Informal jobs and capital inflows are two phenom-
ena that characterize developing market economies. Thus the following model combines
these two features and looks at the results of their interactions.
4.3 Model set-up
In what follows we briefly describe a small open-economy DSGE model where agents
face two labor market segments (formal and informal). The profile of labor market seg-
ments and the three agents in the economy, households, firms, and government, are de-
scribed bellow.
4.3.1 Labor market
Following recent trend in modeling labor market, e.g., as in Zenou (2008), we take
labor market adjustments along the extensive rather than intensive margin. The formal
labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions and the informal labor
market is perfectly competitive. The representative households consist of a mass of 1. Of
this mass, nFt is the fraction of household members working in the formal labor market,
nSt is the fraction of workers in the informal labor market, and ut is the unemployment
rate. Thus the unemployment rate at period t reads as
ut = 1− nFt − nSt . (4.1)
The search frictions in the formal labor market can be captured by the following
matching function:
mt = m[st, vt] = σm[st]
µ[vt]
1−µ, (4.2)
where st and vt denote, respectively, the total number of the unemployed job-seekers
and vacancies, and mt is the total number of matches per period. σm is a measure of
the efficiency of the matching process and µ is the elasticity of matches with respect to
job-seekers. Therefore, the matching process is a positive function of the number of job-
seekers and vacancies posted. In each period t, there is a probability of PVθt = mtvt =
σmθ
−µ
t of successfully filling a vacancy, where θt =
vt
st
is a measure of market tightness.
Similarly, a job-seeker has a probability of PUθt = mtst = σmθ
1−µ
t of finding a formal
job. The law of motion of the formal workers depends on a constant, exogenous, job
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destruction rate [ρ] and on new matches, such that
nFt = [1− ρ]nFt−1 +mt = [1− ρ]nFt−1 + PVθtvt. (4.3)
The matching process is meant to capture the search frictions in an environment on which
all workers and firms are ex-ante identical. The search for a formal job in [t + 1], [st+1],
is an increasing function of current unemployed workers, ut, and of the job destruction
[ρnFt ] in the formal labor market such that the current job-seekers’ dynamic is given by
st = ut−1 + ρnFt−1 = 1− [1− ρ]nFt−1 − nSt−1. (4.4)
The informal labor market faces no frictions. Whoever decides to work informally
finds a job depending on his productivity and his reservation wage. We assume that only
the unemployed workers have the possibility to search for a job in the formal labor market.
Therefore, the workers informally engaged must first became unemployed and then search
for a formal job.
4.3.2 Households
A composite consumption good [ct] enters concavely into the households’ preferences,
described by the following discounted lifetime expected utility function as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU [ct], (4.5)
where, β ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor and E0 is the mathematical conditional expec-
tation given currently available information. The instantaneous utility function, U [·], is
represented by
U [ct] = c
1−γ
t / (1− γ) , (4.6)
where γ is a measures of the degree of relative risk aversion. A household member can
either be working in the formal or in the informal labor market, earning, respectively,
a real wage of wFt and w
S
t ; if unemployed, the household member receives a constant
unemployment benefit of wU . Furthermore, the representative households own capital
[kt] that depreciates at a rate of δ ∈ [0, 1] and evolves over time as
kt = it + [1− δ]kt−1, (4.7)
where it stands for the gross investment.
We consider a benchmark small open economy facing a single big economy (the rest
of the world, ROW) with a constant real interest rate [r∗]. Domestic agents, however,
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face a country risk premium
[
f(dft )
]
that is defined as a spread over the foreign interest
rate. This financial framework is in line with the presumption that under an imperfect
enforcement of international obligation, a country risk premium (country spread) is set
up by international creditors to compensate the risk of defaulting on a financial contracts.
Indeed, there is evidence favoring debt-sensitive interest rate in emerging countries (see,
e.g., Akitoby and Stratmann (2008)). Thus as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), we
set the interest rate faced by domestic agents [rdt ] as a function of foreign debt, which is
described as fallows:
rdt = r
∗ + f(dft ) = r
∗ + ξ
[
exp[d
f
t−d¯]−1
]
, (4.8)
where dft is the debt, ξ and d¯ are constant parameters. So, being rkt a variable denoting
the rental rate of capital, the representative household’s inter-temporal budget constraint
is given by
dft = [1 + r
d
t−1]d
f
t−1 − [1− τW ]wFt nFt − wSt nSt − wUut + ct + it
− rkt kt−1 − Πft + Φ(k), (4.9)
where the function Φ(k) is meant to capture capital adjustment costs. We set Φ(k) =
φ
2
[kt − kt−1]2. The constant tax rate on labor income and the firm’s profit are denoted,
respectively, by τW and Πft . Agents are also subject, at all dates, to the solvency constraint
of the form
lim
j→∞
Et
(
dft+j/
j∏
s=0
[
1 + r∗ + f(dfs )
]) ≤ 0, (4.10)
such that the representative household’s problem can be described by the following La-
grangian function
LHt = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{[
nFt
[
cFt
](1−γ)]
/(1− γ)
+
[
nSt
[
cSt
](1−γ)]
/(1− γ)
+
[
(1− nFt − nSt ) [cut ](1−γ)
]
/(1− γ)
+ λ1,t[d
f
t − [1 + rdt−1]dft−1 + [1− τW ]wFt nFt + wSt nSt + wUut
− nFt cFt − nSt cSt − utcut − kt + [1− δ]kt−1 + rkt kt−1 + Πft − Φ(k)]
+ λ2,t
[
nFt − (1− ρ)nFt−1 − PUθt [1− (1− ρ)nFt−1 − nSt−1]
]
+ λ3,t
[
lim
j→∞
Et
(
dft+j/
j∏
s=0
[
1 + r∗ + f(dfs )
])]}
, (4.11)
where λ1,t, λ2,t and λ3,t are Lagrange multipliers. cFt , c
S
t and c
u
t denote, respectively,
77
Informal Sector, Business Cycles, and Fiscal Policy
formal, informal and the unemployed members consumption of the representative house-
holds. By integrating the households’ heterogeneity into a representative agent frame-
work, the first order necessary conditions with respect to ct and kt of the household’s
maximization problem provide the following Euler equation:
1 = βEt
[
c−γt+1
[
1− δ + rkt+1 + φ(kt+1 − kt)
]
c−γt [1 + φ(kt − kt−1)]
]
(4.12)
Equation (4.12) shows that a positive change in consumption at any time period t must,
optimally, have a benefit equal to the cost of decreasing, in [t + 1], the same discounted
value of consumption of one unit of investment. The partial derivative with respect to dft
delivers
λ1,t = β
[
1 + rdt
]
Etλ1,t+1, (4.13)
where country spread enters to penalize current consumption.
4.3.3 Firms
In this economy an internationally tradable homogeneous composite good is pro-
duced. This homogeneous composite good is the result of a concave combination of
three inputs: capital [kt], formal labor [nFt ] and the informal labor [n
S
t ]. While output and
formal labor are subject to taxation, the informal labor is not taxed as it is unobserved by
the official authority. Accordingly, the production technology for a firm is described by a
constant return to scale production function
yt = atk
αk
t−1[n
F
t ]
αF [nSt ]
αS , (4.14)
where yt is the internationally tradable composite good and at captures the total factor
productivity (TFP). The parameters αk, αF and αS are, respectively, the share of capital,
formal and the informal labor inputs on output.
As for costs, while searching for informal job is costless, posting a vacancy in the
formal labor market brings a cost of κ. Moreover, while firms pay wFt to formal labor
which is set through of Nash bargaining, the informal labor is paid a wage ofwSt that result
from competitive informal labor market equilibrium. The maximization of the firm’s
profit
[
Πf
]
is subject to the law of motion of formal employment given by Equation (4.3).
Thus we write the problem of a firm as
Πft = max{nSt ,nFt ,kt−1}
{
[1− τF ]yt − κvt − [1 + τN ]wFt nFt − wSt nSt
− rkt kt−1 + βEtΛt,t+1Πft+1
}
, (4.15)
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s.t. nFt = [1− ρ]nFt−1 + PVθtvt,
s.t. yt = atk
αk
t−1[n
F
t ]
αF [nSt ]
αS ,
where τN stands for payroll tax and τF is the corporate tax. βEtΛt,t+1 is the stochastic
discount factor such that EΛt,t+1 = Et
[
λ1,t+1
λ1,t
]
. By rewritten the law of motion of formal
employment for a firm, the firm’s problem can be read in terms of Lagrangian function as
max
{nFt ,nSt ,vSt ,kt−1}
LΠft = Πft + Γt[nFt − [1− ρ]nFt−1 − PVθtvt]. (4.16)
The first order conditions with respect to the informal labor gives the wage of the informal
labor
wSt = [1− τF ]
yt
nSt
αS. (4.17)
Similarly the rentability of capital is
rkt = [1− τF ]
yt
kt−1
αk (4.18)
The optimal quantity of vacancies satisfies Γt = −κ/PVθt . That is, at the optimum,
the marginal value of a formal worker for a firm, [Γt], must be equal to the symmetric of
the cost of posting a vacancy divided by the probability to fill in this vacancy
[−κ/PVθt].
Using this optimal condition for vacancy, the equilibrium condition in regards to formal
work is given by:
κ
PVθt
= [1− τF ] yt
nFt
αF +
[−κ− ΓtPVθt] ∂vt∂nFt
− [1 + τN ]wFt − [1− ρ]βEtΛt,t+1Γt+1
= [1− τF ] yt
nFt
αF − [1 + τN ]wFt +4EtΛt,t+1
[
κ
PVθt+1
]
, (4.19)
where4 = [1− ρ]β. Therefore, in the absence of frictions [κ = 0], wage augmented by
payroll tax on the formal labor equals to the marginal product of formal labor net of tax.
Whenever there is no government nor frictions [κ = τF = τN = 0] wage equals marginal
product of formal labor - competitive labor demand function.
4.3.4 Nash bargaining
While wage in the informal labor market is fully flexible, in the formal labor market
it is determined by a Nash bargaining. Thus for this purpose, we first derive the rep-
resentative household’s marginal utility of having a member that, in period t, changes
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his employment status from unemployed to employed in the formal sector
[
UF
t,nFt
]
. This
household’s marginal value is strictly increasing with respect to the wedge between the
wage net of labor income tax and unemployment benefits as well as to the expected value
of still being employed next period. That is, the unemployment benefits lost by a matched
worker will be replaced by a formal wage net of tax augmented of the expected value of
still being employed next period. Accordingly, it reads:
UFt,nFt =
∂LHt
∂nFt
= λ1,t
[
(1− τW )wFt − wU
]
+ 4Et[1− PUθt+1 ]UFt+1,nFt+1 . (4.20)
We next derive the marginal value for a firm that in period t hires a formal worker as
follows4
VFt,nFt =
∂LΠft
∂nFt
= [1− τF ] yt
nFt
αF − [1 + τN ]wFt
+ 4EtΛt,t+1
[
VFt+1,nFt+1
]
. (4.21)
Thus taking 0 < η < 1 as work’s bargaining power, the Nash bargaining solution is the
wage
[
wFt
]
that solves the following problem:
N Ft = max{wFt }
[
η logUFt,nFt + [1− η] logV
F
t,nFt
]
, (4.22)
where UF
t,nFt
and VF
t,nFt
are defined in equations (4.20) and (4.21), respectively. The first
order condition yields
η[1− τW ]VFt,nFt = [1− η][1 + τ
N ]
[UF
t,nFt
λ1,t
]
. (4.23)
The term
[UF
t,nFt
λ1,t
]
is the household’s marginal value, in terms of unit of consumption
goods, of having an additional member employed formally. A worker is indifferent be-
tween being formally employed and receiving a reservation wage of wFt (the minimum
value of real wages to make a worker willing to work) augmented by the discounted value
of being employed next periods or being unemployed receiving an unemployment ben-
efit, wU . Similarly, a firm is indifferent between filling a vacancy by hiring a worker
under a pay-off equal to its real reservation wage of w¯Ft (the maximum value of real wage
willing to pay to a formal worker) or keeping the vacancy unfilled. Therefore, the Nash
4Comprehensively, the marginal social welfare
[
SH,Ft,m
]
that results from a match mt is the sum of the
marginal value of the matched household and the marginal value of the respective firm, such that SH,Ft,m =
UF
t,nFt
+ VF
t,nFt
.
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bargaining solution is an interior solution over the wedge between firm and household’s
real reservation wage, being the real location determined by the household’s bargaining
power. So, as η → 0, the Nash bargaining solution approaches to the household’s real
reservation wage, such that
wFt = ηw¯
F
t + [1− η]wFt . (4.24)
Consistently, abstracting from the dynamics of wages over time, we can think of an
household’s real reservation wage and unemployment benefits as two consumption bundle
over an indifference curve, such that moving from one consumption bundle to the other
has no marginal effects for households. An identical rationality may be applied on firm’s
decision. Thus on this conceivable framework, households and firms face
[UF
t,nFt
λ1,t
]
=[
VF
t,nFt
]
= 0. Therefore, the equations (4.20) and (4.21) become, respectively:
wFt =
[
wU
1− τW
]
−
[ 4
1− τW
]
Et[1− PUθt+1 ]Λt,t+1
[UF
t+1,nFt+1
λ1,t+1
]
. (4.25)
w¯Ft =
[
1− τF
1 + τN
]
yt
nFt
αF +
[ 4
1 + τN
]
EtΛt,t+1
[
VFt+1,nFt+1
]
. (4.26)
where wFt and w¯
F
t are, respectively, the households’ and firms’ real reservation wages as
defined above. From Equation (4.19) we may conclude that VF
t,nFt
=
[
κ
PVθt
]
. So, plugging
equations (4.25) and (4.26) into (4.24) and taking into account the first order condition in
Equation (4.23), we derive the real wage as a function of households bargaining power:
wFt = η
[
1− τF
1 + τN
]
yt
nFt
αF + [1− η]
[
wU
1− τW
]
+ ηκ
[ 4
1 + τN
]
EtΛt,t+1
[
PUθt+1
PVθt+1
]
(4.27)
As expected, the real wage is a positive function of marginal productivity of labor, unem-
ployment benefits and the labor market tightness. Therefore, the higher unemployment
benefits are the greater is the opportunity cost for workers, and so, they preserve for a
higher formal real wage. Further, a job-seeker behaves more aggressively regarding real
wage whenever he expects to easily find another job opportunity. In turn, wage claimed
is inversely related to the probability of a firm filling a formal vacancy. Lastly, by using
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equations (4.19) and (4.27) we write the dynamic of employment over time as
θµt = [1− η]
σm
κ
[(
1− τF ) yt
nFt
αF −
(
1 + τN
1− τW
)
wU
]
+ 4EtΛt,t+1
[
1− ηPUθt+1
]
θµt+1 (4.28)
4.3.5 Government
Government has three sources of fiscal revenues: labor income taxes [τW ], payroll
taxes [τN ] and taxes levied on produced-output [τF ]. We assume that government ex-
penditures do not contribute, directly, to either production or to household utility. Gov-
ernment, however, consumes gt and rebates all remaining revenues to households in the
form of a constant unemployment benefits [wU ] such that its deficit equals to zero at every
period of time [def gt = 0]. So, the government’s intertemporal budget constraints is
def gt = gt + w
Uut − τFyt − [τW + τN ]wFt nFt = 0. (4.29)
4.3.6 Model closure and equilibrium conditions
Following Zenou (2008) we assume that the unemployed pool is a prior state for for-
mal job-seeking: the workers employed informally must first become unemployed and
then search for job in the formal labor market. Zenou (2008) argues the adequacy of this
assumption because, in developing countries, a large fraction of jobs are found through
word-of-mouth communication and social networking.5 We add that, in developing coun-
tries, there is usually a large fraction of low-educated level and unskilled workers with no
means to search for job in the formal labor market. Therefore, they need first to engage in
training programs to become qualified and, then, apply to existing vacancies in the formal
market.6
Zenou (2008) assumes that the workers in the unemployment pool never go to the
informal sector because the unemployed workers are always better than the informal
workers. We, however, relax this assumption by allowing mobility in both directions.
Accordingly, we define the equilibrium mobility condition assuming that the household’s
value in the unemployment pool [Uut ] is the accumulated intertemporal pay off of the in-
formal labor augmented by a switching cost (or benefits) of moving from formal sector to
5An alternative argument still is presented by Zenou (2008; p. 341) ... formal and informal sectors are
usually not located in the same part of the city. So one has first to move to the location where formal jobs
are, and then, while unemployed, searches for a formal job.
6For example, the World Bank through its Education and Employment Division of the Population and
Human Resources Department has conducted programs of vocational-technical education in Developing
Countries.
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the informal sector. Therefore, we set the switching cost as follows:
MFt,S = Ξ + ψEt[w
F
t+1 − wFt ]. (4.30)
This switching cost differs from that in Zenou (2008) in two ways. First, Ξ rather than
be strictly positive as in Zenou (2008), it is an equilibrium outcome. A positive value for
Ξ means that the workers in the unemployment pool never move to the informal sector,
while a negative value for Ξ means that workers in unemployment pool may have benefit
to move to the informal sector. Indeed, equilibrium condition yields a negative value for
Ξ. The expected changes on formal labor wage
[
∆wFt+1
]
dictates to what extend the two
sector are connected. If ψ > 0 times changes in the formal wages
[
ψ∆wFt+1
]
is higher
than Ξ in absolute value, then the worker in unemployment pool will keep as unemployed
in that sector and only look for formal hires. If ψ∆wFt+1 is lower than Ξ in absolute value,
then a worker in the unemployment pool will move to the informal sector and start to
work informally. Thus we write the mobility condition as
Uut
λ1,t
= Et
∞∑
s=0
[βsΛt,t+1w
S
t+s +M
F
t+s,S] = w
S
t + Ξ + βEtΛt,t+1
[Uut+1
λt+1
]
(4.31)
where U
u
t
λ1,t
stands for the household’s value for unemployment in units of consumption
good. Thus we compute the value for an unemployed work [Uut ] and the value of that
employed in the formal sector [U et ]. These are done by making use of Equation (4.20) and
by taking into account that UF
t,nFt
= U et − Uut . So, we write
U et = λ1,t[1− τW ]wFt + βEt
[
[1− ρ]UFt+1,nFt+1 + U
u
t+1
]
(4.32)
Uut = λ1,twUt + βEt
[
[1− ρ]PUθt+1UFt+1,nFt+1 + U
u
t+1
]
(4.33)
Finally, by using household’s budget constraint together with government’s budget
constraint and the firm’s profit we get the resource constraint for our laboratory economy
as follows:
yt = ct + gt + it + κvt + tbt +
φ
2
[kt − kt−1]2 , (4.34)
where tbt = [1 + rdt−1]d
f
t−1 − dft denotes the balance of trade for the domestic economy.
The equilibrium conditions consist of a system of twenty one equations in twenty one
endogenous variables. Table 4.1, below, summarizes the equilibrium conditions for our
baseline model.
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Table 4.1: Model Summary - Baseline model
E4.1 Matches mt = σm[st]µ[vt]1−µ
E4.2 Output yt = atkα
k
t−1[n
F
t ]
αF [nSt ]
αS
E4.3 Formal empl. dynamics nFt = [1− ρ]nFt−1 + PVθtvt
E4.4 Market tightness θt = vt1−[1−ρ]nFt−1−nSt−1
E4.5 Prob. fill. a vacancy PVθt = σmθ−µt
E4.6 Prob. find. a job PUθt = σmθ1−µt
E4.7 Euler eq. consumption 1 = β[1 + r∗ + f(dft )]EtΛt,t+1
E4.8 Capital dynamics kt = it + [1− δ]kt−1
E4.9 Euler eq. capital
[1 + φ(kt − kt−1)] =
βEtΛt,t+1
[
1− δ + [1− τF ]yt+1kt αk + φ(kt+1 − kt)
]
E4.10 Informal wage wSt = [1− τF ] ytnSt α
S
E4.11 Formal wage
wFt = η
[
1−τF
1+τN
]
yt
nFt
αF + [1− η]
[
wU
1−τW
]
+ηκ
[
4
1+τN
]
EtΛt,t+1θt+1
E4.12 Employment dynamics
θµt = [1− η]σmκ
[(
1− τF ) yt
nFt
αF −
(
1+τN
1−τW
)
wU
]
+4 EtΛt,t+1
[
1− ηPUθt+1
]
θµt+1
E4.13 Switching costs MFt,S = Ξ + ψEt[w
F
t+1 − wFt ]
E4.14 Mobility conditions U
u
t
c−γt
= wSt + Ξ + βEtΛt,t+1
[
Uut+1
c−γt+1
]
E4.15 Employment value
Uet = [1− τW ]c−γt wFt
+βEt
[
(1− ρ) [Uet+1 − Uut+1]+ Uut+1]
E4.16 Unemployment value
Uut = wUc−γt
+βEt
[
(1− ρ)PUθt+1
[Uet+1 − Uut+1]+ Uut+1]
E4.17 Debt dynamics
dft = [1 + r
d
t−1]d
f
t−1 − [1− τW ]wFt nFt − wSt nSt
−wUut + ct + it − rkt kt−1 −Πft + φ2 [kt − kt−1]2
E4.18 Gov. consumption gt =
[
τW + τN
]
wFt n
F
t + τ
F yt − wUut
E4.19 Aggregate res. const. yt = ct + gt + it + κvt + tbt + φ2 [kt − kt−1]2
E4.20 Job-searchers st = 1− [1− ρ]nFt−1 − nSt−1
E4.21 TFP shock ln at = βa ln at−1 + σεεt
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4.4 Alternative financial market integration
The single-asset economy (the baseline model) we have described previously is char-
acterized by an external risk premium to capture financial frictions that are present, partic-
ularly, in developing countries. In what follows we describe two alternative frameworks
for financial integration: one where agents have access to a complete set of Arrow-Debreu
contingent claims and the other featuring a closed economy.
4.4.1 Complete asset markets
Let bft,t+1 denote the amount of assets purchased by households in period t to deliver a
unit of good in particular state of period t+1, and pt,t+1 denoting a pricing kernel such that
the period-t price of a random outcome bft,t+1 in period [t + 1] is given by Etpt,t+1b
f
t,t+1.
7
Thus households’ wealth in period t, in terms of asset holding, is given by bft,t. In this
economy, agents are also subject, at all dates and under all contingencies, to a no-Ponzi-
game constraint of the form
lim
j→∞
Etpt,t+jb
f
t,t+j ≥ 0, (4.10’)
where pt,t+j ≡ p0,1 × p1,2 × ... × pt+j−1,t+j , with pt,t ≡ 1, denotes the pricing kernel
such that Etpt,t+jb
f
t,t+j is the period-t value of a portfolio b
f
t,t+j with a random payment
in period [t + j]. The partial derivatives from the the household’s maximization problem
with respect to bft+1 delivers the following Euler equation:
λ1,tpt,t+1 = βλ1,t+1. (4.35)
Therefore, while the access to a complete set of Arrow-Debreu contingent claims enables
agents to diversify risks for every state, in the one-asset economy model, as we saw in
previous section, portfolio diversification hold only on average (see Equation (4.13)).
The economy is small and open to the rest of the world. This counterpart is similar
to the home economy, inclusive the access to the menu of internationally traded assets.
Taking the starred letters to denote foreign variables, the first order condition of foreign
households problem with respect b∗t,t+1 yields
λ∗1,tp
∗
t,t+1 = βλ
∗
1,t+1. (4.35*)
Because of free capital mobility, asset’s price equals across-countries for all dates
and states, [pt,t+1 = p∗t,t+1]. Under the assumption that foreign and domestic households
7One should note that Etpt,t+1b
f
t,t+1 can be seen as the expected amount of imported goods for a
particular state of period [t+ 1], given the information available at period t.
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have the same constant subjective discounted factor [β], equations (4.35) and (4.35*)
can be rearranged in order to get λ1,t = ξ0λ∗1,t, where ξ0 =
λ1,0
λ∗1,0
is meant to determine
the relative size of domestic marginal utility of consumption with respect to its foreign
counterpart. Because the focus is on productivity shocks within a small open economy,
we taken foreign variables as exogenously given and time invariant. As a result we get
λ1,t = ξ0λ
∗
1 = ψ0. Therefore, the access to a complete asset markets allows households
to fully insure themselves against domestic risk, facing only foreign aggregate risk which
is nil, here, by hypothesis. Table 4.2 displays the two non sharing equilibrium equations
with respect to the previous presented single-asset economy model.
Table 4.2: Complete asset markets
E4.7’ Euler eq. consumption c−γt = ψ0
E4.17’ Asset holdings
Etpt,t+1b
f
t,t+1 = b
f
t,t + [1− τW ]wFt nFt + wSt nSt
+wUut − ct − it + rkt kt−1 + Πft − φ2 [kt − kt−1]2
4.4.2 Closed economy
While in the previous presented economic models households can partial or fully di-
versify country specific risk by implementing an optimal consumption plan, in closed
economy they have no such possibility. Here, households cannot borrow and lend inter-
nationally.8 Therefore, the economic agents can only accumulate capital with the savings
of its own residents.
The households’ problem remains the same as described by Lagrangian function in
Equation (4.10) with two additional restrictions dft+1 = d
f
t = 0. The equilibrium condi-
tions differ only with respect to the Euler equation for consumption (due to the impossi-
bility of implementing all consumption plans) and the resource constraint of the economy
(due to the impossibility to absorb foreign savings). Table 4.3 also displays the two non-
sharing equations with respect to the one-asset economy model.
Table 4.3: Closed economy
E4.7” Euler eq. consumption c−γt = λ1,t
E4.17” H. budget constraint
ct + it = [1− τWt ]wFt nFt
+wSt n
S
t + w
Uut + r
k
t kt−1 + Π
f
t − φ2 [kt − kt−1]2
8This is essentially a financial autarky. Because our model features only a tradable good, once we
assume financial autarky (dft = 0), the model becomes a closed economy framework.
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4.5 Dynamics of the model
In this section we lay out the dynamics of the model. We are interested on the dy-
namics of the informal sector over the business cycle as well as its impact on the overall
economic volatility. We are also interested in how financial frictions, as measured by EFP
(or say, country risk premium, ξ), affect the volatility and the dynamics of the model. The
quantitative simulation and calibration strategy are presented in the following sections.
4.5.1 Calibration
The calibration strategy is meant to match annual business cycle frequency in develop-
ing countries. Drawing on the conventional business cycle literature we set the subjective
discount factor [β] equal to 0.96 and depreciation rate [δ] equal to 0.1.
To assign values to the production function parameters, we rely on Gollin (2002) and
Bernanke and Gu¨rkaynak (2001) who show that factor shares in developing countries
are, generally, similar to those of developed countries, whenever we take into account
the self-employing sectors. Indeed, regardless of income per capita, the former finds a
labor share ranging from 0.68 to 0.80, on an average of 0.758. Thus we take a capital
share
[
αk
]
equal to 0.28. The labor shares
[
αF , αS
]
are set accordingly to the size of the
informal employment
[
n¯S
]
. We set n¯S accordingly to the average size in the literature.
For instance, Bacchetta et al. (2009) conclude that there is a large variation of the informal
employment across countries; reporting (with a decreasing trend) a relative size of the
informal employment around of 60 percent for developing countries. So, we set n¯S =
0.56. This choice leads us to arrive at αS = 0.4383, for an unemployment rate [u¯] of 8 per
cent.9
In regards to the matching process, there are five parameters to which we need to
assign values: the bargaining power parameter [η], the elasticity of matches with respect
to job seekers [µ], the matching efficiency parameter [σm], the vacancy costs parameter
[κ], the separation rate [ρ], and two cost parameters for the mobility condition, the fixed
switching costs [Ξ] and the expected formal wage-dependent switching cost parameter
[ψ].
As is conventional in the literature, we assume that firms and workers share equal
fraction of surplus of matches, by setting η = 0.5. Moreover, we set µ = η satisfying the
so-called Hosios (1990) condition. While the matching efficiency parameter [σm] reflects
to what extent the units of formal labor markets are matched, for a given externality that
9According to International Labor Organization (ILO), the unemployment rate in developing countries
over the last two years is 5.5%. However, our choice of 8% is consistent to that of 7.2% chosen by Albrecht
et al. (2009) and the reference therein of 6.1% for Mexico, 5.5 for Brazil and 13% for Colombia.
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each one exerts on the others, the vacancy costs parameter [κ] reflects frictions generating
equilibrium unemployment. Exogenously, we set σm = 0.5. By making use of equa-
tions (4.19) and (4.27) we arrive at κ = 0.2332, yielding an equilibrium ratio of recruiting
costs to output of 1.9 per cent which is slightly above to that of 1.2 percent that Satchi and
Temple (2009) obtains for Mexico and that of 1 percent for US economy in Andolfatto
(1996). Following related literature, we set ρ = 0.1. The fixed mobility costs parameter
[Ξ = −0.1539] is an equilibrium outcome, derived by managing equations (4.31), (4.32)
and (4.33). The formal wage-dependent switching costs parameters [ψ = 0.7527] is set to
reflect formal wage relative to informal one.
Drawing on Kugler and Kugler (2009) and Gordon and Li (2009), the fiscal instru-
ments are set such that τF = 0.3, τW = 0.35 and τN = 0.15. The persistence [βa] and the
variance [σe] of the productivity shocks are set 0.52 and 1, respectively. d¯ is set to match
the observed average trade-balance-to-output ratio of −0.05 in developing countries. The
remaining parameters as capital adjustment costs [φ = 0.028], external finance premium
(EFP) [ξ = 0.000742] and the relative risk aversion parameter [γ = 2] are borrowed from
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003). Table 4.4 below summarizes the calibrated values for
the parameters and Table 4.5 displays the implied steady state values.
Table 4.4: Summary of the calibration
Parameter Value Description
β 0.96 Discount factor
δ 0.10 Capital depreciation rate
r∗ 0.0417 World interest rate
αk 0.2800 Capital share
αS 0.4383 Informal labor share
η 0.50 Households bargaining power
µ 0.50 Elasticity of matches to searches
κ 0.4739 Vacancy costs
σm 0.50 Efficiency of matches
Ξ -0.1539 Switching costs
ψ 0.7527 Formal wage-dependent switching costs
ρ 0.10 Separation rate
τF 0.30 Corporate tax
τW 0.35 Labor income tax
τN 0.15 Payroll tax
φ 0.028 Capital adjustment costs
ξ 0.000742 External Finance Premium
γ 2.00 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
βa 0.52 Persistence of TFP shock
σe 1.00 Variance of TFP shock
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Table 4.5: Summary of the steady state values
Description Notation (1)
Wage share
[
wFnF + wSnS
]
/y 0.455
Unemployment rate u 0.080
Formal employment nF 0.360
Informal employment nS 0.560
Investment to output ratio i/y 0.138
Vacancy costs to output ratio κv/y 0.019
Consumption to output ratio c/y 0.530
Trade balance to output ratio tb/y -0.049
Government consumption to output ratio g/y 0.362
4.5.2 Dynamics
Figure 4.1 below illustrates the dynamics of the three economic models. The figure
plots the dynamics of the selected variables when the economy is hit with a positive tech-
nology shock. The variables are expressed in percentage deviation from the steady state
values. A positive productivity shock leads to rise in output, investment, consumption,
and formal wage in all markets. A deterioration of trade balance (as percentage of out-
put) takes place as well. In regards to the cyclicality of government consumption [ρgt,yt ],
although we find that it is procyclical in both scenarios of financial markets (single-asset
economy, complete asset markets, and closed economy), we observe that the degree of
procyclicality increases from complete asset markets to closed economy. That is, the
degree of procyclicality is, respectively, 20% and 23% higher in single-asset economy
and in closed economy than the cyclicality of government consumption in economy with
complete asset markets. This result sheds light on the argument that developing countries
are often constrained by fragile financial markets and low financial integration that may
impinge with the stabilization role of fiscal policy, determining procyclicality of fiscal
policy.
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Figure 4.1: Dynamics of selected variables for alternative levels of financial integration
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Baseline Model Complete Markets Financial Autarky
Contrarily to the view of buffer role of informality or that taking informality as an
inferior segment rationed out of formal labor market, we find a procyclical informal em-
ployment and a countercyclical formal one. These results strongly collaborate with the
findings in Bosch and Maloney (2008). Indeed, the authors report that formal (informal)
employment are strongly countercyclical (procyclical) in Brazil and Mexico. Particularly,
they conclude that the countercyclicality of formal employment is due to the difficulty
of finding formal jobs from the informal sector during recessions rather than because of
increased separation from formal jobs; and a procyclical rather than countercyclical jobs
flows from formal to the informal sector. Similar results can be found in Fiess et al. (2010)
and Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012). Both papers report procyclical informal sector.
Figure 4.2 displays the dynamics of matches [m], unemployment (searches, [s]) and
formal vacancies [v]. The first result that emerges from the figure is the larger volatility of
the variables in the Single Asset and Financial Autarky models than that observed in the
Complete Asset model. This result can be also inferred from Figure 4.1 and confirmed in
the Table 4.6. It calls us for the importance of credit market conditions for the fluctuations
in economic activity.
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The second observation is that, as in developed countries, unemployment is counter-
cyclical. Further, while formal vacancies are procyclical (leading to the so-called meeting
effect), the number of matches are countercyclical. The contemporaneous correlations of
vacancies with output are 0.0296, 0.4492 and 0.1238 for the Single Asset, Complete Asset
and Financial Autarky models, respectively. In the same order, the correlation between
matches and output are -0.4692, -0.1310 and -0.3653. These statistics suggest there is
some informal mechanism at work. That is, the flows of workers out of the unemploy-
ment pool operate mainly through of the informal mechanism (e.g., informal employment
relationship through of sub-contracting arrangements such as part-time and temporary
jobs) rather than formal one. Again, the results are consistent with procyclical flows of
workers from formality into informality observed by Bosch and Maloney (2008) in Brazil
and Mexico.
Figure 4.2: Dynamics of matches, searches, and vacancy for alternative levels of financial
integration
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Table 4.6 summarizes the main statistics of the models. The top block of the Table 4.6
reports the qualitative co-movements (sign of correlations) of output with a selected vari-
able i for the three alternative financial integration. (1), (2) and (3) refer, respectively,
91
Informal Sector, Business Cycles, and Fiscal Policy
model 1 (Single Asset model), model 2 (Complete market model) and model 3 (Financial
Autarky model). As is standard in business cycle literature, investment and consumption
are procyclical. Informal jobs are procyclical and formal jobs are countercyclical. Trade
balance to output ratio is countercyclical in all markets, supporting the idea that imports
exceeds exports during expansions and vice versa in downturns.
The bottom block of Table 4.6 displays the standard deviation of output and the rel-
ative standard deviation with respect to output of the selected variables. In line with the
predictions of credit market related-literature, we find a positive relation between credit
market imperfections and fluctuations in output (see the first column). One Asset model
is 52 percentage point more volatile than Complete Asset model. Also, Financial Autarky
economy is approximately twice as volatile as the Complete Asset economy.
Table 4.6: Qualitative co-movements of output with selected variables under alternative
financial integration scenarios.
(1) (2) (3)
ρ[yt,nFt ] − − −
ρ[yt,nSt ] + + +
ρ[yt,wFt ] + + +
ρ[yt,wSt ] − + −
ρ[yt,ct] + NA +
ρ[yt,it] + + +
ρ[yt,tbt/yt] − − NA
ρ[yt,gt] + + +
Volatilities
σyt σnFt /σyt σnSt /σyt σwFt /σyt σwSt /σyt σct/σyt σit/σyt σgt/σyt
(1) 2.34 1.54 1.83 2.01 1.21 1.17 4.30 1.17
(2) 1.54 0.15 0.54 0.76 0.55 NA 4.51 1.02
(3) 2.74 0.94 1.31 1.55 0.38 0.56 3.00 1.11
To go a little further, we explore the implication of financial frictions on the dynamics
of the model. We take the EFP [ξ] as a measure of financial integration (disintegration)
such that the larger is ξ the lower (higher) is the financial integration (disintegration). For
this purpose, discretionarily, we use three different values for ξ: ξ = 0, ξ = 0.05, and
ξ = 0.1. Figure 4.3 illustrates the key dynamics of the selected variables. The star-dashed
lines are the dynamics for a country perfectly integrated (with no EFP [ξ = 0]), and the
solid and dot-dashed lines are the dynamics under a spread of 0.05 and of 0.1, respectively.
We observe that, as the country premium increases, the economic responses to TFP
shocks become larger. We can make a connection between Single Asset and Financial
Autarky models with small size economy. So, small economies are subject a large fluctu-
ations on their macroeconomic aggregates, because they face larger EFP.
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Figure 4.3: Effects of external finance premium on the dynamics selected variables
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Notwithstanding, a word of caution is warranted. According to our baseline model we
present early, the economic volatility can stem from two sources: from imperfections in
credit market measured by EFP and/or from the size of the informal sector. Figure 4.4,
from upper left to lower right, reports the relation between financial integration, measured
by EFP [ξ], and cyclicality of government consumption net of transfers
[
ρ(g,y)
]
, the rela-
tion between EFP and the standard deviation of output [σy], the relation between EFP
and formal matches [m], and the relation between EFP and the size of the informal sector[
nS
]
.
Starting from the lower right output, we observe a negative relationship between finan-
cial integration and the informal sector. That is, the lager is financial integration (lower
size of ξ) the lower is the response of the informal sector to TFP shock. The size of the
informal sector here is measured as the accumulated responses of the informal sector to
TFP shocks for different size of ξ (ranging ξ from 0.0001 to 0.005242). This finding
is in line to the argument we present early that credit-constrained borrowers take infor-
mality as a beneficial cushion. Still this argument is line with the lower left output of
Figure 4.4, where we observe a positive relation between formal matches and financial
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integration. In others words, the prevalence of the informal mechanism over the formal
ones is larger with worse credit markets conditions. We, however, find a nonmonotonic
relation between EFP and volatility of output (see the upper right of Figure 4.4)
Figure 4.4: Implication of Financial Integration on selected variables
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To analyze the importance of the steady state size of the informal sector, Figure 4.5
displays the relationship between the steady state size of the informal sector and the se-
lected variables. The Figure 4.5 shows a monotonically increasing relation between the
size of informality and the procyclicality of government consumption on the one hand,
and the size of informality and volatility of output, on the other hand. Eng (2010) argue
that existence of a sizable informal sector might explain why fiscal policy is procyclical
in developing countries. Granda-Carvajal (2010) and Ferreira-Tiryaki (2008) conclude
that countries with a sizable informal economy exhibit higher variability in output, con-
sumption and investment. Both matches and unemployment are negatively related with
the informal sector. That is, the informal sector strengthens the countercyclical behav-
ior of formal matches and unemployment rate. Bacchetta et al. (2009) rely on Eslava
et al. (2010)’s results to argue that less developed financial markets may hamper a more
dynamic process of the formal job creation and prevent higher transition rates from the
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Figure 4.5: Implication of the informal sector on the selected variables
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informal to the formal economy, such that the informal labor market and financial mar-
ket dynamics enter a complementary relationship. Our results, therefore, appear to be
consistent with that argument.
We end this section by shedding light on the effects of labor market policies on the
formal (matches) and the informal labor input. The size of the informal sector poses
challenges in terms of achieving the desired level of fiscal revenues as it increases the
sensitivity of tax bases to tax rate changes. Putting differently, the government’s ability to
generate additional revenues is severely constrained when there is an informal sector. A
positive change in tax rate will trigger an incentive for non taxable sector which, in turn,
reduces tax base. To explore this argument, we use the model to analyze the effects of
labor income tax
[
τW
]
on the informal sector and formal matches. Figure 4.6 displays
the responses of matches and the informal labor input to labor income tax. We change τW
and see to the accumulated responses of matches and the informal employments. First, we
observe that matches and the informal sector relate inversely and symmetrically. Second,
from a tax rate lager than 40%, the informal sector response go up explosively and formal
matches response go down explosively. This result confirms the above argument and is
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strictly linked to the well-known Laffer curve. We can infer from Figure 4.6 that tax rate
larger than 60% has no effect on tax revenue.
Figure 4.6: Effects of labor income tax on matches and on the size of the informal sector
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we develop a model of a small open-economy with dual labor markets.
The formal labor market is characterized by trading frictions a la Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides in which labor adjusts at the extensive margin. The informal sector is friction-
less.
Our exercises lead us to conclude that credit market conditions play an important role
on economic responses to productivity shocks. Indeed, the results show that the worse
are credit markets conditions, as measured by country risk premium, the larger are the
responses of economic aggregates. Therefore, a perfectly integrated economy responds
more smoothly to shocks than that with limited access to credit markets. We also find
that risk premium and the informal sector work under a complementary relationship. The
results suggest both that informality and country risk premium hamper firms to hire formal
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workers.
By allowing the flows of workers in both directions between the two labor markets,
this chapter delivers a procyclical informal sector. That is, informality expands in periods
of expansions and shrinks when recessions take place. Similar to the results for country
risk premium, we find that an economy with a sizable informal sector experiences larger
volatility in output. Further, we find that both credit markets imperfections and the in-
formal sector stand up as a source of the procyclical behavior of fiscal policy observed,
particularly, in developing countries. We end by concluding that a sizable informal sec-
tor poses challenges for labor market policies interventions as such polices alone might
discourage formal hires and motivate informality.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions of the thesis
5.1 Summary
This thesis addresses some questions for which more research is still warranted: pro-
cyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries, business cycle regularities of the in-
formal sector, and differentiation in business cycle features across country development
level. On the one hand, while imperfections in credit markets and weak political and
institutional frameworks have a long tradition in explaining the procyclicality of fiscal
policy, the informal sector has played little (or no) role in that story. On the other hand,
while business cycle theories diverge on their assumptions about economic fluctuations,
virtually all of them focuses only on formal economic activity. Thus this thesis aims to
show that informality may play an important role in accounting for fiscal procyclicality,
business cycle fluctuations and labor market outcomes.
The thesis consists of three stand-alone chapters. First, it focus on the cyclicality of
fiscal policy in developing countries in contrast to that in developed countries. Second,
it assesses the business cycle regularities of the informal sector and its relation with key
macroeconomic aggregates. Third, it analyses the implications of the informal sector and
financial integration on business cycle fluctuations, on fiscal policy, and on labor markets
outcomes.
A common factor to all these chapters is the informal sector. While in the first chapter
we propose a discussion on why the informal sector may be central to determining cyclical
stances of fiscal policy, in the second and third chapters the informal sector is at the core
of analysis. The main conclusion of this thesis could be summarized chapter-by-chapter
as follows.
After a general introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 surveys the literature on procycli-
cality of fiscal policy in developing countries, comparing with that in developed countries
on three aspects: first, it reviews the theories for procyclicality of fiscal policy; second,
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it summarizes the alternative methods in the literature to assess the cyclicality of fiscal
policy; and third, it appraises the empirical literature and the tests of the several alterna-
tive theories. At reviewing the evidence on cyclicality of fiscal policy, we only select the
literature which looks at policy instrument (government consumption (GC) and/or gov-
ernment expenditure (GE)) rather than outcome variables. In addition, tax rates is a good
indicator to measure the cyclicality of fiscal policy. However, because the literature has
no a systematic estimates of the cyclicality of tax rates, such variable is neglected in this
review.
Relying on signal and statistical significance, evidence of cyclicality of fiscal policy is
assigned to acyclical, countercyclical and procyclical categories for developed and devel-
oping countries. We conclude that the view that fiscal policy is procyclical in developing
countries contrasting with the countercyclical or acyclical ones in developed countries
has reached the mainstream status. That is, the conduction of procyclical fiscal policy in
developing countries can be seen as a stylized fact, while such policy is countercyclical
or acyclical in developed countries. In a sample of 160 estimates of cyclicality of fiscal
policy for developed countries, we find that 36,3% are countercyclical, while 24.4% are
acyclical. In developing countries, the picture is, however, different: in a sample of 344
estimates of cyclicality of fiscal policy, only 3.5% are countercyclical. The remaining,
19.6% are acyclical and 77% are procyclical. Still, among the studies which deliver pro-
cyclical fiscal policy for both group of countries, 89% (17 out of 19) constitute evidence
that procyclicality is more strong in developing countries. Taking developed and devel-
oping countries as a whole, we conclude that only 11.3% (53 out of 471) of the empirical
estimates follow Keynesian prescription.
With regards to credit channel based explanations, in a sample of 218 results we find
that 33.5% support that relaxing credit constraints provide room for conducting counter-
cyclical fiscal policy, while 56,5% constitute the evidence that such factors have no effect
on cyclicality of fiscal policy. Results on political-institutional channels appear to dis-
tribute symmetrically among positive (30.3%), negative (37%), and null effect (32.6%)
on fiscal procyclicality.
We observe that most of the literature has not addressed properly at least one of three
crucial methodological challenges: concept of procyclicality of fiscal policy, endogene-
ity, and identification problem. Among the studies that focus on policy instruments, only
32% have taken into account endogeneity problem, and only 12.5% correct for both en-
dogeneity and/or omission bias. While the literature takes credit constraints and political
economy as alternative explanations for fiscal procyclicality, we argue that they are not
alternative explanations but complementary, being political economy theoretically dom-
inant: if there was no procyclicality during expansion phases, there would not be pro-
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cyclicality during recessions. Further, developing countries are the default recipients of
foreign direct investment inflows due to lower labor costs and higher marginal produc-
tivity of capital. In spite of that their fiscal policy mostly behaves procyclically. We
end by arguing that informality may also be a feasible explanation in determining fiscal
procyclicality; but, to the best of our knowledge, the literature fails to address this link.
Chapter 3 assesses business cycle features of the informal sector and its relation with
key macroeconomic variables. We first estimate the size of the informal sector cover-
ing 37 poor, 46 emerging and 22 rich countries using a deterministic dynamic general
equilibrium (DGE) model, and then we provide a comprehensive set of business cycle
regularities of the informal sector in macroeconomic context.
The main findings are summarized throughout of Chapter 3 in the form of Stylized
Facts (from Stylized Fact 1 to Stylized Fact 10) and 5 corollaries. These latter synthesize
the implications of the underground sector on the key economic aggregates. In particular,
the Chapter 3 concludes that while the absolute size of the informal sector is procyclical
in both group of countries, the relative size of the informal economy to GDP is counter-
cyclical (if anything acyclical) in poor countries and weakly procyclical in rich countries.
The informal economy is less persistent than real output either in downturns or upturns.
Evidence points to a positive effect of informality on procyclicality of fiscal policy, on
fluctuations in overall economic activity; and a negative effect on investment and on the
persistence of macroeconomic aggregates. These and further conclusions are summarized
on Table 5.1 bellow.
As the facts are listed, they are contrasted with the exiting literature and try to touch
upon some mechanisms that constitute a fertile ground for future research. Moreover, we
believe that further research should be directed to the estimation of the informal economy.
For instance, the DGE model on which we rely to estimate the informal economy assumes
balanced budget for the government and depend at some extent to the estimates of the
informal economy presented by Schneider et al. (2010). In spite of these shortcomings,
the stylized facts constitute a further input to the existing literature.
Chapter 4 accesses the dynamics of the informal sector over the business cycle as well
as its impact on the overall economic volatility. It also analyzes how financial frictions,
measured by the external finance premium, affect the volatility and the dynamics of an
economy. These tasks are accomplished by calibrating the model to match annual busi-
ness cycle frequency in developing countries. Specifically, in Chapter 4 we develop a
small, open, developing economy model, financially integrated, with dual labor markets.
The formal labor market is characterized by search and trading frictions a la Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissadires in which labor adjusts at extensive margins. The informal sector in
frictionless.
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Table 5.1: Informal sector and cyclical properties of economic aggregates: stylized
facts and corollaries
Facts/Corol. Statements
Fact 1 The size of the informal sector, in percentage of official output, relates nega-
tively with the level of development.
Fact 2 There is a declining trend of the relative size of the informal economy to GDP;
the rate of reduction is higher, and rather similar, in poor and emerging coun-
tries when compared to rich countries.
Fact 3 The informal economy tends to be more volatile than official output.
Fact 4 The absolute size of the informal economy is strongly procyclical.
Fact 5 The size of the informal economy relative to official output tends to be coun-
tercyclical in poor countries while procyclical in emerging and rich countries.
Fact 6 The informal economy is positively correlated with government consumption.
Fact 7 The absolute size of informal sector is positively correlated with private con-
sumption.
Fact 8 The informal sector is more persistent in rich countries than in poor countries.
Fact 9 The informal economy is more persistent during recessions than expansions,
in poor countries.
Fact 10 Informal sector is asymmetric, particularly, in poor countries.
Corollary 1 Countries with sizeable informal sector tend to experience greater fluctuation
in their overall economic activity.
Corollary 2 Countries with sizeable underground economy are unable to adjust their own
investment levels, particularly in upturns.
Corollary 3 Countries with sizeable underground economy enhance the likelihood to ex-
hibit a procyclical fiscal policy.
Corollary 4 Countries with sizeable underground economy enhance the likelihood to boost
import in a procyclical fashion.
Corollary 5 Countries with sizeable underground economy enhance the likelihood to ex-
hibit smaller persistence in their macroeconomic variables.
The exercises performed in Chapter 4 lead, therefore, to several conclusions: first, the
analysis finds that credit markets conditions play an important role in economic responses
to total-factor productivity shocks. Indeed, the results show that the worse is the credit
markets conditions, measured by external financial premium, the larger are the responses
of economic aggregates to total factor productivity shocks. Therefore, a perfectly inte-
grated economy behaves more smoothly to shocks than that with limited access to credit
markets. We also find that the worse are credit market conditions the larger is the size of
the informal sector. Still, the results suggest that both informality and external financial
premium hamper firms to hire formal workers.
By allowing the transitions of workers in both directions in the two labor market seg-
ments, Chapter 4 delivers a procyclical informal sector. That is, informality expands in
periods of expansions and shrinks when recessions take place. We find that, similar to
external financial premium, an economy with a sizable informal sector experiences large
volatility in output. Furthermore, both credit market imperfections and the size of the
informal sector stand up as a source for procyclical behavior of fiscal policy observed par-
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ticularly in developing countries. We end by noting that a sizable informal sector poses
challenges for labor market policies interventions as such polices alone might discourage
formal hires and motivate informality.
5.2 Limitations, future research, and policy prescriptions
Based on the exercises conducted throughout the three main chapters (2, 3 and 4), this
section aims at discussing some limitations of the thesis and highlights some avenues for
possible future research.
5.2.1 Limitations and future research
The literature review conducted in Chapter 2 examines a collection of pieces of the lit-
erature on procyclicality of fiscal policy, comparing developing and developed countries,
at different points in time. It relies on the assumption that every such piece of the literature
contains a valid theory and that, when it comes with empirical evidence, such evidence is
not fuzzy. Thus the limitation of Chapter 2 is the complete reliance on previously pub-
lished research and on the methodology used by these studies. Therefore, Chapter 2 is not
preoccupied with the critical discussion of the existing theories and their importance over
time on procyclicality of fiscal policy. For example, while some political economy models
suggest that democracy, with appropriate checks and balances, improves macroeconomic
management including giving room for countercyclical fiscal policy (Persson and Svens-
son (1987)), others argue (see e.g., Lane (2003)) that democracy, involving multiple veto
points in the process of policy-making, may lead to procyclical fiscal policy. With all its
complexity and difficulties, political economy model deserve more attention in the future.
Chapter 3 estimates the size of the informal output. The main limitation of the ap-
proach we carry out in this chapter is that it assumes a balanced budget for the government
and it depends on an initial value for which we use the estimates available in Schneider
et al. (2010). The empirical evidence provided in Chapter 3 is a simple test on the rela-
tion between the size of the informal sector and some characteristics of macroeconomic
fluctuations and the relation between the size of the informal sector with the cyclicality
of government consumption. Therefore, Chapter 3 does not discriminate, empirically, the
channels by which the informal sector link to the official business cycles characteristics
and the cyclicality of government consumption.
Chapter 4 succeeds in matching several theoretical and empirical strands of literature.
But it also has its limitations. The assumption that the informal segment of labor mar-
kets is competitive may be strong because several researches argue that informal workers
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engage mainly through friendships and family relationships. If so, the wage in the in-
formal sector is not determined uniquely by marginal productivity but, instead, affected
by the degree of the relation between employer and employed. Furthermore, Chapter 4
consider domestic productivity shocks, but most of the developing countries rely largely
on imported technologies as sources of new productive knowledge. Generally, such in-
ternational technology transfer imply movement of people; but the analysis of such exter-
nalities is out of reach of the model.
Finally, a common omission to all these chapters is the lack of the discussion of the
informal financial markets. We are aware that such markets play an important role on
the issues covered in this thesis. Assessing the role of informality of the financial sector
on macroeconomic policies and business cycle fluctuations should be high on the future
research agenda.
5.2.2 Policy prescriptions
The results found in this thesis point for, at least, three policy recommendations: pro-
moting the formalization of both workers and firms, strengthening financial markets, and
the improvement of institutional framework in developing countries. These reform poli-
cies are likely to help countries to cope with adverse chocks, to conduct countercyclical
fiscal policy as well as giving room for higher potential growth.
Successful formalization policies should take into account, in some extent, the reasons
why firms and workers choose the formal or informal sector and the transitional cost
faced by these economic units from the informal sector to the formal one. Furthermore,
formalization policies should be design in accordance with the typology of informality
and adapted to country context. For example, policies that reduce formalization costs
and improved access to financial markets may be more effective for fighting against the
informal unregistered firms, while improving regulatory enforcement and inspections may
work better for combating against tax evasion. The literature has devoted much on this
issue. An extensive discussion on how to encourage formalization of economic units can
be founded in Kenyon (2007a;b) and ILO (2006; 2007)’s report.
While formalization policies should be carried out along with policy initiatives for
local development structures, achieving a robust financial markets and strong institutional
framework, such as legal and regulatory framework that facilitates the enforcement of
financial contracts, loan recovery, and the realization of collateral, are intrinsic tasks. Be-
cause developing countries are largely bounded to urban based-banks which organized
their supplier of credit primarily to the wealthier population and larger corporations, al-
ternative financial institutions should be developed to overcome this misfunctioning of
financial market. These alternative financial institutions promote competition between
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banking and other financial sector which improve the efficiency of intermediation and
resilience of financial markets. Government able to issue state contingent debt and man-
aging the maturity structure of noncontingent debt are widely accepted in the literature
that may be welfare-improving and as safe way to repair the misfunctioning of financial
market in developing countries (for an overview, see, e.g., Angeletos (2002), Buera and
Nicolini (2004) and Brooke et al. (2013)).
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Appendix A: Figures
A1 Relation between volatility of y and the size of s de-
livered by LQ.
Figure 1: Relation between volat. of y delivered by LQ and the size of s.
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A2 Relation between volatility of y and the size of s de-
livered by FD.
Figure 2: Relation between volat. of y delivered by FD and the size of s.
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A3 Distribution of correlations between (yt) and st; yt
and gt; st and gt; and between (st + yt) and gt de-
livered by LQ.
Figure 3: Distribution of C. correlations between (yt), and st; yt and gt; st and gt; and
between (st + yt) and gt delivered by LQ.
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A4 Distribution of correlations between yt and st/st; yt
and gt/yt; st/yt and gt/yt; and between (st + yt) and
gt/(st + yt) delivered by LQ
Figure 4: Distribution of C. correlations between yt, and st/st; yt and gt/yt; st/yt and
gt/yt; and between (st + yt) and gt/(st + yt) delivered by LQ.
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A5 Distribution of contemporaneous correlations between
(yt) and (st); (yt) and (gt); (st) and (gt); and between
(st + yt) and (gt) delivered by FD.
Figure 5: Distribution of contemporaneous correlations between (yt) and (st); (yt) and
(gt); (st) and (gt); and between (st + yt) and (gt) delivered by FD.
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A6 Distribution of contemporaneous correlations between
(yt) and (st); (yt) and (gt); (st) and (gt); and between
(st + yt) and (gt) delivered by FD.
Figure 6: Distribution of contemporaneous correlations between (yt) and (st); (yt) and
(gt); (st) and (gt); and between (st + yt) and (gt) delivered by FD.
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Appendix B: Derivations
B1 First order conditions
By integrating the households’ heterogeneity into a representative agent framework,
the Lagrangian function described by Equation (4.11) becomes
LHt = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
c
(1−γ)
t /(1− γ)
+ λ1,t[d
f
t − [1 + rdt−1]dft−1 + [1− τW ]wFt nFt + wSt nSt + wUut
− ct − kt + [1− δ]kt−1 + rkt kt−1 + Πft − Φ(·)]
+ λ2,t
[
nFt − (1− ρ)nFt−1 − PUθt [1− (1− ρ)nFt−1 − nSt−1]
]
+ λ3,t
[
lim
j→∞
Et
(
dft+j/
j∏
s=0
[
1 + rW + f(dfs )
])]}
, (1)
The first order conditions with respect to the controls
[
ct, kt, d
f
t , n
F
t
]
are:
With respect to ct
c−γt = λ1,t (2)
With respect to kt
[1 + φ(kt − kt−1)] = βEtΛt,t+1
[
1− δ + rkt+1 + φ(kt+1 − kt)
]
(3)
With respect to dft
1 = βEtΛt,t+1
[
1 + rdt
]
(4)
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With respect to nFt
λ2,t = λ1,t
[
(1− τW )wFt − wUt
]
+ βEtλ2,t+1
[
(1− ρ)[1− PUθt+1 ]
]
(5)
B2 Economy’s resource constraints
 Recall households’ constraint given by Equation (4.9)
dft = [1 + r
d
t−1]d
f
t−1 − [1− τW ]wFt nFt − wSt nSt − wUut + ct + it
− rkt kt−1 − Πft + Φ(·), (6)
 The government’s deficit defined in the Equation (4.29)
def gt = gt + w
Uut − τFyt − [τW + τN ]wFt nFt = 0. (7)
We define the demand for foreign assets as follows
tbt =
[
1 + rdt−1
]
dft−1 − dft (8)
where tbt denotes the balance of trade for the domestic economy.
 Using Equation (8) into Equation (7) we get
tbt = [1− τW ]wFt nFt + wSt nSt + wUut − ct − it
+ rkt kt−1 + Π
f
t − Φ(·), (9)
 Recall the definition for firm’s profit
Πft = [1− τF ]yt − κvt − [1 + τN ]wFt nFt − wSt nSt − rkt kt−1, (10)
 Plugging Equation (10) into Equation (9) yields
tbt = [1− τW ]wFt nFt + wUut − ct − it + [1− τF ]yt
− κvt − [1 + τN ]wFt nFt − Φ(·), (11)
 Recall that government’s deficit is null at every period of time [def gt = 0]. Subtract-
ing its expression into the right side of Equation (11), the terms cancel out yielding the
country’s resource constraints as
yt = ct + gt + it + κvt + tbt +
φ
2
[kt − kt−1]2 , (12)
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B3 Wage in the formal sector
WAGE IN THE FORMAL MARKET
 Remember that
4 = [1− ρ]β
 From the first order condition in Equation (4.22) we get
η[1− τW ]VFt,nFt = [1− η][1 + τ
N ]
[UF
t,nFt
λ1,t
]
⇒
[UF
t,nFt
λ1,t
]
=
[
η
1− η
] [
1− τW
1 + τN
]
VFt,nFt (13)
Making use of equations (4.24), (4.25) and (4.26), we proceed as follows
wFt = ηw¯
F
t + [1− η]wFt .
= η
[[
1− τF
1 + τN
]
yFt
nFt
αF +
[ 4
1 + τN
]
EtΛt,t+1
[
VFt+1,nFt+1
]]
+ [1− η]
[[
wU
1− τW
]
−
[ 4
1− τW
]
Et[1− PUθt+1 ]Λt,t+1
[UF
t+1,nFt+1
λ1,t+1
]]
(14)
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Note that
[
VF
t+1,nFt+1
]
=
[
κ
PVθt+1
]
.
Thus using the relation in Equation (14), we proceeds as follows
wFt = η
[[
1− τF
1 + τN
]
yFt
nFt
αF +
[ 4
1 + τN
]
EtΛt,t+1
[
κ
PVθt+1
]]
+ [1− η]
[
wU
1− τW
]
− [1− η]
[[ 4
1− τW
]
Et[1− PUθt+1 ]Λt,t+1
[
η
1− η
] [
1− τW
1 + τN
] [
κ
PVθt+1
]]
= η
[
1− τF
1 + τN
]
yFt
nFt
αF + η
[ 4
1 + τN
]
EtΛt,t+1
[
κ
PVθt+1
]
+ [1− η]
[
wU
1− τW
]
− η
[ 4
1 + τN
]
Et[1− PUθt+1 ]Λt,t+1
[
κ
PVθt+1
]
= η
[
1− τF
1 + τN
]
yFt
nFt
αF + η
[ 4
1 + τN
]
EtΛt,t+1
[
κ
PVθt+1
]
+ [1− η]
[
wU
1− τW
]
− η
[ 4
1 + τN
]
EtΛt,t+1
[
κ
PVθt+1
]
+ κη
[ 4
1 + τNt
]
EtΛt,t+1
[
PUθt+1
PVθt+1
]
= η
[
1− τF
1 + τN
]
yFt
nFt
αF + [1− η]
[
wU
1− τWt
]
+ κη
[ 4
1 + τNt
]
EtΛt,t+1
[
PUθt+1
PVθt+1
]
(15)
B4 Unemployment and employments value
 UNEMPLOYED AND EMPLOYMENT VALUE
From Equation (4.33) we have
Uut = λ1,twU + βEtΛt,t+1
[Uut+1] (16)
Taking into account that UF
t,nFt
= U et −Uut and that PUθt+1 = 0 for a matched worker; from
Equation (4.20) we have
U et = λ1,t
[
(1− τW )wFt − wU
]
+4Et
[U et+1 − Uut+1]+ Uut
= λ1,t(1− τW )wFt +4Et
[U et+1 − Uut+1]+ βEt [Uut+1]
= λ1,t(1− τW )wFt + βEt
[
[1− ρ]UFt+1,nFt+1 + U
u
t+1
]
. (17)
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Similarly
Uut = U et − UFt,nFt
= λ1,t(1− τW )wFt + βEt
[
[1− ρ]UFt+1,nFt+1 + U
u
t+1
]
− λ1,t
[
(1− τW )wFt − wU
]−4Et[1− PUθt+1 ]UFt+1,nFt+1
= λ1,tw
U + βEt
[
[1− ρ]PUθt+1UFt+1,nFt+1 + U
u
t+1
]
(18)
B5 Employment dynamics
 EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS
From equations (4.19)
κ
PVθt
=
(
1− τF ) yt
nFt
αF − [1 + τN ]wFt +4EtΛt,t+1
[
κ
PVθt+1
]
, (19)
We get
wFt =
[(
1− τF ) yt
nFt
αF − κPVθt
+4EtΛt,t+1
[
κ
PVθt+1
]] [
1
1 + τN
]
, (20)
Plugging this into equations (4.27)
η
[
1− τF
1 + τN
]
yt
nFt
αF + [1− η]
[
wU
1− τW
]
+ ηκ
[ 4
1 + τN
]
EtΛt,t+1
[
PUθt+1
PVθt+1
]
=
[(
1− τF ) yt
nFt
αF − κPVθt
+4EtΛt,t+1
[
κ
PVθt+1
]] [
1
1 + τN
]
(21)
Multiplying both sides by
[
1 + τN
]
we have
η
(
1− τF ) yt
nFt
αF + [1− η]
(
1 + τN
1− τW
)
wU
+ ηκ4 EtΛt,t+1
[
PUθt+1
PVθt+1
]
= [1− τF ] yt
nFt
αF − κPVθt
+4EtΛt,t+1
[
κ
PVθt+1
]
(22)
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Rearranging the terms we get
κ
PVθt
= [1− η] (1− τF ) yt
nFt
αF − [1− η]
(
1 + τN
1− τW
)
wU
+ 4EtΛt,t+1
[
κ
PVθt+1
]
− ηκ4 EtΛt,t+1
[
PUθt+1
PVθt+1
]
(23)
Taking into account that PVθt = σmθ−µt , we write employment dynamics as
θµt = [1− η]
σm
κ
[(
1− τF ) yt
nFt
αF −
(
1 + τN
1− τW
)
wU
]
+ 4EtΛt,t+1[1− ηPUθt+1 ]θµt+1 (24)
B6 Equilibrium conditions
 EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS FOR BASELINE MODEL
Matches
mt = σm[st]
µ[vt]
1−µ. (E1)
Output
yt = atk
αk
t−1[n
F
t ]
αF [nSt ]
αS . (E2)
Motion for formal employment
nFt = [1− ρ]nFt−1 + PVθtvt. (E3)
Market tightness
θt =
vt
1− [1− ρ]nFt−1 − nSt−1
. (E4)
Probability of filling a vacancy
PVθt = σmθ−µt . (E5)
Probability of finding a formal job
PUθt = σmθ1−µt . (E6)
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Euler equation for consumption
c−γt = β
[
1 + rW + ξ
(
e[d
f
t−d¯] − 1
)]
c−γt+1. (E7)
Motion for capital
kt = it + [1− δ]kt−1. (E8)
Euler equation for capital
[1 + φ(kt − kt−1)] = βEtΛt,t+1
[
1− δ + [1− τF ]yt+1
kt
αk + φ(kt+1 − kt)
]
. (E9)
Informal wage
wSt = [1− τF ]
yt
nSt
αS. (E10)
Formal wage
wFt = η
[
1− τF
1 + τN
]
yt
nFt
αF + [1− η]
[
wU
1− τW
]
+ ηκ
[ 4
1 + τN
]
EtΛt,t+1θt+1.
(E11)
Employments dynamics
θµt = [1− η]
σm
κ
[(
1− τF ) yt
nFt
αF −
(
1 + τN
1− τW
)
wU
]
+4EtΛt,t+1
[
1− ηPUθt+1
]
θµt+1.
(E12)
Switching costs
MFt,S = Ξ + ψEt[w
F
t+1 − wFt ]. (E13)
Mobility conditions
Uut
c−γt
= wSt + Ξ + βEtΛt,t+1
[Uut+1
c−γt+1
]
. (E14)
The value of an unemployed status
U et = [1− τW ]c−γt wFt + βEt
[
[1− ρ] [U et+1 − Uut+1]+ Uut+1] . (E15)
The value of an employed status
Uut = wUc−γt + βEt
[
[1− ρ]PUθt+1
[U et+1 − Uut+1]+ Uut+1] . (E16)
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Deb dynamics
dft = [1 + r
d
t−1]d
f
t−1 − [1− τW ]wFt nFt − wSt nSt − wUut + ct
+ it − rkt kt−1 − Πft +
φ
2
[kt − kt−1]2
(E17)
Government consumption
gt =
[
τW + τN
]
wFt n
F
t + τ
Fyt − wUut. (E18)
Aggregate resource constraint
yt = ct + it + gt + κvt +
φ
2
[kt − kt−1]2 + tbt. (E19)
Job-searchers
st = 1− [1− ρ]nFt−1 − nSt−1. (E20)
TFP shocks
ln at = βa ln at−1 + σεεt. (E21)
B7 Log-Linearized version of the equilibrium conditions
 LOG-LINEARIZED VERSION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS
Let x¯ be the steady state value of a variable xt and a ”hat” (∧) over xt denoting the
percentage deviation from that steady state such that xˆ = log(xt) − log(x¯). Then, the
log-linear version of equations (E1) to (E19) can be write as:
(E1) ' mˆt = µsˆt + (1− µ)vˆt.
(E2) ' yˆt = aˆt + αkkˆt−1 + αF nˆFt + αSnˆSt .
(E3) ' nˆFt = [1− ρ]nˆFt−1 +
P¯Vθ v¯
n¯F
[
PˆVθt + vˆt
]
.
(E4) ' vˆt = θ¯
v¯
θˆt − θ¯
v¯
n¯F [1− ρ]
[
θˆt + nˆ
F
t−1
]
− θ¯
v¯
n¯S
[
θˆt + nˆ
F
t−1
]
.
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(E5) ' PˆVθt = −µθˆt.
(E6) ' PˆUθt = (1− µ)θˆt.
(E7) ' −γcˆt = βξd¯dˆt − γcˆt+1.
(E8) ' kˆt = i¯
k¯
iˆt + [1− δ]kˆt−1.
(E9) ' −γcˆt + φk¯
[
kˆt − γcˆt
]
− φk¯
[
kˆt−1 − γcˆt
]
= −βγ(1− δ)Etcˆt+1
+ αkβ(1− τF ) y¯
k¯
[
Etyˆt+1 − kˆt − γEtcˆt+1
]
+ βφk¯
[
Etkˆt+1 − γEtcˆt+1
]
− βφk¯
[
kˆt − γEtcˆt+1
]
.
(E10) ' w¯S
[
wˆSt + nˆ
S
t
]
= [1− τF ]αS
[ y¯
n¯S
]
yˆt.
(E11) ' w¯F [−γcˆt + wˆFt + nˆFt ]
= [1− η]
[
wU
1− τW
] [−γcˆt + nˆFt ]
+ ηαF
[
y¯
n¯Ft
] [
1− τF
1 + τN
]
[yˆt − γcˆt]
+ θ¯ηκ
[ 4
1 + τN
] [
−γEtcˆt+1 + Etθˆt+1 + nˆFt
]
.
(E12) ' µθˆt + nˆFt − γcˆt
= A
[ y¯
θ¯µn¯F
]
[yˆt − γcˆt]− B
θ¯µ
[
nˆFt − γcˆt
]
+ C
[
nˆFt + µEtθˆt+1 − γEtcˆt+1
]
− CP¯Uθ
[
nˆFt + µEtθˆt+1 − γEtcˆt+1 + EtPˆUθt+1
]
+ D[nˆFt + µEtθˆt+1 − γEtcˆt+1].
where A = [1 − η]αF σm
κ
[
1−τF
1+τN
]
, B = [1 − η]σm
κ
[
wU
1+τW
]
, C = η
[ 4
1−τW
]
, and D =
[1− η] [ 4
1+τN
]
.
(E13) ' MˆFt,S = −ξ
[
w¯F
M¯Ft,S
]
Etwˆ
F
t+1 + ξ
[
w¯F
M¯Ft,S
]
wˆFt .
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(E14) ' U¯uUˆut = w¯S c¯−γ
[−γcˆt + wˆSt ]+ c¯−γ s¯ [−γcˆt + sˆt]
+ βEtUˆut+1.
(E15) ' Uˆ et = c¯−γ[1− τW ]
[
w¯F
U¯ e
] [−γcˆt + wˆFt ]+ β[1− ρ]EtUˆ et+1
+ βρ
[ U¯u
U¯ e
]
EtUˆut+1.
(E16) ' Uˆut = −γc¯−γ
[
wU
U¯u
]
cˆt + β[1− ρ]P¯Uθ
[ U¯ e
U¯u
]
Et
[
PˆUθt+1 + Uˆ et+1
]
+ βEtUˆut+1 − β[1− ρ]P¯Uθ Et
[
PˆUθt+1 + Uˆut+1
]
.
(E17) ' yˆt = −
[
d¯f
y¯
]
dˆf +
[
d¯f
y¯
] [
ξd¯f + 1 + r¯d
]
dˆft−1
+
[
c¯
y¯
]
cˆ+
[
g¯
y¯
]
gˆ +
[
i¯
y¯
] [
kt+1 − (1− δ)kˆt
]
.
(E18) ' g¯gˆt = [τF + τN ]w¯F n¯F
[
wˆFt + nˆ
F
t
]
+ τF y¯yˆt + w
U u¯uˆt.
(E19) ' y¯yˆt = t¯btˆbt + c¯cˆt + i¯ˆit + g¯gˆt + κv¯vˆt.
(E20) ' s¯sˆt = −(1− ρ)n¯F nˆFt−1 − n¯SnˆSt−1.
(E21) ' aˆt = βaaˆt−1 + εˆt.
B8 The steady state of the model
The informal employment size (n¯S = 0.56) is taken from the literature. Then, we
determine the formal employment size such that n¯F = 1 − n¯S − u¯, where u¯ = 0.08 is
set to match unemployment rate in middle-income countries. One of the maim feature of
matching function is a accounting relationship stating that, in equilibrium, the total flows
in and out of unemployment pool must be equal. So, in the steady state we should observe
m¯ = ρn¯F . From Equation (4.4) we get the steady state of searches as s¯ = u¯− m¯. Then,
using Equation (4.2) we arrive at v¯ =
[
m¯
σm[s¯]µ
][ 1
1−µ ]
. Now we are able to get P¯Uθ = m¯s¯ ,
P¯Vθ = m¯v¯ and the market tightness θ¯ = v¯s¯ =
P¯Uθ
P¯Vθ
.
The vacancy costs parameter is computed as follows: the Equation (4.19) in the steady
state yields
120
Informal Sector, Business Cycles, and Fiscal Policy
κ
P¯Vθ
= (1− τF ) y¯
n¯F
αF − (1 + τN)w¯F +4
[
κ
P¯Vθ
]
,
⇒
[
1−∆
P¯Vθ
]
κ = (1− τF ) y¯
n¯F
αF − (1 + τN)w¯F
⇒ κ =
[
(1− τF ) y¯
n¯F
αF − (1 + τN)w¯F
] [ P¯Vθ
1−∆
]
⇒ κ =
[
(1− τF )P¯Vθ
(1−∆)
]
y¯
n¯F
αF −
[
(1 + τN)P¯Vθ
(1−∆)
]
w¯F (25)
Let us now using Equation (4.27) in its steady state version:
w¯F = η
[
1− τF
1 + τN
]
y¯
n¯F
αF +
[
1− η
1− τW
]
wU
+ η
[ 4
1 + τN
] [ P¯Uθ
P¯Vθ
]
κ (26)
Substituting expression for κ and taking wU = Ψw¯F , with 0 < Ψ < 1, yields.
w¯F = η
[
1− τF
1 + τN
]
y¯
n¯F
αF +
[
1− η
1− τW
]
Ψw¯F
+ η
[ 4
1 + τN
] [ P¯Uθ
P¯Vθ
]{[
(1− τF )P¯Vθ
(1−∆)
]
y¯
n¯F
αF −
[
(1 + τN)P¯Vθ
(1−∆)
]
w¯F
}
(27)
The expression can be simplifying to yields
w¯F = η
[
1− τF
1 + τN
]
y¯
n¯F
αF +
[
1− η
1− τW
]
Ψw¯F
+ η
[ 4
1 + τN
] [
(1− τF )P¯Uθ
(1−∆)
]
y¯
n¯F
αF − η
[4P¯Uθ
1−∆
]
w¯F (28)
Placing the w¯F terms to the right hand side yields[
1−Ψ
(
1− η
1− τW
)
+ η
(4P¯Uθ
1−∆
)]
w¯F = η
(
1− τF
1 + τN
)[
1 +
(4P¯Uθ
1−∆
)]
y¯
n¯F
αF
Let be[
1−Ψ
(
1− η
1− τW
)
+ η
(4P¯Uθ
1−∆
)]
= Υ (29)
Then we are able to write
w¯F =
[ η
Υ
](1− τF
1 + τN
)[
1 +
(4P¯Uθ
1−∆
)]
y¯
n¯F
αF (30)
Having w¯F , we use this into Equation (25) to get κ.
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In regards to the production function we proceeds as follows. First, we use equa-
tions (4.12), and (4.18) to get
y¯
k¯
=
1− β(1− δ)
βαk(1− τF ) (31)
Second, we use Equation (4.14) to arrive
1 =
[
k¯
y¯
]αk [
n¯F
]αF (
n¯S
)αS
y¯(αF+αS)
=
[
βαk(1− τF )
1− β(1− δ)
]αk (n¯F )αF (n¯S)αS
y¯(αF+αS)
(32)
Multiplying both sides by y(αF+αS), we get
y¯ =
[[
βαk(1− τF )
1− β(1− δ)
]αk (
n¯F
)αF (
n¯S
)αS] 1(αF+αS)
(33)
Using this definitions for y¯ we get
k¯ =
[
k¯
y¯
]
y¯ =
[
βαk(1− τF )
1− β(1− δ)
]
y¯, (34)
and, from Equation (7), i¯ = δk¯. We get informal wage from Equation (4.17)
w¯S =
[
1− τF ] y¯
n¯S
αS (35)
The steady state for government consumption is obtained from Equation (4.29)
g¯ =
[
τW + τN
]
w¯F n¯F + τF y¯ − wU u¯ (36)
In the steady state d¯f = d¯. From Equation (4.34) we get t¯b = y¯ − c¯− g¯ − i¯− κv¯. Rear-
ranging this and plugging into the household constraint yields t¯b = r∗d¯. This accounting
relationship states that in the steady state trade surplus of a country must be enough to
face external debt. Drawing on Ju et al. (2010)’s data, we set a trade deficit of 5 percent
of GDP. Thus we set d¯f = −t¯b/r∗. The steady state of ct is obtained from Equation (4.9),
such that
c¯ = −rdd¯f + y¯ − δk¯ − g¯ − κv¯ (37)
The household’s steady state value for unemployment
[U¯u] and for employment [U¯ e] is
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obtained by taking into account that U¯Fn¯F = U¯ e−U¯u. Thus from Equation (4.32), we have
U¯ e = c¯−γ (1− τW )wF + β {(1− ρ)[U¯ e − U¯u] + U¯u}
= c¯−γ
(
1− τW )wF + β(1− ρ)U¯ e − β(1− ρ)U¯u + βU¯u
= c¯−γ
(
1− τW )wF + β(1− ρ)U¯ e + [β − β(1− ρ)] U¯u (38)
Placing the U¯ e terms to the right hand side yields
[1− β(1− ρ)] U¯ e = c¯−γ (1− τW )wF + [β − β(1− ρ)] U¯u
Similarly, from Equation (4.33), we have
U¯u = c¯−γwU + β {(1− ρ)P¯Uθ [U¯ e − U¯u] + U¯u}
= c¯−γwU + β(1− ρ)P¯Uθ U¯ e − β(1− ρ)P¯Uθ U¯u + βU¯u
= c¯−γwU + β(1− ρ)P¯Uθ U¯ e +
[
β − β(1− ρ)P¯Uθ
] U¯u
Placing the U¯u terms to the right hand side yields[
1− β + β(1− ρ)P¯Uθ
] U¯u = c¯−γwU + β(1− ρ)P¯Uθ U¯ e
⇒ U¯u = c¯
−γwU[
1− β + β(1− ρ)P¯Uθ
] + β(1− ρ)P¯Uθ[
1− β + β(1− ρ)P¯Uθ
] U¯ e
Let be U¯u = A+BU¯ e. Now we can use Equation (9) to get
[1− β(1− ρ)] U¯ e = c¯−γ (1− τW )wF + [β − β(1− ρ)]{A+BU¯ e}
Let we call C = c¯−γ
(
1− τW )wF + [β − β(1− ρ)]A and D = 1 − β(1 − ρ) −
[β − β(1− ρ)]B. Then we arrive at U¯ e = C/D and U¯u = A + BC/D. The param-
eter Ξ in the Equation (4.31) is given by Ξ =
[
(1− β)U¯u − c¯−γwS] / [c¯−γ]. Finally, we
set ψ = wF/wS .
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Annex 1: Classification of the countries
Group of countries classified as poor, emerging and rich countries
1.1 Poor Countries
Burundi (BDI), Benin (BEN), Burkina Faso (BFA), Bhutan (BTN), Comoros (COM),
Ghana (GHA), Honduras (HND), Lesotho (LSO), Mali (MLI), Gambia (GMB), Zambia
(ZMB), Zimbabwe (ZWE), Cote d’Ivoire (CIV), Cameroon (CMR), Congo Democratic
Republic (COD), Central African Republic (CAR), Kenya (KEN), Sri Lanka (LKA),
Mongolia (MNG), Mauritania (MRT), Malawi (MWI), Niger (NER), Rwanda (RWA),
Senegal (SEN), Sierra Leone (SLE), Togo (TGO), Madagascar (MDG), Mozambique
(MOZ), Nepal (NPL), Sudan (SDN), Uganda (UGA), Bangladesh (GGD), China (CHN),
Indonesia (IDN), India (IND), Pakistan (PAK), Philippines (PHL).
1.2 Emerging Countries
Albania (ALB), Bulgaria (BGR), Bahrain (BHR), Bolivia (BOL), Botswana (BWA),
Chile (CHL), Costa Rica (CRI), Cyprus (CYP), Dominican Republic (DOM), Ecuador
(ECU), Fiji (FJI), Gabon (GAB), Greece (GRC), Guatemala (GTM), Hungary (HUN),
Iran (IRN), Jordan (JOR), Malta (MLT), Mauritius (MUS), Namibia (NAM), New Zealand
(NZL), Panama (PAN), Portugal (PRT), Paraguay (PRY), El Salvador (SLV), Suriname
(SUR), Swaziland (SWE), Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), Tunisia (TUN), Uruguay (URY),
Argentina (ARG), Colombia (COL), Spain (ESP), Israel (ISR), Korea, Republic of (KOR),
Morocco (MAR), Malaysia (MYS), Peru (PER), Syria (SYR), , Thailand (THA), Turkey
(TUR), Venezuela (VEN), South Africa (ZAF), Brazil (BRA), Egypt (EGY), Mexico
(MEX).
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1.3 Rich Countries
Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Switzerland(CHE), Denmark(DNK), Finland (FIN),
Hong Kong (HKG), Iceland (IRL) Iceland (ISL), Luxembourg (LUX), Macao (MAC),
Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Singapore (SGP), Sweden (SWE), Australia (AUS),
Canada (CAN), France (FRA), United Kingdom (GBR), Italy (ITA), Germany (DEU),
Japan (JPN), Iceland, United States (USA).
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Annex 2: Estimates of the size of the
informal sector
2.1 Poor countries
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Table 2: 1 -Informal Economy Estimates, Poor Countries, 1950-1980
year BDI BEM BFA BTN CAF COM GMB HND LSO MLI ZMB ZWE CIV CMR COD GHA KEN LKA
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960 0,560 0,482 0,686 0,495 0,396 0,372 0,423 0,354 0,698
1961 0,569 0,480 0,682 0,485 0,399 0,377 0,412 0,352 0,697
1962 0,578 0,479 0,679 0,470 0,402 0,382 0,407 0,356 0,690
1963 0,586 0,479 0,682 0,466 0,404 0,390 0,402 0,359 0,687
1964 0,594 0,482 0,689 0,455 0,406 0,390 0,395 0,361 0,680
1965 0,606 0,486 0,694 0,438 0,406 0,389 0,385 0,365 0,675
1966 0,611 0,480 0,696 0,426 0,403 0,389 0,378 0,369 0,674
1967 0,614 0,472 0,695 0,415 0,398 0,390 0,373 0,367 0,671
1968 0,615 0,461 0,688 0,407 0,395 0,391 0,373 0,364 0,666
1969 0,619 0,451 0,681 0,400 0,392 0,393 0,375 0,358 0,660
1970 0,617 0,590 0,534 0,446 0,676 0,391 0,391 0,390 0,376 0,353 0,649
1971 0,615 0,582 0,533 0,428 0,668 0,381 0,387 0,388 0,374 0,344 0,635
1972 0,598 0,580 0,543 0,417 0,658 0,376 0,380 0,381 0,371 0,337 0,627
1973 0,589 0,582 0,533 0,405 0,648 0,373 0,373 0,376 0,376 0,333 0,618
1974 0,579 0,575 0,529 0,400 0,635 0,368 0,366 0,370 0,377 0,327 0,620
1975 0,560 0,564 0,525 0,388 0,615 0,366 0,363 0,365 0,374 0,323 0,613
1976 0,559 0,560 0,516 0,383 0,603 0,361 0,357 0,362 0,374 0,324 0,605
1977 0,552 0,558 0,511 0,387 0,600 0,354 0,354 0,363 0,374 0,324 0,592
1978 0,550 0,551 0,503 0,393 0,600 0,342 0,347 0,355 0,371 0,320 0,584
1979 0,544 0,534 0,493 0,397 0,610 0,330 0,334 0,357 0,374 0,315 0,555
1980 0,492 0,552 0,527 0,445 0,343 0,337 0,558 0,518 0,418 0,487 0,403 0,617 0,323 0,324 0,354 0,377 0,315 0,541
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Table 3: 1 -Informal Economy Estimates, Poor Countries, 1950-1980 (cont.)
year BDI BEM BFA BTN CAF COM GMB HND LSO MLI ZMB ZWE CIV CMR COD GHA KEN LKA
1981 0,483 0,543 0,517 0,445 0,347 0,331 0,554 0,510 0,401 0,480 0,404 0,619 0,319 0,321 0,348 0,380 0,312 0,523
1982 0,472 0,538 0,506 0,437 0,352 0,329 0,556 0,508 0,386 0,472 0,414 0,611 0,316 0,320 0,345 0,386 0,310 0,513
1983 0,462 0,520 0,498 0,428 0,359 0,326 0,560 0,502 0,375 0,468 0,426 0,609 0,314 0,318 0,346 0,391 0,310 0,506
1984 0,452 0,519 0,494 0,414 0,366 0,322 0,562 0,514 0,373 0,469 0,433 0,612 0,315 0,315 0,345 0,398 0,312 0,502
1985 0,442 0,522 0,493 0,406 0,374 0,317 0,565 0,532 0,367 0,464 0,443 0,616 0,319 0,311 0,343 0,404 0,315 0,497
1986 0,436 0,518 0,480 0,402 0,373 0,315 0,571 0,529 0,358 0,463 0,451 0,615 0,324 0,308 0,340 0,407 0,314 0,494
1987 0,430 0,521 0,470 0,398 0,373 0,315 0,577 0,531 0,353 0,455 0,459 0,613 0,329 0,307 0,339 0,410 0,316 0,492
1988 0,426 0,527 0,465 0,391 0,375 0,315 0,570 0,528 0,352 0,449 0,470 0,611 0,334 0,307 0,338 0,414 0,317 0,490
1989 0,418 0,531 0,460 0,382 0,378 0,317 0,552 0,523 0,349 0,442 0,475 0,619 0,340 0,307 0,339 0,415 0,317 0,489
1990 0,420 0,538 0,453 0,376 0,381 0,321 0,538 0,506 0,344 0,436 0,480 0,619 0,351 0,307 0,338 0,415 0,316 0,489
1991 0,422 0,539 0,449 0,372 0,381 0,324 0,527 0,525 0,336 0,430 0,481 0,617 0,360 0,307 0,347 0,414 0,315 0,485
1992 0,423 0,539 0,443 0,367 0,383 0,331 0,515 0,527 0,328 0,430 0,494 0,600 0,365 0,308 0,355 0,410 0,315 0,481
1993 0,422 0,540 0,440 0,357 0,387 0,331 0,499 0,522 0,317 0,420 0,521 0,608 0,372 0,313 0,365 0,411 0,317 0,481
1994 0,425 0,539 0,435 0,349 0,390 0,333 0,489 0,511 0,311 0,418 0,524 0,605 0,376 0,314 0,377 0,413 0,317 0,477
1995 0,429 0,537 0,430 0,336 0,393 0,335 0,485 0,500 0,303 0,421 0,533 0,597 0,376 0,317 0,387 0,413 0,317 0,471
1996 0,430 0,530 0,428 0,329 0,396 0,339 0,479 0,498 0,300 0,420 0,538 0,596 0,374 0,319 0,396 0,414 0,317 0,468
1997 0,430 0,529 0,424 0,324 0,405 0,342 0,473 0,494 0,294 0,419 0,542 0,601 0,377 0,321 0,406 0,415 0,316 0,463
1998 0,431 0,525 0,418 0,324 0,410 0,347 0,472 0,486 0,287 0,417 0,546 0,599 0,377 0,322 0,413 0,415 0,315 0,464
1999 0,416 0,523 0,417 0,323 0,411 0,351 0,470 0,483 0,288 0,415 0,546 0,594 0,374 0,323 0,423 0,415 0,312 0,457
2000 0,419 0,519 0,413 0,317 0,413 0,357 0,467 0,473 0,285 0,413 0,543 0,596 0,377 0,323 0,433 0,418 0,311 0,454
2001 0,421 0,516 0,412 0,310 0,418 0,361 0,465 0,466 0,283 0,418 0,531 0,591 0,385 0,322 0,444 0,409 0,308 0,446
2002 0,422 0,511 0,411 0,302 0,422 0,366 0,457 0,463 0,280 0,414 0,515 0,591 0,394 0,319 0,450 0,403 0,305 0,447
2003 0,423 0,508 0,411 0,293 0,428 0,373 0,452 0,462 0,281 0,413 0,497 0,602 0,403 0,317 0,457 0,403 0,303 0,450
2004 0,415 0,503 0,409 0,286 0,435 0,378 0,432 0,458 0,284 0,406 0,478 0,610 0,412 0,316 0,460 0,402 0,302 0,449
2005 0,404 0,498 0,406 0,277 0,442 0,384 0,423 0,454 0,284 0,408 0,462 0,613 0,421 0,314 0,464 0,396 0,301 0,438
2006 0,400 0,496 0,400 0,275 0,448 0,389 0,416 0,455 0,286 0,403 0,450 0,619 0,429 0,312 0,467 0,388 0,299 0,431
2007 0,396 0,491 0,396 0,277 0,451 0,394 0,409 0,451 0,288 0,399 0,439 0,627 0,439 0,310 0,467 0,383 0,295 0,422
2008 0,388 0,486 0,392 0,278 0,453 0,397 0,402 0,446 0,288 0,394 0,425 0,633 0,449 0,308 0,466 0,375 0,290 0,415
2009 0,388 0,481 0,387 0,278 0,453 0,399 0,398 0,440 0,287 0,390 0,415 0,643 0,459 0,306 0,465 0,366 0,284 0,405
2010 0,385 0,477 0,383 0,276 0,454 0,402 0,394 0,443 0,288 0,385 0,405 0,641 0,468 0,303 0,464 0,359 0,279 0,400
2011 0,385 0,474 0,377 0,272 0,454 0,403 0,390 0,444 0,290 0,379 0,396 0,640 0,478 0,300 0,463 0,353 0,274 0,394
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Table 4: 2 -Informal Economy Estimates, Poor Countries, 1950-1980
year MNG MRT MWI NER RWA SEN SLE TGO MDG MOZ NPL SDN UGA BGD CHN IDN IND PAK PHL
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960 0,560 0,347 0,514 0,395 0,567 0,570 0,495 0,276 0,314 0,385 0,593 0,557
1961 0,554 0,348 0,523 0,395 0,570 0,574 0,506 0,266 0,319 0,378 0,580 0,553
1962 0,540 0,352 0,530 0,397 0,573 0,572 0,516 0,267 0,321 0,372 0,562 0,547
1963 0,538 0,353 0,537 0,400 0,577 0,574 0,523 0,270 0,323 0,365 0,545 0,543
1964 0,535 0,348 0,541 0,401 0,580 0,572 0,531 0,271 0,326 0,359 0,525 0,535
1965 0,537 0,347 0,544 0,400 0,582 0,562 0,538 0,271 0,330 0,351 0,507 0,528
1966 0,524 0,346 0,547 0,401 0,582 0,556 0,543 0,268 0,331 0,345 0,485 0,520
1967 0,505 0,346 0,552 0,402 0,580 0,551 0,548 0,265 0,333 0,340 0,474 0,513
1968 0,496 0,345 0,558 0,401 0,578 0,542 0,551 0,264 0,336 0,335 0,465 0,506
1969 0,483 0,343 0,561 0,398 0,574 0,537 0,550 0,263 0,336 0,332 0,459 0,500
1970 0,467 0,345 0,563 0,395 0,565 0,490 0,527 0,550 0,262 0,335 0,327 0,456 0,494
1971 0,444 0,347 0,561 0,393 0,555 0,501 0,523 0,551 0,257 0,330 0,324 0,449 0,490
1972 0,427 0,348 0,559 0,390 0,544 0,513 0,519 0,555 0,252 0,324 0,321 0,444 0,482
1973 0,410 0,344 0,555 0,391 0,534 0,524 0,516 0,566 0,248 0,316 0,319 0,442 0,485
1974 0,404 0,339 0,552 0,392 0,525 0,534 0,513 0,572 0,243 0,309 0,316 0,441 0,476
1975 0,394 0,332 0,551 0,391 0,518 0,540 0,511 0,556 0,240 0,299 0,313 0,438 0,470
1976 0,381 0,329 0,549 0,391 0,511 0,541 0,509 0,554 0,235 0,291 0,311 0,435 0,463
1977 0,375 0,327 0,547 0,393 0,504 0,541 0,508 0,545 0,232 0,284 0,308 0,430 0,443
1978 0,370 0,333 0,544 0,395 0,498 0,543 0,507 0,538 0,229 0,278 0,306 0,425 0,445
1979 0,356 0,332 0,543 0,398 0,493 0,545 0,508 0,532 0,224 0,267 0,301 0,423 0,435
1980 0,170 0,352 0,351 0,332 0,494 0,541 0,404 0,283 0,393 0,490 0,540 0,548 0,510 0,519 0,221 0,259 0,299 0,419 0,424
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Table 5: 2 -Informal Economy Estimates, Poor Countries, 1950-1980 (cont.)
year MNG MRT MWI NER RWA SEN SLE TGO MDG MOZ NPL SDN UGA BGD CHN IDN IND PAK PHL
1981 0,174 0,353 0,348 0,325 0,477 0,539 0,397 0,277 0,391 0,485 0,530 0,556 0,513 0,502 0,218 0,252 0,297 0,415 0,421
1982 0,168 0,349 0,350 0,323 0,472 0,541 0,392 0,277 0,393 0,481 0,520 0,556 0,516 0,489 0,215 0,246 0,294 0,412 0,412
1983 0,163 0,345 0,351 0,321 0,456 0,538 0,390 0,279 0,397 0,476 0,512 0,556 0,517 0,483 0,212 0,238 0,292 0,405 0,412
1984 0,159 0,341 0,352 0,325 0,447 0,533 0,389 0,283 0,401 0,484 0,504 0,562 0,516 0,477 0,207 0,232 0,289 0,400 0,406
1985 0,158 0,341 0,354 0,333 0,431 0,532 0,390 0,289 0,404 0,488 0,496 0,576 0,521 0,471 0,205 0,228 0,287 0,395 0,406
1986 0,156 0,345 0,357 0,337 0,419 0,533 0,391 0,290 0,408 0,491 0,485 0,587 0,522 0,466 0,200 0,226 0,284 0,388 0,412
1987 0,153 0,347 0,362 0,340 0,412 0,530 0,392 0,292 0,410 0,491 0,477 0,590 0,523 0,454 0,197 0,221 0,281 0,385 0,414
1988 0,152 0,348 0,368 0,345 0,405 0,527 0,396 0,299 0,412 0,488 0,470 0,599 0,519 0,448 0,194 0,217 0,278 0,379 0,417
1989 0,151 0,352 0,373 0,347 0,397 0,522 0,397 0,302 0,409 0,482 0,460 0,595 0,515 0,444 0,190 0,214 0,274 0,374 0,417
1990 0,145 0,358 0,375 0,352 0,391 0,522 0,396 0,302 0,407 0,477 0,454 0,599 0,510 0,440 0,187 0,211 0,271 0,372 0,414
1991 0,157 0,361 0,377 0,357 0,384 0,519 0,393 0,300 0,401 0,475 0,450 0,604 0,507 0,437 0,184 0,207 0,267 0,364 0,411
1992 0,159 0,365 0,372 0,360 0,378 0,518 0,392 0,305 0,407 0,475 0,445 0,604 0,504 0,435 0,180 0,203 0,265 0,363 0,412
1993 0,161 0,364 0,371 0,365 0,372 0,514 0,387 0,308 0,408 0,475 0,439 0,589 0,501 0,431 0,176 0,200 0,262 0,358 0,411
1994 0,160 0,368 0,370 0,375 0,371 0,515 0,391 0,318 0,409 0,468 0,432 0,594 0,498 0,427 0,171 0,197 0,260 0,355 0,409
1995 0,160 0,370 0,375 0,378 0,379 0,516 0,390 0,322 0,411 0,470 0,424 0,588 0,492 0,422 0,166 0,191 0,256 0,350 0,406
1996 0,161 0,372 0,379 0,381 0,384 0,514 0,393 0,326 0,414 0,464 0,414 0,583 0,482 0,417 0,161 0,189 0,251 0,347 0,406
1997 0,161 0,375 0,382 0,384 0,396 0,508 0,394 0,330 0,414 0,459 0,406 0,554 0,473 0,410 0,156 0,184 0,248 0,346 0,399
1998 0,161 0,379 0,386 0,388 0,405 0,498 0,401 0,333 0,415 0,454 0,399 0,527 0,466 0,403 0,152 0,180 0,244 0,346 0,393
1999 0,161 0,379 0,391 0,389 0,411 0,489 0,409 0,336 0,414 0,444 0,395 0,478 0,458 0,395 0,147 0,180 0,240 0,344 0,393
2000 0,160 0,378 0,394 0,393 0,416 0,478 0,416 0,340 0,413 0,425 0,392 0,460 0,450 0,387 0,144 0,180 0,236 0,341 0,392
2001 0,160 0,376 0,397 0,398 0,416 0,466 0,422 0,342 0,409 0,413 0,385 0,444 0,445 0,381 0,141 0,181 0,233 0,339 0,395
2002 0,162 0,369 0,399 0,400 0,415 0,455 0,426 0,343 0,404 0,406 0,380 0,422 0,440 0,376 0,137 0,181 0,230 0,336 0,394
2003 0,165 0,369 0,403 0,400 0,411 0,450 0,429 0,344 0,405 0,399 0,377 0,397 0,434 0,370 0,134 0,181 0,227 0,337 0,390
2004 0,165 0,364 0,406 0,403 0,407 0,441 0,433 0,345 0,403 0,395 0,374 0,372 0,427 0,363 0,130 0,181 0,224 0,337 0,388
2005 0,165 0,348 0,407 0,405 0,403 0,434 0,434 0,346 0,397 0,392 0,369 0,352 0,420 0,356 0,127 0,180 0,219 0,337 0,386
2006 0,166 0,326 0,403 0,402 0,397 0,424 0,430 0,345 0,393 0,388 0,364 0,332 0,411 0,348 0,123 0,179 0,213 0,338 0,383
2007 0,164 0,315 0,394 0,399 0,390 0,417 0,429 0,345 0,385 0,385 0,359 0,320 0,403 0,341 0,119 0,179 0,207 0,336 0,383
2008 0,162 0,307 0,387 0,397 0,381 0,407 0,427 0,345 0,378 0,381 0,355 0,310 0,394 0,334 0,115 0,178 0,200 0,331 0,383
2009 0,158 0,298 0,376 0,392 0,367 0,400 0,425 0,345 0,363 0,373 0,347 0,303 0,385 0,327 0,111 0,177 0,195 0,330 0,381
2010 0,157 0,292 0,366 0,388 0,356 0,397 0,422 0,343 0,357 0,366 0,339 0,296 0,377 0,321 0,107 0,176 0,190 0,327 0,381
2011 0,156 0,285 0,357 0,382 0,347 0,395 0,410 0,339 0,354 0,361 0,328 0,290 0,370 0,316 0,103 0,175 0,185 0,325 0,378
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Table 6: 1 -Informal Economy Estimates, Emerging Countries, 1950-1980
year ALB BGR BHR BOL BWA CHL CRI CYP DOM ECU FJI GAB GRC GTM HUN ISR
1950 0,752 0,429 0,465 0,504
1951 0,759 0,301 0,427 0,462 0,482 0,512
1952 0,750 0,306 0,429 0,457 0,486 0,520
1953 0,727 0,306 0,430 0,454 0,496 0,531
1954 0,730 0,310 0,419 0,448 0,499 0,541
1955 0,734 0,311 0,416 0,437 0,507 0,550
1956 0,711 0,306 0,402 0,427 0,512 0,556
1957 0,695 0,307 0,399 0,419 0,510 0,556
1958 0,699 0,307 0,397 0,413 0,507 0,556
1959 0,694 0,304 0,391 0,408 0,500 0,558
1960 0,696 0,304 0,386 0,397 0,523 0,401 0,493 0,562 0,353
1961 0,693 0,302 0,379 0,397 0,527 0,395 0,486 0,567 0,346
1962 0,694 0,299 0,375 0,394 0,533 0,390 0,468 0,574 0,340
1963 0,686 0,298 0,370 0,386 0,533 0,386 0,457 0,581 0,332
1964 0,678 0,294 0,365 0,379 0,527 0,382 0,441 0,582 0,328
1965 0,672 0,289 0,366 0,382 0,515 0,378 0,425 0,581 0,320
1966 0,669 0,285 0,360 0,378 0,523 0,375 0,408 0,579 0,312
1967 0,662 0,277 0,355 0,376 0,520 0,372 0,393 0,581 0,303
1968 0,664 0,272 0,351 0,371 0,517 0,366 0,382 0,579 0,306
1969 0,653 0,266 0,348 0,367 0,515 0,361 0,371 0,573 0,299
1970 0,400 0,471 0,175 0,652 0,261 0,343 0,359 0,508 0,357 0,358 0,572 0,321 0,283
1971 0,395 0,468 0,176 0,650 0,256 0,338 0,354 0,498 0,355 0,347 0,572 0,318 0,278
1972 0,390 0,465 0,178 0,646 0,251 0,332 0,348 0,486 0,351 0,336 0,568 0,314 0,272
1973 0,385 0,461 0,178 0,637 0,250 0,328 0,342 0,474 0,350 0,324 0,570 0,312 0,256
1974 0,381 0,456 0,178 0,635 0,250 0,322 0,324 0,458 0,344 0,311 0,568 0,309 0,249
1975 0,377 0,451 0,178 0,636 0,245 0,314 0,323 0,443 0,336 0,305 0,560 0,305 0,241
1976 0,373 0,444 0,182 0,629 0,247 0,311 0,326 0,429 0,328 0,301 0,556 0,300 0,240
1977 0,369 0,438 0,178 0,627 0,249 0,307 0,329 0,420 0,321 0,295 0,547 0,296 0,242
1978 0,366 0,432 0,175 0,623 0,250 0,300 0,327 0,410 0,314 0,293 0,536 0,291 0,239
1979 0,362 0,425 0,173 0,609 0,250 0,294 0,323 0,402 0,307 0,289 0,526 0,284 0,242
1980 0,358 0,419 0,171 0,604 0,525 0,245 0,288 0,318 0,394 0,301 0,354 0,445 0,288 0,520 0,281 0,238
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Table 7: 1 -Informal Economy Estimates, Emerging Countries, 1981-2011 (cont.)
year ALB BGR BHR BOL BWA CHL CRI CYP DOM ECU FJI GAB GRC GTM HUN ISR
1981 0,357 0,413 0,166 0,605 0,511 0,241 0,279 0,312 0,386 0,296 0,348 0,442 0,288 0,518 0,278 0,237
1982 0,353 0,404 0,162 0,600 0,496 0,233 0,276 0,309 0,382 0,294 0,341 0,435 0,286 0,514 0,276 0,238
1983 0,348 0,398 0,161 0,610 0,483 0,236 0,277 0,306 0,382 0,292 0,339 0,429 0,286 0,514 0,274 0,238
1984 0,345 0,393 0,159 0,622 0,476 0,240 0,282 0,303 0,381 0,294 0,340 0,426 0,286 0,518 0,273 0,235
1985 0,345 0,386 0,156 0,629 0,472 0,243 0,280 0,299 0,379 0,296 0,341 0,423 0,286 0,517 0,272 0,234
1986 0,344 0,382 0,157 0,634 0,466 0,246 0,280 0,297 0,378 0,297 0,342 0,420 0,286 0,519 0,271 0,237
1987 0,343 0,377 0,158 0,636 0,461 0,248 0,279 0,293 0,378 0,297 0,340 0,421 0,285 0,524 0,270 0,235
1988 0,344 0,372 0,161 0,642 0,457 0,248 0,276 0,291 0,374 0,299 0,344 0,428 0,288 0,526 0,269 0,236
1989 0,345 0,363 0,162 0,649 0,461 0,248 0,274 0,290 0,370 0,301 0,349 0,430 0,287 0,530 0,269 0,238
1990 0,341 0,355 0,163 0,658 0,437 0,245 0,273 0,286 0,364 0,302 0,350 0,436 0,287 0,531 0,267 0,237
1991 0,334 0,342 0,165 0,660 0,418 0,242 0,271 0,283 0,363 0,306 0,347 0,441 0,286 0,533 0,262 0,238
1992 0,341 0,340 0,164 0,659 0,405 0,240 0,272 0,281 0,365 0,307 0,347 0,444 0,286 0,533 0,259 0,235
1993 0,351 0,345 0,164 0,658 0,396 0,236 0,270 0,280 0,361 0,308 0,347 0,449 0,285 0,527 0,257 0,231
1994 0,356 0,351 0,166 0,656 0,390 0,230 0,267 0,278 0,356 0,310 0,348 0,453 0,287 0,526 0,258 0,229
1995 0,358 0,358 0,166 0,658 0,386 0,226 0,264 0,277 0,350 0,310 0,349 0,457 0,287 0,522 0,258 0,227
1996 0,360 0,363 0,168 0,658 0,381 0,219 0,262 0,274 0,347 0,308 0,349 0,459 0,287 0,519 0,258 0,223
1997 0,361 0,366 0,169 0,658 0,379 0,213 0,263 0,272 0,346 0,310 0,350 0,461 0,286 0,520 0,257 0,219
1998 0,366 0,369 0,170 0,651 0,375 0,207 0,262 0,271 0,345 0,308 0,350 0,457 0,286 0,519 0,257 0,216
1999 0,368 0,365 0,169 0,637 0,365 0,202 0,259 0,270 0,336 0,305 0,349 0,454 0,284 0,513 0,255 0,214
2000 0,370 0,361 0,170 0,632 0,358 0,200 0,259 0,271 0,328 0,309 0,348 0,457 0,281 0,508 0,253 0,213
2001 0,358 0,358 0,170 0,628 0,351 0,199 0,257 0,270 0,318 0,314 0,343 0,461 0,278 0,503 0,250 0,210
2002 0,354 0,354 0,167 0,625 0,344 0,196 0,253 0,269 0,313 0,314 0,341 0,464 0,276 0,500 0,248 0,207
2003 0,350 0,351 0,162 0,630 0,337 0,195 0,250 0,269 0,307 0,310 0,339 0,465 0,274 0,495 0,246 0,206
2004 0,345 0,347 0,158 0,631 0,331 0,192 0,247 0,270 0,307 0,314 0,338 0,468 0,271 0,488 0,244 0,206
2005 0,340 0,343 0,158 0,635 0,322 0,191 0,246 0,269 0,307 0,310 0,337 0,471 0,269 0,485 0,241 0,207
2006 0,335 0,335 0,161 0,634 0,322 0,189 0,243 0,266 0,308 0,308 0,330 0,474 0,268 0,483 0,238 0,207
2007 0,329 0,327 0,165 0,635 0,319 0,185 0,240 0,265 0,305 0,304 0,326 0,473 0,265 0,479 0,237 0,207
2008 0,326 0,318 0,168 0,634 0,314 0,182 0,236 0,262 0,302 0,300 0,326 0,474 0,262 0,475 0,234 0,206
2009 0,314 0,305 0,170 0,628 0,308 0,176 0,231 0,256 0,298 0,295 0,323 0,474 0,258 0,474 0,231 0,204
2010 0,308 0,297 0,170 0,622 0,304 0,177 0,231 0,254 0,296 0,292 0,323 0,476 0,257 0,477 0,232 0,204
2011 0,305 0,293 0,168 0,615 0,301 0,173 0,229 0,251 0,293 0,289 0,319 0,475 0,256 0,479 0,232 0,204
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Table 8: 2 -Informal Economy Estimates, Emerging Countries, 1950-1980
year JOR MLT MUS NAM NZL PAN PRT PRY SLV SUR SWZ TTO TUN URY ARG
1950 0,175 0,479 0,400
1951 0,172 0,478 0,404
1952 0,171 0,477 0,394
1953 0,170 0,475 0,399
1954 0,171 0,470 0,399
1955 0,169 0,466 0,401
1956 0,168 0,463 0,396
1957 0,167 0,461 0,399
1958 0,166 0,456 0,399
1959 0,165 0,451 0,390
1960 0,300 0,454 0,164 0,447 0,449 0,567 0,511 0,391
1961 0,302 0,444 0,163 0,438 0,435 0,560 0,509 0,387
1962 0,300 0,436 0,162 0,427 0,427 0,549 0,506 0,378
1963 0,297 0,429 0,161 0,419 0,417 0,535 0,506 0,368
1964 0,299 0,426 0,160 0,410 0,412 0,519 0,507 0,371
1965 0,296 0,420 0,159 0,401 0,407 0,503 0,509 0,371
1966 0,292 0,414 0,157 0,390 0,401 0,490 0,511 0,365
1967 0,290 0,406 0,154 0,380 0,397 0,479 0,514 0,362
1968 0,285 0,398 0,152 0,373 0,398 0,471 0,514 0,358
1969 0,280 0,386 0,153 0,881 0,365 0,397 0,464 0,517 0,359
1970 0,270 0,372 0,152 0,851 0,363 0,541 0,397 0,457 0,516 0,355
1971 0,270 0,364 0,152 0,815 0,354 0,535 0,393 0,451 0,514 0,350
1972 0,263 0,362 0,150 0,778 0,346 0,527 0,381 0,445 0,512 0,345
1973 0,253 0,362 0,150 0,746 0,338 0,519 0,374 0,433 0,510 0,339
1974 0,248 0,363 0,148 0,723 0,334 0,507 0,372 0,427 0,510 0,336
1975 0,243 0,363 0,144 0,693 0,324 0,492 0,519 0,391 0,360 0,419 0,510 0,329
1976 0,236 0,365 0,144 0,679 0,324 0,483 0,512 0,384 0,352 0,413 0,507 0,328
1977 0,230 0,365 0,142 0,664 0,322 0,469 0,505 0,384 0,345 0,406 0,501 0,326
1978 0,216 0,363 0,142 0,670 0,317 0,456 0,491 0,380 0,338 0,402 0,492 0,319
1979 0,206 0,361 0,142 0,670 0,314 0,441 0,480 0,374 0,325 0,397 0,482 0,316
1980 0,201 0,355 0,283 0,275 0,142 0,666 0,310 0,425 0,469 0,371 0,392 0,314 0,392 0,471 0,313
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Table 9: 2 -Informal Economy Estimates, Emerging Countries, 1981-2011 (cont.)
year JOR MLT MUS NAM NZL PAN PRT PRY SLV SUR SWZ TTO TUN URY ARG
1981 0,193 0,351 0,284 0,269 0,142 0,657 0,304 0,407 0,467 0,365 0,390 0,302 0,386 0,462 0,311
1982 0,187 0,344 0,283 0,265 0,142 0,645 0,298 0,391 0,467 0,355 0,390 0,296 0,380 0,451 0,312
1983 0,183 0,334 0,284 0,265 0,140 0,643 0,296 0,384 0,468 0,355 0,390 0,290 0,375 0,449 0,312
1984 0,180 0,328 0,286 0,267 0,140 0,646 0,293 0,383 0,469 0,355 0,384 0,285 0,369 0,451 0,312
1985 0,178 0,322 0,286 0,270 0,139 0,649 0,292 0,381 0,470 0,356 0,382 0,280 0,366 0,459 0,311
1986 0,178 0,319 0,286 0,276 0,137 0,653 0,292 0,380 0,475 0,356 0,384 0,277 0,364 0,467 0,313
1987 0,177 0,317 0,284 0,284 0,136 0,656 0,293 0,379 0,477 0,356 0,387 0,275 0,365 0,476 0,316
1988 0,176 0,314 0,280 0,288 0,135 0,651 0,291 0,378 0,480 0,357 0,384 0,277 0,367 0,478 0,317
1989 0,175 0,309 0,274 0,292 0,133 0,668 0,287 0,376 0,481 0,366 0,380 0,280 0,370 0,482 0,315
1990 0,177 0,305 0,270 0,294 0,132 0,683 0,285 0,374 0,479 0,370 0,374 0,283 0,373 0,484 0,322
1991 0,179 0,300 0,265 0,290 0,131 0,681 0,281 0,370 0,482 0,372 0,370 0,290 0,373 0,486 0,326
1992 0,182 0,294 0,261 0,293 0,132 0,689 0,276 0,366 0,484 0,379 0,365 0,294 0,375 0,487 0,326
1993 0,183 0,292 0,257 0,292 0,132 0,681 0,271 0,365 0,485 0,379 0,360 0,297 0,373 0,484 0,325
1994 0,182 0,288 0,253 0,297 0,133 0,668 0,268 0,363 0,484 0,380 0,356 0,303 0,373 0,482 0,323
1995 0,181 0,284 0,249 0,297 0,133 0,655 0,264 0,362 0,477 0,371 0,354 0,307 0,374 0,477 0,321
1996 0,180 0,279 0,247 0,298 0,132 0,637 0,262 0,360 0,471 0,375 0,351 0,311 0,375 0,469 0,320
1997 0,178 0,275 0,246 0,297 0,130 0,628 0,260 0,360 0,468 0,366 0,352 0,315 0,374 0,463 0,317
1998 0,179 0,270 0,242 0,298 0,129 0,617 0,257 0,358 0,467 0,366 0,351 0,317 0,373 0,452 0,313
1999 0,179 0,267 0,238 0,296 0,128 0,605 0,252 0,359 0,460 0,362 0,348 0,317 0,371 0,444 0,309
2000 0,179 0,264 0,234 0,295 0,127 0,588 0,248 0,361 0,455 0,356 0,351 0,321 0,368 0,439 0,308
2001 0,180 0,261 0,231 0,295 0,127 0,583 0,244 0,360 0,453 0,361 0,354 0,324 0,366 0,438 0,308
2002 0,180 0,262 0,230 0,294 0,126 0,587 0,240 0,358 0,445 0,364 0,355 0,324 0,363 0,434 0,301
2003 0,180 0,263 0,227 0,292 0,125 0,589 0,237 0,360 0,443 0,368 0,355 0,326 0,361 0,434 0,308
2004 0,181 0,264 0,224 0,292 0,124 0,590 0,235 0,366 0,437 0,375 0,360 0,325 0,359 0,439 0,313
2005 0,181 0,266 0,222 0,292 0,123 0,590 0,233 0,362 0,434 0,367 0,367 0,323 0,357 0,441 0,316
2006 0,175 0,265 0,221 0,289 0,121 0,587 0,231 0,362 0,432 0,357 0,373 0,316 0,356 0,460 0,316
2007 0,172 0,265 0,219 0,285 0,120 0,585 0,230 0,365 0,430 0,351 0,380 0,315 0,354 0,461 0,312
2008 0,169 0,264 0,217 0,280 0,118 0,577 0,229 0,366 0,424 0,341 0,388 0,315 0,352 0,458 0,308
2009 0,168 0,263 0,214 0,273 0,117 0,568 0,226 0,365 0,419 0,331 0,396 0,315 0,349 0,451 0,301
2010 0,169 0,266 0,213 0,268 0,116 0,555 0,225 0,363 0,420 0,326 0,398 0,317 0,347 0,447 0,297
2011 0,169 0,268 0,212 0,263 0,116 0,543 0,224 0,360 0,419 0,325 0,412 0,317 0,342 0,442 0,293
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Table 10: 3 -Informal Economy Estimates, Emerging Countries, 1950-1980
year COL ESP IRN KOR MAR MYS PER SYR THA TUR VEM ZAF BRA EGY MEX
1950 0,527 0,466 0,793 0,683 0,408 0,649 0,488
1951 0,519 0,465 0,794 0,689 0,401 0,639 0,487
1952 0,517 0,462 0,786 0,692 0,394 0,628 0,483
1953 0,512 0,460 0,776 0,690 0,381 0,608 0,477
1954 0,507 0,457 0,765 0,684 0,371 0,608 0,473
1955 0,496 0,451 0,760 0,678 0,363 0,599 0,467
1956 0,487 0,444 0,752 0,666 0,357 0,589 0,461
1957 0,478 0,437 0,740 0,661 0,349 0,587 0,451
1958 0,474 0,431 0,726 0,651 0,338 0,577 0,442
1959 0,474 0,422 0,718 0,634 0,334 0,570 0,435
1960 0,471 0,416 0,280 0,701 0,520 0,669 0,716 0,305 1,200 0,625 0,327 0,325 0,555 0,743 0,430
1961 0,467 0,412 0,280 0,712 0,512 0,667 0,710 0,304 1,187 0,616 0,326 0,323 0,549 0,740 0,424
1962 0,463 0,405 0,280 0,715 0,517 0,664 0,707 0,302 1,175 0,607 0,327 0,322 0,541 0,732 0,418
1963 0,460 0,395 0,278 0,721 0,512 0,656 0,698 0,296 1,153 0,599 0,327 0,321 0,532 0,720 0,414
1964 0,459 0,385 0,276 0,710 0,508 0,648 0,693 0,293 1,123 0,590 0,330 0,318 0,530 0,710 0,409
1965 0,456 0,375 0,271 0,709 0,511 0,641 0,686 0,289 1,097 0,581 0,327 0,314 0,528 0,695 0,402
1966 0,455 0,366 0,266 0,705 0,508 0,633 0,680 0,288 1,071 0,574 0,323 0,308 0,522 0,680 0,393
1967 0,452 0,355 0,259 0,685 0,508 0,626 0,668 0,285 1,034 0,560 0,322 0,305 0,514 0,669 0,386
1968 0,450 0,347 0,253 0,668 0,499 0,618 0,655 0,282 0,999 0,549 0,322 0,299 0,511 0,664 0,379
1969 0,446 0,339 0,245 0,643 0,494 0,611 0,652 0,279 0,967 0,536 0,318 0,295 0,504 0,661 0,371
1970 0,443 0,330 0,237 0,623 0,504 0,605 0,652 0,270 0,933 0,529 0,315 0,290 0,492 0,655 0,366
1971 0,436 0,322 0,233 0,608 0,493 0,595 0,647 0,270 0,897 0,517 0,310 0,284 0,484 0,649 0,362
1972 0,431 0,317 0,229 0,594 0,486 0,580 0,643 0,269 0,861 0,509 0,307 0,279 0,475 0,644 0,360
1973 0,427 0,311 0,224 0,591 0,485 0,567 0,642 0,263 0,847 0,499 0,304 0,276 0,471 0,643 0,358
1974 0,423 0,304 0,216 0,578 0,479 0,549 0,632 0,261 0,805 0,489 0,305 0,272 0,456 0,636 0,354
1975 0,417 0,295 0,204 0,558 0,475 0,526 0,613 0,256 0,788 0,467 0,308 0,266 0,442 0,618 0,349
1976 0,416 0,288 0,195 0,551 0,450 0,516 0,600 0,248 0,767 0,450 0,307 0,262 0,429 0,601 0,344
1977 0,417 0,283 0,183 0,536 0,430 0,506 0,591 0,238 0,768 0,436 0,306 0,260 0,422 0,574 0,341
1978 0,414 0,279 0,172 0,518 0,412 0,493 0,590 0,228 0,755 0,430 0,299 0,258 0,413 0,552 0,338
1979 0,412 0,275 0,169 0,494 0,405 0,482 0,592 0,220 0,726 0,429 0,291 0,257 0,401 0,534 0,336
1980 0,409 0,271 0,167 0,467 0,402 0,467 0,587 0,217 0,716 0,429 0,285 0,256 0,391 0,513 0,332
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Table 11: 3 -Informal Economy Estimates, Emerging Countries, 1981-2011 (cont.)
year COL ESP IRN KOR MAR MYS PER SYR THA TUR VEM ZAF BRA EGY MEX
1981 0,404 0,268 0,164 0,455 0,397 0,454 0,580 0,211 0,709 0,425 0,283 0,252 0,384 0,489 0,325
1982 0,395 0,266 0,164 0,446 0,394 0,440 0,570 0,206 0,697 0,420 0,283 0,248 0,381 0,472 0,316
1983 0,387 0,265 0,164 0,436 0,390 0,426 0,564 0,202 0,688 0,416 0,281 0,247 0,377 0,455 0,311
1984 0,381 0,263 0,162 0,424 0,388 0,415 0,567 0,198 0,676 0,415 0,283 0,245 0,379 0,442 0,313
1985 0,376 0,261 0,160 0,415 0,386 0,402 0,569 0,197 0,661 0,412 0,288 0,244 0,384 0,434 0,314
1986 0,375 0,261 0,160 0,406 0,383 0,397 0,576 0,195 0,655 0,409 0,293 0,245 0,382 0,426 0,313
1987 0,374 0,261 0,161 0,399 0,381 0,397 0,583 0,196 0,653 0,405 0,297 0,247 0,379 0,422 0,316
1988 0,372 0,261 0,161 0,388 0,380 0,397 0,586 0,198 0,651 0,395 0,301 0,249 0,378 0,419 0,317
1989 0,368 0,258 0,164 0,377 0,379 0,394 0,587 0,198 0,627 0,389 0,295 0,250 0,375 0,415 0,318
1990 0,373 0,256 0,164 0,364 0,377 0,390 0,591 0,201 0,618 0,382 0,302 0,250 0,375 0,409 0,319
1991 0,376 0,252 0,164 0,351 0,374 0,383 0,596 0,203 0,591 0,375 0,307 0,252 0,376 0,401 0,319
1992 0,374 0,247 0,161 0,337 0,371 0,372 0,595 0,205 0,574 0,369 0,309 0,254 0,375 0,396 0,317
1993 0,372 0,243 0,159 0,326 0,368 0,364 0,589 0,206 0,551 0,358 0,308 0,256 0,376 0,395 0,314
1994 0,367 0,241 0,160 0,319 0,368 0,353 0,579 0,207 0,532 0,353 0,310 0,260 0,377 0,393 0,312
1995 0,355 0,240 0,162 0,310 0,367 0,341 0,570 0,206 0,516 0,351 0,314 0,262 0,377 0,386 0,306
1996 0,348 0,239 0,164 0,302 0,368 0,333 0,561 0,205 0,498 0,346 0,315 0,262 0,372 0,381 0,309
1997 0,341 0,239 0,166 0,294 0,367 0,322 0,558 0,204 0,484 0,339 0,317 0,262 0,369 0,375 0,311
1998 0,337 0,239 0,167 0,283 0,366 0,311 0,551 0,203 0,472 0,333 0,317 0,263 0,365 0,369 0,309
1999 0,335 0,238 0,169 0,282 0,363 0,310 0,545 0,203 0,476 0,327 0,317 0,263 0,362 0,365 0,306
2000 0,339 0,237 0,170 0,280 0,359 0,311 0,539 0,202 0,480 0,322 0,317 0,263 0,365 0,358 0,303
2001 0,343 0,235 0,172 0,276 0,355 0,307 0,535 0,202 0,484 0,316 0,317 0,264 0,363 0,351 0,298
2002 0,343 0,232 0,173 0,273 0,352 0,305 0,534 0,202 0,488 0,316 0,314 0,263 0,363 0,346 0,295
2003 0,346 0,230 0,174 0,268 0,351 0,303 0,532 0,200 0,491 0,313 0,315 0,262 0,363 0,343 0,293
2004 0,345 0,228 0,175 0,265 0,347 0,301 0,532 0,197 0,492 0,305 0,320 0,261 0,366 0,341 0,292
2005 0,345 0,227 0,175 0,262 0,341 0,299 0,532 0,194 0,490 0,302 0,318 0,258 0,367 0,339 0,290
2006 0,339 0,225 0,174 0,259 0,336 0,298 0,537 0,188 0,485 0,297 0,315 0,255 0,367 0,334 0,290
2007 0,335 0,222 0,173 0,256 0,331 0,296 0,537 0,185 0,482 0,291 0,309 0,252 0,366 0,331 0,288
2008 0,330 0,218 0,170 0,253 0,325 0,293 0,527 0,182 0,479 0,286 0,301 0,249 0,365 0,324 0,286
2009 0,326 0,212 0,168 0,249 0,317 0,291 0,507 0,176 0,475 0,280 0,295 0,243 0,360 0,316 0,283
2010 0,324 0,210 0,166 0,249 0,311 0,293 0,502 0,174 0,475 0,283 0,292 0,239 0,360 0,312 0,282
2011 0,319 0,209 0,163 0,247 0,307 0,290 0,490 0,171 0,472 0,282 0,289 0,236 0,357 0,306 0,282
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Table 12: 1 -Informal Economy Estimates, Rich Countries, 1950-1980
Year AUT BEL CHE DNK FIN HKG IRL ISL LUX MAC NLD
1950 0,170 0,348 0,116 0,279 0,299 0,280 0,145 0,208
1951 0,169 0,346 0,117 0,277 0,299 0,279 0,142 0,207
1952 0,167 0,344 0,117 0,278 0,295 0,276 0,142 0,205
1953 0,166 0,342 0,118 0,278 0,290 0,276 0,140 0,200
1954 0,167 0,340 0,118 0,278 0,289 0,274 0,138 0,196
1955 0,167 0,338 0,118 0,277 0,286 0,273 0,137 0,193
1956 0,165 0,336 0,117 0,277 0,281 0,270 0,000 0,136 0,191
1957 0,163 0,333 0,116 0,277 0,277 0,268 0,248 0,135 0,189
1958 0,161 0,328 0,113 0,276 0,273 0,269 0,244 0,133 0,190
1959 0,160 0,326 0,113 0,277 0,270 0,270 0,240 0,131 0,188
1960 0,159 0,325 0,112 0,276 0,268 0,275 0,269 0,235 0,130 0,187
1961 0,156 0,323 0,111 0,272 0,264 0,269 0,268 0,232 0,129 0,185
1962 0,153 0,319 0,109 0,268 0,258 0,275 0,267 0,230 0,127 0,183
1963 0,151 0,314 0,107 0,264 0,253 0,272 0,265 0,229 0,125 0,181
1964 0,148 0,312 0,106 0,262 0,251 0,270 0,262 0,226 0,124 0,177
1965 0,146 0,306 0,103 0,258 0,248 0,260 0,258 0,222 0,122 0,175
1966 0,143 0,301 0,102 0,253 0,243 0,252 0,253 0,217 0,121 0,174
1967 0,140 0,296 0,100 0,249 0,238 0,253 0,250 0,211 0,119 0,171
1968 0,137 0,292 0,099 0,245 0,233 0,252 0,247 0,205 0,119 0,168
1969 0,134 0,289 0,098 0,241 0,232 0,256 0,243 0,203 0,119 0,165
1970 0,132 0,283 0,097 0,236 0,229 0,257 0,236 0,202 0,120 0,162
1971 0,130 0,279 0,096 0,231 0,224 0,254 0,232 0,203 0,120 0,160
1972 0,127 0,275 0,094 0,229 0,221 0,251 0,226 0,199 0,119 0,159
1973 0,125 0,272 0,093 0,225 0,218 0,247 0,222 0,197 0,118 0,156
1974 0,122 0,269 0,092 0,221 0,214 0,243 0,217 0,194 0,118 0,155
1975 0,119 0,263 0,090 0,217 0,209 0,240 0,212 0,188 0,117 0,154
1976 0,118 0,261 0,089 0,217 0,205 0,237 0,209 0,186 0,116 0,152
1977 0,117 0,257 0,089 0,214 0,202 0,233 0,207 0,185 0,116 0,151
1978 0,115 0,255 0,089 0,212 0,200 0,230 0,204 0,182 0,116 0,151
1979 0,114 0,252 0,089 0,210 0,201 0,225 0,201 0,181 0,116 0,150
1980 0,112 0,250 0,089 0,207 0,200 0,221 0,196 0,180 0,116 0,160 0,149
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Table 13: 1 -Informal Economy Estimates, Rich Countries, 1981-2011 (cont.)
Year AUT BEL CHE DNK FIN HKG IRL ISL LUX MAC NLD
1981 0,111 0,246 0,088 0,206 0,198 0,216 0,192 0,179 0,115 0,157 0,149
1982 0,111 0,244 0,088 0,206 0,197 0,209 0,188 0,177 0,114 0,155 0,149
1983 0,110 0,243 0,087 0,206 0,195 0,203 0,185 0,174 0,114 0,152 0,148
1984 0,110 0,244 0,087 0,207 0,193 0,201 0,183 0,175 0,114 0,149 0,147
1985 0,109 0,243 0,087 0,206 0,192 0,197 0,181 0,174 0,114 0,150 0,146
1986 0,109 0,243 0,087 0,205 0,190 0,195 0,179 0,175 0,114 0,148 0,145
1987 0,108 0,243 0,087 0,202 0,189 0,193 0,180 0,177 0,113 0,144 0,145
1988 0,108 0,243 0,086 0,199 0,188 0,190 0,180 0,174 0,113 0,141 0,144
1989 0,107 0,242 0,086 0,198 0,187 0,186 0,180 0,171 0,111 0,140 0,143
1990 0,106 0,240 0,085 0,196 0,183 0,183 0,180 0,170 0,110 0,136 0,142
1991 0,105 0,236 0,085 0,194 0,179 0,180 0,177 0,169 0,109 0,136 0,142
1992 0,104 0,234 0,084 0,193 0,176 0,176 0,176 0,168 0,107 0,131 0,141
1993 0,103 0,231 0,083 0,191 0,175 0,173 0,176 0,167 0,106 0,129 0,141
1994 0,102 0,229 0,083 0,191 0,176 0,170 0,176 0,167 0,105 0,128 0,140
1995 0,101 0,228 0,083 0,190 0,177 0,166 0,177 0,168 0,104 0,127 0,139
1996 0,100 0,226 0,082 0,188 0,177 0,163 0,177 0,168 0,104 0,129 0,138
1997 0,099 0,225 0,082 0,187 0,178 0,161 0,176 0,167 0,103 0,129 0,138
1998 0,099 0,223 0,082 0,185 0,178 0,157 0,176 0,168 0,103 0,131 0,137
1999 0,098 0,222 0,081 0,183 0,178 0,154 0,174 0,166 0,102 0,132 0,135
2000 0,098 0,221 0,081 0,181 0,177 0,154 0,171 0,164 0,101 0,130 0,135
2001 0,097 0,219 0,081 0,179 0,176 0,153 0,168 0,162 0,100 0,130 0,134
2002 0,096 0,217 0,081 0,177 0,175 0,151 0,166 0,159 0,099 0,127 0,134
2003 0,096 0,216 0,081 0,174 0,173 0,149 0,163 0,158 0,097 0,122 0,134
2004 0,096 0,216 0,081 0,173 0,172 0,149 0,161 0,157 0,096 0,116 0,133
2005 0,095 0,215 0,081 0,171 0,171 0,148 0,160 0,156 0,095 0,115 0,132
2006 0,095 0,214 0,081 0,170 0,171 0,148 0,157 0,154 0,094 0,113 0,131
2007 0,095 0,213 0,081 0,169 0,170 0,147 0,154 0,150 0,094 0,111 0,130
2008 0,095 0,211 0,081 0,167 0,169 0,146 0,150 0,147 0,093 0,111 0,130
2009 0,094 0,209 0,081 0,164 0,166 0,144 0,146 0,144 0,092 0,110 0,130
2010 0,094 0,209 0,081 0,164 0,166 0,143 0,146 0,145 0,092 0,103 0,130
2011 0,094 0,208 0,081 0,164 0,166 0,143 0,146 0,147 0,091 0,098 0,129
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Table 14: 2 -Informal Economy Estimates, Rich Countries, 1950-1980
Year NOR SGP SWE AUS CAN FRA GBR ITA DEU JPN USA
1950 0,302 0,279 0,218 0,244 0,260 0,181 0,484 0,253 0,134
1951 0,300 0,277 0,216 0,240 0,259 0,182 0,484 0,259 0,132
1952 0,296 0,275 0,213 0,238 0,257 0,181 0,484 0,257 0,131
1953 0,290 0,272 0,214 0,237 0,256 0,182 0,484 0,258 0,130
1954 0,287 0,267 0,214 0,236 0,255 0,183 0,482 0,259 0,129
1955 0,286 0,265 0,213 0,236 0,254 0,183 0,480 0,259 0,130
1956 0,284 0,262 0,211 0,234 0,252 0,183 0,474 0,258 0,130
1957 0,281 0,260 0,210 0,231 0,249 0,182 0,469 0,257 0,128
1958 0,279 0,258 0,209 0,228 0,246 0,182 0,463 0,251 0,127
1959 0,276 0,254 0,207 0,226 0,242 0,181 0,459 0,248 0,127
1960 0,273 0,270 0,253 0,206 0,228 0,240 0,181 0,455 0,245 0,127
1961 0,268 0,266 0,249 0,203 0,225 0,235 0,180 0,447 0,239 0,125
1962 0,266 0,262 0,246 0,202 0,224 0,231 0,178 0,437 0,231 0,125
1963 0,263 0,255 0,242 0,201 0,223 0,228 0,176 0,427 0,223 0,124
1964 0,259 0,260 0,238 0,200 0,222 0,224 0,175 0,417 0,217 0,124
1965 0,255 0,256 0,235 0,198 0,221 0,219 0,173 0,409 0,210 0,123
1966 0,252 0,249 0,234 0,197 0,219 0,216 0,170 0,403 0,204 0,121
1967 0,248 0,242 0,230 0,195 0,215 0,211 0,167 0,400 0,198 0,119
1968 0,246 0,233 0,228 0,193 0,213 0,207 0,165 0,394 0,192 0,118
1969 0,243 0,225 0,225 0,191 0,211 0,204 0,163 0,389 0,185 0,118
1970 0,242 0,217 0,222 0,189 0,208 0,200 0,161 0,384 0,193 0,177 0,116
1971 0,238 0,211 0,221 0,187 0,207 0,196 0,158 0,372 0,191 0,169 0,115
1972 0,235 0,205 0,219 0,185 0,205 0,192 0,156 0,364 0,189 0,162 0,115
1973 0,232 0,200 0,217 0,184 0,205 0,189 0,156 0,359 0,187 0,157 0,114
1974 0,230 0,199 0,216 0,182 0,202 0,185 0,154 0,351 0,184 0,151 0,112
1975 0,227 0,197 0,215 0,180 0,199 0,181 0,152 0,342 0,182 0,146 0,111
1976 0,225 0,195 0,214 0,180 0,198 0,180 0,151 0,340 0,180 0,143 0,111
1977 0,223 0,192 0,214 0,178 0,195 0,178 0,150 0,334 0,179 0,141 0,111
1978 0,221 0,188 0,213 0,177 0,194 0,176 0,149 0,331 0,178 0,139 0,110
1979 0,219 0,186 0,211 0,176 0,193 0,174 0,149 0,329 0,177 0,136 0,109
1980 0,217 0,182 0,210 0,175 0,191 0,173 0,147 0,326 0,176 0,134 0,108
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Table 15: 2 -Informal Economy Estimates, Rich Countries, 1981-2011 (cont.)
year NOR SGP SWE AUS CAN FRA GBR ITA DEU JPN USA
1981 0,216 0,178 0,210 0,173 0,189 0,171 0,146 0,321 0,174 0,132 0,107
1982 0,216 0,175 0,209 0,170 0,185 0,169 0,145 0,317 0,173 0,130 0,105
1983 0,213 0,172 0,208 0,169 0,184 0,168 0,145 0,315 0,173 0,129 0,105
1984 0,210 0,168 0,206 0,168 0,184 0,167 0,145 0,313 0,172 0,128 0,105
1985 0,208 0,168 0,205 0,167 0,184 0,167 0,145 0,311 0,172 0,126 0,104
1986 0,207 0,167 0,204 0,166 0,183 0,166 0,144 0,309 0,171 0,125 0,103
1987 0,206 0,164 0,202 0,165 0,182 0,165 0,144 0,306 0,171 0,123 0,102
1988 0,206 0,161 0,201 0,164 0,180 0,165 0,144 0,304 0,170 0,122 0,102
1989 0,204 0,157 0,200 0,163 0,178 0,164 0,142 0,301 0,170 0,120 0,101
1990 0,202 0,155 0,200 0,161 0,175 0,162 0,141 0,299 0,168 0,118 0,100
1991 0,200 0,154 0,199 0,159 0,172 0,160 0,138 0,296 0,168 0,116 0,099
1992 0,198 0,152 0,198 0,158 0,170 0,159 0,137 0,292 0,165 0,114 0,099
1993 0,196 0,147 0,197 0,157 0,170 0,157 0,136 0,288 0,163 0,112 0,098
1994 0,194 0,144 0,195 0,157 0,170 0,157 0,136 0,286 0,162 0,111 0,098
1995 0,193 0,139 0,194 0,156 0,169 0,157 0,135 0,285 0,161 0,110 0,097
1996 0,190 0,140 0,193 0,154 0,168 0,156 0,134 0,284 0,159 0,109 0,096
1997 0,189 0,138 0,191 0,153 0,168 0,155 0,134 0,282 0,158 0,108 0,095
1998 0,188 0,139 0,190 0,151 0,166 0,155 0,133 0,281 0,158 0,107 0,094
1999 0,187 0,136 0,188 0,149 0,165 0,155 0,132 0,279 0,157 0,106 0,093
2000 0,185 0,132 0,187 0,148 0,164 0,155 0,130 0,278 0,156 0,105 0,091
2001 0,184 0,134 0,187 0,147 0,162 0,153 0,129 0,277 0,155 0,104 0,090
2002 0,183 0,132 0,186 0,145 0,161 0,152 0,128 0,275 0,154 0,104 0,088
2003 0,182 0,129 0,184 0,144 0,160 0,151 0,127 0,273 0,153 0,103 0,087
2004 0,181 0,126 0,182 0,142 0,159 0,150 0,125 0,271 0,153 0,103 0,087
2005 0,180 0,124 0,181 0,140 0,157 0,149 0,124 0,270 0,153 0,103 0,086
2006 0,180 0,124 0,180 0,139 0,155 0,148 0,123 0,269 0,153 0,103 0,085
2007 0,180 0,122 0,179 0,137 0,153 0,147 0,122 0,268 0,153 0,103 0,084
2008 0,181 0,124 0,180 0,135 0,151 0,145 0,120 0,266 0,152 0,103 0,083
2009 0,182 0,125 0,182 0,133 0,148 0,143 0,119 0,263 0,151 0,102 0,082
2010 0,182 0,121 0,179 0,132 0,147 0,143 0,118 0,263 0,152 0,102 0,082
2011 0,181 0,120 0,178 0,130 0,146 0,143 0,118 0,263 0,152 0,102 0,082
157
